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The industrialised countries remained in recovery mode in 2015, while growth in emerging markets slowed down 
markedly, with Latin-America and Russia even slipping into recession. Favourable business cycle conditions in 
the United States and Britain, together with moderate growth in the euro area, had a stabilising influence on the 
world economy. Fluctuations in the price of oil and other commodities led to very heterogeneous developments 
in emerging economies, with India’s growth rate exceeding that of China in 2015. Demographic trends and 
China’s growing reliance on domestic demand are expected to lead to further long-term declines in its structural 
growth rate, which should nevertheless remain stable in 2016.
Chapter 2   Intergeneratioal Fairness   ??
The idea of a contract between generations forms the bedrock of an equitable social order, stability and sustain-
ability. In many countries the public sector is now expected to replace the family by funding education and pen-
sions, but social welfare models are facing major challenges. This chapter looks at how to preserve intergenera-
tional fairness by tackling issues like demographic ageing, rising healthcare costs, blocked housing, labour market 
flexibility and emigration.
Chapter 3   Tuning Secondary Eucation   ??
Education is one of the most controversial issues in Europe. Reforms can have major short-term budgetary ef-
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with a special focus on the secondary education level. It interprets current reform tensions and asks whether and 
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What measures are required to promote the creation of a vibrant regional economy in the Western Balkans? How 
can the region become a development pole, instead of a potential source of instability? This chapter outlines key 
aspects of the Western Balkans’ economic transformation in the 15 years since the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia and explores reform options for building a brighter future.
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Chapter 2   Intergenerational Fairness
• European countries are developing into gerontocratic societies focused more on paying out past savings than 
investing in the future. These trends need to be reversed or they may hamper future growth potential and lower 
social cohesion, not least by alienating young people.
• The northern European model of greater labour market flexibility with income protection for job losers (a 
safety network) reduced the potential exclusion of younger people from the social contract.
• Incentives should be provided to reduce the blocking of housing by the elderly, including reverse mortgages 
and higher rates of property taxes (often political taboo, especially in southern Europe). 
• Retirement ages should be raised to make the pension system more sustainable. Setting Europe-wide norms 
would be the easiest way to achieve this, but is prone to political pushback.
• High labour mobility in an economic area enables individuals to leave nations with high debt levels. One way 
to avoid such migration may be to switch to a contributions-based insurance pension system on a cross-nation-
al basis.
Chapter 3   Tuning Secondary Education
• Education should cater for individual students’ capacity and aspirations. European countries should create 
dual educational tracks that also offer practical education, in cooperation with private industry. 
• The content of vocational education programmes should reflect labour demand characteristics, and be adapt-
ed to structural changes.
• Governments should continue to pursue the social and economic benefits of comprehensive education, and 
prevent family background from being the main determinant of track choice or of segregated schooling.
• Administration of public schools should ensure that teachers exert suitable effort, especially with underprivi-
leged children. Standardised tests can be helpful to this end, as can family choices across public and private 
publicly-funded schools subject to quality controls.
• EU attempts to monitor and coordinate education policy should be adjusted to reflect the policy guidelines 
above, and deserve more attention from national policymakers and the public. 
Chapter 4   Denmark: Too Good to Be True? 
• The take-away lesson for other countries does not lie in the specific policies adopted by Denmark, but rather 
that a medium-term focus on economic policy and a string of reforms can work, and create scope for policy 
choices. 
• Make reforms work. A large number of reforms, including forward-looking reforms to address Denmark’s 
ageing population, have been launched. However, implementation is crucial and progress in harvesting their 
projected effects should be closely monitored.
• A high level of labour market-relevant qualifications and their relatively equal distribution are crucial for 
maintaining a high employment and income level, as well as a relatively equal distribution of income. 
• Public finances will be strained in the future, calling for better reallocation of resources or improvements in the 
public sector’s efficiency and productivity. 
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Chapter 5   Western Balkans: Coming Together
• The Western Balkan consumption-based growth model has reached its limits. Sustainable growth calls for re-
industrialisation and a focus on producing higher value-added tradeable goods and services.
• Cooperation between the region’s countries needs to be expanded beyond the free flow of goods and services 
to include the free movement of capital, people and ideas. 
• Regional physical, institutional, financial and educational infrastructure needs to be dramatically improved 
and brought up to European standards. The public sector needs to be streamlined. Banks should clean up their 
balance sheets in order to resume lending to the productive sectors of the economy. 
• To overcome the lack of competitiveness resulting from previous inflation, some countries may need to deval-
ue, but scope for such a measure is limited, partly due to the high level of euroisation of both deposits and 
loans.
• Education reform is one of the key preconditions for the region’s long-term viability. Students need to stop 
memorising facts and start learning how to creatively solve problems. A regional market for higher education 
should be established to support the creation of a regional labour market. 
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2015 has created many uncertainties for Europe. The 
unprecedented and unexpected inflow of refugees, asy-
lum seekers and migrants from the war in Syria and 
surrounding areas, the Middle East and North Africa 
to Europe have led to unresolved arguments about how 
these people and their related costs are to be distribut-
ed among EU member states. No longer-term solution 
to this issue has been found to date. Border controls 
reintroduced in the Schengen area threaten the prac-
tice, if  not the principle, of freedom of movement. The 
terrorist attacks in Paris in No vember 2015, the scares 
in Brussels, and the mob sex attacks on New Year’s Eve 
in German cities, linked to organised groups, raise con-
cerns about security, the eventual integration or other-
wise of immigrants, and the evolution of European so-
cieties. The substantial inflow of people will inter alia 
change demographic structures, the balance of skills in 
the labour force, and will also affect public finances. 
The United Kingdom’s planned referendum on EU 
membership, the possibility of a ‘Brexit”, is creating 
uncertainty for the United Kingdom and, to some de-
gree, for the whole EU. 
Meanwhile, a slow and fragile economic recovery con-
tinued in the developed world, including much of the 
EU. Emerging markets, constrained by China, bol-
stered by a resilient India, slowed down. Oil prices col-
lapsed, and inflation remained low. The United States 
is taking cautious steps towards normalising its mon-
etary policies by making modest increases in its inter-
est rates. But although the Federal Reserve is moving 
towards exiting Quantitative Easing, the Bank of 
Japan and the European Central Bank are continuing 
to pursue their policies of large-scale asset purchases. 
In the coming years, the equilibrium real interest rate 
(the interest rate net of inflation needed to keep the 
global economy growing near to its potential) is likely 
to be very low, and perhaps even negative. With infla-
tion hovering around zero, the central banks will have 
little room for manoeuvre should growth falter. In 
many developed economies, fiscal policy will not be 
able to sustain demand were another downturn to 
come along.
Against the backdrop of this febrile conjuncture, the 
macroeconomic outlook of which is detailed in 
Chapter 1, the EEAG Report 2016 provides a detailed 
examination of two long-standing issues that will have 
a strong bearing on Europe’s medium-term develop-
ment. As European societies age, the political weight 
of the old grows, threatening intergenerational fair-
ness, which is explored in Chapter 2. Developments in 
secondary education, the subject of Chapter 3, have 
been triggered by budget pressures and the changing 
environment in which young people of widely varying 
aptitudes have to be equipped for adult life and work. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the apparent success of Den-
mark, whose flexible labour markets, inclusive welfare 
state, flourishing economy and harmonious society in-
vite admiration and imitation. Chapter 5 reviews de-
velopments in the Western Balkans, the countries that 
formerly made up Yugoslavia, which were wracked by 
war and ethnic conflict in the 1990s, but are now re-
covering economically and socially, boast strong links 
with the EU and harbour aspirations to join it. 
Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Conditions and Outlook
Whereas the industrialised countries remained in re-
covery mode last year, economic development in the 
emerging markets slowed down markedly. Latin 
America and Russia actually went into recession, al-
beit for different reasons. Whereas in previous years 
the emerging markets were the main drivers behind 
world economic development, and thereby the slow 
recovery of the industrialised world, these roles were 
reversed last year. Good business cycle conditions in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, together 
with recovery towards moderate growth in the euro 
area, had a stabilising influence on the world economy 
in 2015. This development is in essence expected to 
continue, allowing countries like the United States 
and the United Kingdom to slowly change their mon-
etary policy stance and make it less accommodating. 
The recessions in Latin America and Russia will lose 
their strength and the smaller East Asian economies 
will be able to return to somewhat higher growth. All 
in all, this will allow the world economy to remain in 
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the moderate recovery mode that has been witnessed 
since 2011.
Dependence on oil and other raw material prices has 
led to very heterogeneous developments within the 
emerging world: India’s growth rate now exceeds that 
of China. Demographic developments and the slow 
transformation of the Chinese economy into one less 
reliant on world demand and increasingly on domestic 
developments have and will continue to cause struc-
tural growth to slowly fall. Nevertheless for the cur-
rent year, low and, in recent months, further declining 
oil and commodity prices, the announced infrastruc-
ture investment plans and measures to stabilise de-
mand for housing, together with more expansionary 
monetary policy, will allow the Chinese economy to 
continue to grow at its current pace.
For oil-exporting countries, such as Brazil, Russia and 
many in the Middle East, the dramatic decline in oil 
prices over the last couple of years means a loss of na-
tional income and places a heavy burden on their 
economies. On the other hand, for oil-importing coun-
tries, these dynamics provide a welcome stimulus to 
domestic demand. Exerting downward pressure on in-
flation rates, they allow monetary policy in most of 
the industrialised world to remain expansionary for 
longer than otherwise would have been the case.
The current recovery in Europe has largely been driv-
en by an improvement in consumer demand. This has 
been boosted by steadily improved consumer confi-
dence and an inflation rate that has been even lower 
than expected. Business, however, remains reluctant to 
invest. Despite the ECB’s ultra-expansionary mone-
tary policy stance, the demand for corporate credit 
merely stabilised at a low level in 2015. 
ECB monetary policy currently seems to work most 
strongly through exchange rates. The euro depreciated 
last year, increasing the competitiveness of all its 
member countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world. As a 
result, all of the larger economies and several of the 
smaller ones already gained market shares last year. 
Countries like France and Italy, which have been suf-
fering for years from similar structural problems and 
have substantially lost price competitiveness since the 
introduction of the euro, are now being helped by its 
low value. The danger is that this may slow down 
structural reforms of labour and product markets, and 
thereby backfire as soon as the euro strengthens. Low 
interest rates, a result of low inflation and expansion-
ary monetary policy, further reduce the pressure for 
fiscal consolidation. Although this supports the busi-
ness cycle, it creates a significant risk of instability. 
Public debt is still high. There would be little room for 
manoeuvre should conditions deteriorate. 
Progress in the crisis-afflicted countries of the euro 
area towards improving international competitive-
ness, achieved by reducing relative price levels, will 
continue to be made. Not only Ireland, but also Spain 
and Cyprus, will exceed the euro area average growth 
rate this year, while maintaining below average infla-
tion. These countries are therefore on the path to re-
covery. The political turmoil during the first half  of 
2015, by contrast, sent Greece back into recession.
Chapter 2
Intergenerational Fairness
The idea of a contract between generations is the basis 
of an equitable social order, stability and sustainabili-
ty. In many countries the public sector is now expected 
to replace the family by funding education and pen-
sions, but social welfare models are facing major chal-
lenges. This chapter is concerned with the interaction 
of generations, the way that generational clashes are 
translated through the political system, and the long-
term consequences for the sustainability of the econo-
my and society. 
Modern Europe is ageing rapidly. The changing de-
mographic pyramid might give politicians incentives 
to cater for the demands of the elderly, since they are 
becoming numerically ever more dominant, and to 
overlook the concerns of young people. Gerontocratic 
politics focuses more on the paying-out of past saving 
than in investment for the future. The policy results in 
burdens on the younger generations.
Labour regulations offer security of employment that 
benefit fundamentally older workers, and establish 
disincentives for employers to hire younger people 
(the dual labour market, that particularly characteris-
es Mediterranean Europe). Young people have re-
ceived expensive training (perhaps not enough of it), 
but they are in no position to repay into the social con-
tract. Relatively high rates of youth and younger gen-
eration unemployment have been a phenomenon of 
crisis economics, but the phenomenon of high exclu-
sion rates in some parts of Europe preceded the crisis. 
The emigration of the young and talented makes the 
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demographic pyramid even more lop-sided, and raises 
the question of how social security systems will be fi-
nanced in the future.
Housing resources are inefficiently allocated, with 
dwellings that are too big for the old and unavailable 
to the young. Older people have real estate, and young-
er purchasers (especially in urban centres) are deterred 
by rising prices (and cannot get onto the lower rungs 
of the “property ladder”). The younger employed or 
unemployed are especially disadvantaged. 
Pension schemes, mostly originally designed as Pay As 
You Go systems, are increasingly precarious. The 
funding of the pension entitlements of younger peo-
ple is threatened, as demographic projections predict 
that there will be fewer new earners paying in (“as you 
go”). In addition, pensions have increased because of 
provisions that often both index and guarantee a cer-
tain increase, even when there is a low cost of living 
increase. There are strong cases for raising retirement 
ages, but even stronger political pressures to resist 
such reforms.
In socialised medical insurance systems, increasingly 
expensive care for older people, in the last years of 
their life, dominates the cost structure. The health care 
explosion will disproportionately affect the most pros-
perous European countries, and they are also likely to 
face the prospect of exit, especially by skilled younger 
people.
When productive and innovative (young) people aban-
don their country, they leave behind a highly indebted 
country. Now the debt has to be paid off  by a smaller, 
less productive, ageing population. In a sense, individ-
ual citizens have an option to “walk away” from their 
government debt obligation by leaving the country. 
Emigration can be seen as an individual’s “private de-
fault option” on government debt. Government debt, 
often incurred in order to maintain the advantages of 
the elderly, is becoming unsustainable.
Finally, environmental damage threatens the future of 
the young, as present day output is obtained cheaply 
at the cost of future generations who will have to bear 
the burden of the clean-up costs.
Europe is confronting a radical choice on where the 
responsibility lies for enforcing an effective and fair 
social contract. In a world of high mobility the old 
model of competing national examples is threatened 
by the possibility of exit from policy failures. There is 
a need to Europeanise some part of the intergenera-
tional contract and, at the same time, protect it from 
political interference – an interference that is charac-
teristic not just of states with poor performance and 
failed policies, but also of apparently successful eco-
nomic models. 
Chapter 3 
Tuning Secondary Education
The question of how best to organise secondary edu-
cation is fraught in every country. Nations are contin-
uously comparing the performance of their own edu-
cational systems with others, seeking improvements. 
Education is expected to achieve many economic and 
social objectives, often mutually incompatible. 
Govern ments tinker with it obsessively. There have 
been substantial school reforms in recent years in 
Italy, France, Finland, and the United Kingdom, to 
take just four examples. These reforms have variously 
addressed issues of the degree to which the curriculum 
has a practical orientation, the autonomy of schools, 
the relationship between publicly and privately funded 
schools, and the management of teachers. In all cases 
reform has been deeply controversial.
Secondary education is almost entirely publicly fund-
ed because it is recognised as producing public bene-
fits, accruing to society as a whole, not only to the re-
cipients of the education: it is largely a public good. It 
produces general skills that employers are unwilling to 
provide, rather than job- or firm-specific skills, which 
are primarily of value to a specific employer and 
which that employer is normally willing to provide. 
The students themselves, or their parents, are not 
called upon to finance their education because future 
earning power is poor collateral for a loan, so relying 
on parental resources disadvantages children of poor 
parents. In addition to the problems caused by limited 
financial markets, education also suffers from the 
problems created by imperfect information: the cus-
tomers of the educational industry, the students, and 
even their parents, cannot judge the quality of the 
product they are receiving, justifying public regulation 
and certification, if  not provision. Furthermore, edu-
cation is a group activity. Children cannot be educated 
separately and individually: it would cost too much, 
and in any case the social element is important per se. 
Thus the curriculum and organisation of schools are a 
matter of common concern, unsuited to provision in a 
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private market. While comprehensive education domi-
nates in practice, there is a heated debate about the 
merits of providing different streams or tracks through 
the system for students of different aptitudes, and the 
merits of providing both academic and more practical 
or vocational paths. In many countries the vocational 
path has languished with low prestige and often poor 
resources and structures, while the academic path has 
enjoyed excessive prestige and resources.
School systems differ widely across Europe, but there 
is slow convergence in some respects: for example, the 
average number of years of schooling across countries 
is becoming more similar. Family background has a 
major influence on achievement. Different systems at-
tempt to offset it in different ways. The tracking or 
streaming of students is done differently. Some coun-
tries, like Germany, Switzerland and Austria, provide 
a better vocational route than others, such as the 
United Kingdom. The role and scale of the private 
sector in education differ across countries. 
Evidence suggests that schools perform better when 
they are externally evaluated, but given sufficient au-
tonomy. Competition from private schools may also 
enhance performance. Giving schools more resources 
moderately improves students’ achievement, although 
it matters less than socio-economic background. 
While higher teachers’ salaries raise students’ achieve-
ment, their motivation and the respect they enjoy mat-
ter more. 
Pressure for reform was partly generated by the fiscal 
pressures on EU member states after the financial cri-
sis. The widespread growth of university education 
throughout Europe, and the resilience of the German 
system of dual tracks, both academic and vocational, 
with a strong link to apprenticeships, has prompted a 
rethink of secondary education. 
Educational systems are the preserve of national, re-
gional and local governments. The EU has only a mi-
nor role to play. Nevertheless it may be useful to ask 
what, if  anything, might usefully be done at the EU 
level. The EU has long-established programmes for 
fostering exchanges between member states’ educa-
tional systems. They monitor and document the evo-
lution of school systems, and provide data for interna-
tional comparisons that are highly valuable. A very 
useful addition to the current system might be stand-
ardised examination results. There are sound argu-
ments for further coordination of educational systems 
across the EU, particularly as and when a Union-wide 
labour market develops. But any such coordination 
and harmonisation are a very long way off. 
Chapter 4
Denmark: Too Good to Be True?
Denmark boasts both high income levels and relative-
ly equal income distribution. These facts stand out by 
international comparisons and have attracted a great 
deal of attention, not least because Denmark has a 
very large public sector, and thus a high tax burden, it 
is a small and open economy, and has successfully 
pursued a fixed exchange rate policy.
The Danish experience may thus seem paradoxical to 
some, and an exceptional recipe for circumventing 
common policy dilemmas to others. The Danish econ-
omy’s relatively favourable performance is not the re-
sult of a quick fix, but rather the outcome of a long 
string of reforms addressing structural problems; and 
very explicitly taking into account the constraints 
faced by a small, open economy. The latter is immedi-
ately clear from Denmark’s fixed exchange rate policy, 
and the need to ensure its credibility. This policy has 
passed the market test since the interest spread vis-à-
vis the euro area has been very small for years, and 
even occasionally negative. 
The Danish case shows that policy choices are possi-
ble, even in an era of globalisation. The public sector 
plays a larger role than in most other countries. The 
interesting lesson is how the welfare state has been de-
signed to balance concerns for economic performance 
on the one hand, and for the public provision of wel-
fare services and the pursuit of egalitarian outcomes 
on the other. Two points are particularly important. 
Firstly, while the public sector is large, the private sec-
tor is very liberal in Denmark. The Danish model is 
thus not “politics against markets”. Second ly, Den-
mark’s welfare arrangements have a strong active fo-
cus on supporting labour market participation and 
human capital acquisition. Since the financial viability 
of the welfare model ultimately depends on maintain-
ing a high employment level in the private sector, the 
conflict between welfare state objectives and economic 
performance is not as stark at it may appear at first.
The specific policies pursued by Denmark do not 
make its economy immune to crisis, neither of  do-
mestic nor of  foreign origin, as seen during the recent 
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financial crisis. What stands out, however, is that 
Denmark’s labour market has maintained its high 
degree of  flexibility, and although many individuals 
are affected by unemployment, unemployment spells 
are short. Thanks to the high level of  turnover in the 
labour market, youth and long-term unemployment 
are low by international comparison. High turnover 
rates thus effectively function as an implicit work 
sharing mechanism. Equal burden sharing is impor-
tant from a distributional perspective, but it is also of 
structural importance. The alternative would be 
longer unemployment spells concentrated on a small-
er group of  individuals, more long-term unemploy-
ment and a corresponding depreciation of  human 
and social capital. In short, high turnover rates re-
duce the negative structural implications of  high 
unemployment. 
Looking to the future, a sequence of reforms is being 
implemented to ensure the financial viability of 
Denmark’s welfare model. The main focus of these re-
forms is to strengthen labour supply and private sector 
employment. A key feature of the reforms is gradual 
increases in statutory retirement ages, and their even-
tual indexation to developments in longevity. These 
reforms ensure that the conditions for fiscal sustaina-
bility are satisfied.
 
Another strategy to combat the labour markets of de-
mographic ageing, namely migration, is a particularly 
thorny issue for a country with extensive welfare ar-
rangements. Even if  welfare arrangements are not 
magnets attracting migrants, the financial viability of 
the welfare model rests on a high employment level. 
Egalitarian objectives imply high entry requirements 
in the form of qualifications to find jobs (to qualify for 
high minimum wages), as well as generous social 
transfers. This creates a very close relationship be-
tween the employment rate and how public finances 
are affected by immigration. Denmark thus faces a 
difficult trilemma of having to choose between ex-
tremely tough immigration rules (constrained by in-
ternational treaties and EU rules), lowering minimum 
wages or differentiating between social rights. All 
three avenues challenge the basic objectives of the wel-
fare state. To date Denmark has largely pursued the 
first and third avenues, but how far is it possible to 
proceed in these directions?
While challenges remain, the political focus on medi-
um- and long-run issues is notable. If  anything in 
these developments stands out, it is in the political 
economy of establishing consensus across a broad po-
litical spectrum, leading to support for reforms, as 
well as continuity and consistency in policies. This 
consensus has been achieved, despite the fact that 
most governments have been minority governments 
(and usually coalitions among several parties), and de-
spite frequent shifts in government.
Chapter 5
Western Balkans: Coming Together
The chapter on the Western Balkans (WB) outlines 
some of the important features of the economic trans-
formation of the region in the past 15 years. The re-
gion’s countries have come a long way from establish-
ing a fragile peace towards increasing cooperation. 
Their economies are undergoing a transition towards 
the market system and several important improve-
ments in that area have been made. The financial sys-
tem was restructured with the forceful entrance of 
reputable European banking groups. Inflation, a long 
standing problem, has been eventually brought under 
control. With a significant help from the EU, the phys-
ical and institutional infrastructure of the region is be-
ing rebuilt. Nevertheless, there are still many impor-
tant challenges ahead. We discuss the achievements, as 
well as some pitfalls and challenges facing the WB. In 
doing so, we draw lessons from the countries of the 
Baltics and central and south eastern European re-
gions, which have been undergoing similar processes 
for a decade longer. Finally, we propose possible paths 
towards the sustainable development of the region. 
The WB region grew strongly in the period 2001–2008, 
fuelled by an influx of foreign investments and growth 
in consumption, primarily of imported goods and ser-
vices. Such growth proved unsustainable, as it led to 
unsustainable current account deficits and to a virtual 
destruction of the tradeable sector of the WB’s econo-
my. In the post-2008 period, with the exception of 
Albania, which was able to sustain modest growth lev-
els throughout the crisis, most other countries of the 
region are either struggling to exit recession or are 
growing very slowly. Unemployment, already a large 
problem even in the boom period, is even higher in the 
post-crisis period. Banks operating in the region (typi-
cally, subsidiaries of the large European banking 
groups) are experiencing high levels of non-perform-
ing loans and are reluctant to lend. The situation is 
made even more challenging by unusually high levels 
of euroisation of both deposits and loans, reducing 
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the scope for standard monetary policy measures. 
People react to prolonged economic woes by renewed 
emigration from the region at both the low and the 
high end of skill and experience spectrum. 
Clearly, significant changes in the economic model are 
needed in order to return to healthy growth and, in-
creasingly, countries of the region are recognising 
that. It is essential that economies re-orient themselves 
towards creating increasingly higher value-added 
tradeable goods and services utilising the creative po-
tential of the people more fully. The physical, institu-
tional, educational, and financial infrastructure would 
need to be further improved to achieve that. Just as 
importantly, the level of cooperation between coun-
tries needs to go beyond free trade and investments to 
include free movement of people and ideas across the 
regional borders. The creation of a regional labour 
market would make the region potentially much more 
attractive to foreign investment. Regional institutions 
of higher learning could play an important role and 
benefit significantly from the creation of the regional 
labour market, which would, in turn, enhance the re-
gion’s prospects of eventual integration with the EU.
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MacroeconoMic conditions 
and outlook
1.1 Introduction
After ending the year 2014 quite positively, the global 
economy actually weakened substantially during the 
first half  of 2015. This was largely due to weak devel-
opments in emerging markets. 
The economies of Brazil and 
Russia suffered from an economic 
slowdown due to low oil prices 
and, in the case of Russia, inter-
national sanctions among other 
factors. Although economic 
growth in China has been contin-
uously slowing for several years 
now, its weak development dur-
ing the first half  of 2015 in par-
ticular took the markets by 
surprise. 
Although the US economy can-
not decouple itself  from the glob-
al economy, it depends more 
heavily on its own domestic de-
mand than on foreign demand. 
By far the most important do-
mestic demand component, pri-
vate consumption, developed less 
dynamically over the summer 
half  of the year. The recovery in 
the United States nevertheless 
continued in 2015, with growth 
rates hovering around or slightly 
above their potential. This al-
lowed the US Federal Reserve to 
start increasing interest rates at 
the end of the year. The euro area 
also continued to recover in 2015 
and this process is expected to 
continue in 2016, allowing its 
economy to grow gradually. 
1.2 The current situation
1.2.1 The global economy
World trade declined during the first half  of 2015 (see 
Figure 1.1). This was especially the case of trade with 
and within emerging economies. Although world 
trade and industrial production did pick up somewhat 
during the second half  of 2015, they did not manage 
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to exceed the moderate pace of expansion witnessed 
since 2011. During summer they recovered mainly due 
to the mitigation of negative trends in major com-
modity-exporting emerging markets, which had been 
suffering from the sharp decline in prices for crude oil 
and industrial and agricultural commodities since 
mid-2014. This short-lived recovery, however, only led 
to a modest acceleration in global economic expan-
sion. The pace of economic growth in China and oth-
er major commodity-importing emerging economies 
was not affected markedly, i.e. it remained virtually 
unchanged and relatively moderate by historical 
standards. In addition, the increase in economic out-
put in the United States slowed somewhat compared 
to early summer thanks to a slowdown in non-residen-
tial construction and inventory investments.
Despite the temporary slowdown during the first 
half  of  2015, almost all advanced economies bene-
fitted from developments in the commodity markets. 
The price of  a barrel of  Brent crude oil dropped by 
over 50  percent in the second half  of  2014 from a 
level of  almost 110 US dollars. After recovering 
slightly during the first quarter of  2015 to a little 
over 60 US dollars, it fell again by over 25 percent 
between May and August, reaching a trough of 
around 45 US dollars. Although the Brent price re-
mained more or less steady at between 45 and 55 
dollars during the autumn, the price of  a barrel 
started falling again at the end of  2015, plunging to 
just over 35 US dollars at the start of  2016. Although 
not to the same degree as oil, the prices of  other ag-
ricultural and industrial raw materials have also 
dipped noticeably since mid-2014. Whereas demand-
side aspects can explain the fall in many of  these ag-
ricultural and industrial raw material prices, in the 
case of  oil the expansion of  production in the United 
States (fracking) between 2012 and mid-2015 and in 
some Middle Eastern countries is also a driving 
force behind this development. Falling oil prices 
were reflected in a steady decline in inflation figures 
throughout 2015 (see Figure 1.2).
Economic developments among individual industrial 
countries have nevertheless remained very heterogene-
ous. The United States and the United Kingdom are 
currently experiencing an upswing. In both countries, 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is already well 
above pre-crisis levels and production capacity is 
largely utilised. Among other things, this is indicated 
by unemployment rates which are already as low as in 
the boom year of 2007 in both economies. Although 
the competitiveness of both countries will be impact-
ed by the strong appreciation of their currencies that 
began in summer 2014, their domestic economies, 
however, are strongly supported by the increasing im-
provement in the labour market, the financial situa-
tion of households and low energy prices. 
The pace of economic expansion in the euro area and 
Japan, by contrast, is still considerably lower. Although 
the currencies of both economies have depreciated 
over the past year and a half, not least due to expan-
sionary monetary policies, their improved internation-
al competitiveness has not yet translated into a clear 
upturn in growth rates. In the euro area in particular, 
production capacity is still under-utilised. Furthermore, 
both economies are still suffering from a large number 
of unresolved structural problems, leading to only a 
moderate long-term trend growth path. 
In China and many East Asian 
emerging economies, domestic de-
mand was also supported by the 
favourable development in oil 
prices in summer 2015. However, 
this was offset by a number of fac-
tors, which dampened growth in 
emerging economies. In China 
growth is slowing down gradually, 
reflecting a structural trend that 
has been going on for several 
years. Whereas the service sector is 
becoming increasingly important, 
growth rates, especially in com-
modity-intensive sectors like in-
dustry and construction, are fall-
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ing noticeably. Since mid-2014, this demand-side effect, 
together with supply-side factors, has led to a decline in 
the prices of oil and other industrial and agricultural 
commodities, thereby contributing decisively to a sharp 
deterioration of the economic situation in Russia, 
Brazil, Indo nesia and other emerging economies. As 
these countries depend on commodity exports, the 
price decline has led to painful losses in national in-
come and has limited scope for expenditure by house-
holds and enterprises. In addition, the attractiveness of 
commodity-exporting countries as investment targets 
also diminished for international investors. Accordingly, 
many currencies such as those of Brazil, Russia and 
Indonesia, decreased in value over the past year. This 
accelerated inflation in these economies, prompting lo-
cal central banks to tighten monetary policy considera-
bly in some cases. Finally, fiscal policy in Brazil has also 
taken a noticeably more restrictive course, while Russia 
felt the effects of the economic sanctions imposed on 
the country in the wake of the political conflict with 
Ukraine. Accordingly, GDP shrank strongly in Russia 
and Brazil during the first half of 2015, before the re-
cession slowed in the second half of the same year.
Strong turbulence in the Chinese stock market caused 
quite a stir last summer. The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite – the most closely watched stock index of 
that country – lost about a third of its value between 
June and late August, before stabilising at a level that 
is still around 60 percent higher than on average dur-
ing 2014. There are many indications that these fluc-
tuations represent a desirable partial correction of 
previous, fundamentally unjustified exaggerations, 
which should leave no appreciable traces in the real 
economy. The exceptionally strong rise in share prices 
from July 2014 to June 2015 con-
trasted sharply to macroeconom-
ic developments – the expansion 
pace of the Chinese economy has 
decreased trend-wise in recent 
years. However, the sub-text of 
“fundamentally unjustified exag-
gerations” may only be part of 
the story. An important long-
term aspect is that the Chinese 
stock market itself  is heavily sub-
ject to structural change, which 
may result in higher stock values 
despite ever weakening funda-
mentals. The stock market in 
China is nevertheless still far less 
important to the wealth position 
of households, or as a financing tool for companies, 
than in the United States, for example. 
Nevertheless, turmoil in the Chinese stock markets did 
have a direct negative impact on international financial 
markets. Uncertainty among capital market partici-
pants increased and led to a restructuring of emerging 
market portfolios that have particularly strong trade 
links with China. This hit at a time when many emerg-
ing countries were already suffering from the fall in 
commodity export prices. Although most stock indices 
appeared to be back on the road to recovery by the end 
of October 2015 and capital flight from China and oth-
er emerging markets appeared under control by that 
point, market participants lost confidence again this 
January, resulting in further losses. 
This was helped by economic developments in China, 
which fared significantly better than expected by many 
market participants. Also the repeated deferment of 
the first policy rate increase in years in the United 
States did promote the attractiveness of many emerg-
ing economies as an investment target somewhat dur-
ing this time. Finally, the Chinese government inter-
vened with a series of measures that aimed to stabilise 
share prices and reduce the outflow of capital. For in-
stance, strict trade restrictions for financial market 
participants were imposed, and the People’s Bank of 
China sold foreign exchange reserves. However, it 
seems doubtful whether the sometimes hasty interven-
tion by the government and the central bank was actu-
ally required. At best, it contributed to effectively 
thwart a desirable market correction at the prize of 
having weakened the credibility of the Chinese leader-
ship to gradually liberalise the financial sector.
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All in all, whereas sentiment in Asia and Latin 
America decreased markedly during the last one and a 
half  years, Western Europe and North America essen-
tially remained on a recovery path, painting a diverg-
ing picture of the global economy (see Figure 1.3). 
World trade and world GDP are expected to have in-
creased by 2.6 and 2.5 percent respectively last year 
(see Table 1.A.1). 
1.2.2 United States
After a weak start to the year, the US economy re-
turned to its more or less potential growth rate (see 
Figure 1.4). This confirms that the weakness seen in 
the first quarter of 2015 was mainly due to temporary 
factors, such as the harsh winter and the dockworker 
strikes. Logically, the second quarter was character-
ised by catch-up effects. During the second half  of 
2015, GDP increased by an annualised rate of about 
2.5 percent compared to the first half  of the year. 
Throughout the year, the largest growth contributions 
came from consumer spending, and, to a lesser extent, 
from investment in equipment, highlighting that the 
engine for growth was found in domestic demand.
Favourable labour market conditions did not lead to 
an acceleration in wage growth last year. Hourly earn-
ings before taxes in the private sector have increased 
by around 2 percent since the end of 2010. Never-
theless, the real disposable income of households has 
risen significantly in the face of low inflation and new-
ly created jobs since the beginning of 2014. In October 
2015 it was 3.9 percent higher than the previous year. 
Household assets also benefitted from rising real es-
tate and stock prices. All in all, and despite a weaker 
first quarter, this created an environment in which pri-
vate consumption was able to grow at around 3 per-
cent during the year (see Figure 1.5). Although private 
fixed investment did grow faster than private con-
sumption, it nevertheless remained well behind the 
growth levels witnessed the years before. Overall, 
strong domestic demand and the appreciation of the 
US dollar has, via a strong rise in imports, led foreign 
trade to contribute negatively to GDP growth. Real 
GDP increased by 2.5 percent in 2015.
The labour market continued to develop positively. 
The unemployment rate fell from 5.7 percent at the 
beginning of  the year to 5.0 percent in December, re-
sulting in an average unemployment rate of  5.3 per-
cent for 2015 (see Figure 1.6). During the year on 
average well-above 200,000 new jobs were created 
per month. Although this was less than in 2014, it 
clearly surpassed figures for the period from 2010 to 
2013. At the same time, the share of  part-time work 
declined and the drop in the labour force participa-
tion rate during recent years appears to have ground 
to a halt. 
The sharp decline in oil prices and the strengthening 
of the US dollar even caused inflation rates to turn 
negative during the first trimester of the year. Despite 
very loose monetary policy, inflation just managed to 
hover above zero during the rest of the year, resulting 
in an average inflation rate of 0.1 percent for 2015 (see 
Figure 1.7). Taking food- and energy-related items out 
of the basket paints a different picture: the resulting 
core inflation rate steadily increased from 1.6 percent 
at the beginning of 2015 to 2.1 percent at its end.
1.2.3 Asia
In China, the pace of  expansion 
accelerated slightly during 2015, 
after a relatively weak first quar-
ter. Real GDP grew in the second 
and third quarters of  2015 com-
pared to the previous quarter by 
an annualised 7.4 percent. This 
was significantly higher than ex-
pected by many market partici-
pants, especially given the slow-
down in the potential growth 
rate seen in China’s economy for 
several years and since growth 
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was only 5.3 percent in the first quarter of  2015. A 
key driver behind the robust expansion in the sum-
mer half  of  the year was the increase in private con-
sumption, which benefitted from an increase in real 
disposable income and favourable earnings pros-
pects. Last but not least, impetus was provided by fis-
cal policy via expanding the railway network, im-
proving the water supply and public housing. Overall, 
real GDP did rise by 6.9 percent last year.
Strong turbulence in the Chinese stock markets in the 
summer of 2015 attracted a great deal of attention. 
After the speculative boom lasting from July 2014 to 
June 2015, during which the stock indices in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen rose by over 150 
percent, they have lost over a 
third of their value since mid-
June 2015. The losses have in-
creased uncertainty among inter-
national financial investors and 
led to an outflow of foreign capi-
tal. Fears of a hard landing of the 
Chinese economy also played a 
role. The net capital withdrawal 
from China amounted to around 
350 billion US dollars during the 
first nine months of 2015. The 
relatively solid development of 
the Chinese economy together 
with market interventions by 
Chinese policymakers, like those 
of the domestic public pension 
funds, for example, which started 
to invest in Chinese stocks 
deemed too risky by private inves-
tors, as well as the restrictions im-
posed on currency derivatives, 
contributed to a stabilisation in 
autumn 2015. The jittery situa-
tion in financial markets all over 
the world, however, led Chinese 
stock market indices to plummet 
again in January of this year.
In view of the weakening econo-
my during the first quarter, the in-
creased uncertainty in Chinese fi-
nancial markets in summer and 
the continuing low core inflation 
rate that remained below 2 per-
cent, monetary policy was further 
eased throughout 2015. The key 
interest rate has been lowered in several steps by a to-
tal of 265 basis points since November 2014, while 
bank reserve requirement ratios have decreased by 
2.5 percentage points since February 2015. To stabilise 
real estate markets, the Chinese government also im-
proved financing conditions and relaxed the condi-
tions for acquiring second homes in some regions. All 
of these factors helped to push real estate prices back 
up again slightly. 
Industrial production increased at historically low 
rates of around 6 percent last year. In some economic 
sectors, such as the cement and steel industries, pro-
duction even declined slightly. By contrast, there were 
a) In constant prices, seasonally adjusted and work-day adjusted.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, last accessed on 1 January 2016.
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gains in the services sector, which 
has been developing more dy-
namically than the industrial sec-
tor since 2013. As production in 
the services sector is more labour 
intensive, the slowdown in indus-
try did not have a negative impact 
on overall employment. Thus, 
10.7 million new jobs were creat-
ed in urban and sub-urban areas 
in the first nine months of 2015. 
Economic developments in Japan 
deteriorated significantly during 
the course of last year. After a 
strong first quarter, which was 
marked by a sharp increase in in-
vestment and an increase in in-
ventories, output only expanded 
weakly during the summer and 
fall period. The decrease in 
growth was mainly due to a slump 
in exports. Both exports to China 
and other Asian countries, as well 
as those to Europe and the United 
States, declined sharply during 
the second quarter of the year. 
Investment activity was also weak 
during the summer half. Despite 
the fall in oil prices, which in prin-
ciple should support real income 
growth, private consumption 
grew sluggishly and remained 
weak. Overall, total economic 
output is expected to have risen 
by 0.6 percent last year. 
Early 2015 inflation rates were 
still above 2 percent due to the 
VAT increase in April 2014. After 
this one-off  effect faded, inflation 
dropped substantially, reaching 
0 percent in September and slight-
ly rising again since. Another 
driving force behind the decline 
during the summer half  year was 
energy prices. Correcting for this, 
we saw a moderate increase to lev-
els slightly below 1 percent by the 
end of last year. Core inflation 
has thereby remained in positive 
territory since autumn 2013. The 
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central bank also recently decided not to further ex-
pand its monetary policy for that reason. In addition, 
the depreciation of the yen, which in real effective 
terms amounted to almost 10 percent since summer 
2014, or close to 30 percent since summer 2012, has 
gradually become noticeable in consumer prices. The 
average inflation rate for 2015 turned out to be 
0.9 percent.
The labour market is very robust, despite the econom-
ic slowdown. Employment has risen over the course of 
the year and unemployment fell to 3.1 percent in 
October, its lowest level since summer 1995. 
Unlike in previous years, real GDP growth in India 
managed to stay above 7 percent throughout 2015 in a 
year-over-year comparison, and is expected to result 
in an average growth rate of 7.3 percent. Positive im-
pulses came from both private consumption and pub-
lic investment. The mood among private households 
brightened, which was mainly due to moderate infla-
tion developments. Consumer prices have been declin-
ing since the beginning of 2014, thereby strengthening 
the purchasing power of households. The slowdown 
in inflation mainly reflects the drop in energy prices, 
active control of food prices and the recently increased 
credibility of monetary policy. In addition, the gov-
ernment has increased its investment and also took 
first steps towards implementing a series of structural 
reforms. Among other things, it started to allow for-
eign direct investment to enter additional sectors, such 
as construction and railways. As a result, net FDI into 
India amounted to around 20 billion US dollars in the 
first six months of 2015. This corresponds to a growth 
rate of over 120 percent compared to the same period 
last year. At the same time, such investments plum-
meted in many other emerging economies during the 
same period.
In the other East Asian emerging markets (Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, 
Singa pore and Hong Kong), economic momentum 
slowed down slightly during last year. Overall growth 
rates are still fairly comparable to those of  previous 
years. The slight slowdown is mainly due to a decline 
in demand from Chinese industry for intermediate 
and capital goods from these countries. In addition, 
the slowdown in China has exerted downward pres-
sure on international commodity prices, and com-
modity exporters like Indonesia have suffered as a re-
sult. All in all, real GDP is expected to have grown by 
3.2 percent in these other East Asian countries last 
year. 
1.2.4 Latin America and Russia
Overall the GDP growth rate in Latin America 
(Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia and 
Chile) has declined steadily since 2010. The pro-
nounced weakness in the region led to a – 0.7 percent 
decline in real GDP in 2015. A major reason is the 
sharp drop in commodity prices, which have worsened 
the terms of trade of the region. In addition, Latin 
American currencies continued to depreciate. The 
Colombian peso and the Brazilian real, for instance, 
have lost around 30 percent of their value in real effec-
tive terms since mid-2014. For the Mexican peso, the 
loss also amounted to well over 10 percent. These cur-
rency depreciations firstly imply a burden on business-
es and households indebted in foreign currency. 
Secondly, owing to these depreciations, inflation rates 
in most Latin American countries lie above the infla-
tion targets of the respective central banks. While 
Brazil has raised interest rates several times since au-
tumn 2014 in response, Colombia and Chile followed 
with two interest rate hikes last fall. In Mexico, on the 
other hand, inflationary pressures have eased up since 
spring last year and are now within the target range of 
the central bank. 
In Brazil, the largest economy in the region, industri-
al production has been declining since the middle of 
2014. The unemployment rate skyrocketed from ap-
proximately 5 percent at the beginning of  last year to 
almost 8 percent by the end of  it. Producer and con-
sumer confidence are also down due to numerous cor-
ruption scandals and political crises. Last but not 
least, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies are hav-
ing a dampening effect. The fiscal consolidation is be-
ing driven by subsidy cuts, tax increases and increases 
in regulated prices. As the primary balance of  the 
central government, i.e. the fiscal position corrected 
for interest payments, slipped into the red in Brazil 
over the past year, investors were particularly critical 
of  the worsening of  the overall budget balance. 
Accordingly, the government’s creditworthiness was 
downgraded over the year to as low as junk status by 
some rating agencies. Mexico, Colombia and Chile, 
by contrast, are in better overall economic shape. In 
these countries, industrial production continued to 
expand. 
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The economy in Russia has been 
in a recession since mid-2014. 
High interest rates and negative 
growth prospects have led to a 
substantial scale-back in lending 
to businesses and households 
since the beginning of 2015. The 
amount of non-performing loans 
has basically doubled since the 
start of the crisis. High inflation 
rates and falling real income lev-
els caused a downright slump in 
retail sales. The rate of decline 
started to abate in the third quar-
ter of 2015. This turnaround was 
due to a number of developments, 
especially in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors. The ruble’s depreciation improved 
profitability in certain export sectors (including in the 
mining, metal processing and chemical industries). 
Since mid-2014, the ruble has lost about half  its value 
against the US dollar and a third of its value against 
the euro. Furthermore, some industries benefitted 
from production losses in Eastern Ukraine and larger 
government contracts related to defence and infra-
structure spending. Agriculture and food producers 
benefitted from the ban on western food imports. The 
very fast and consistent implementation of a policy of 
import substitution gave Russian producers addition-
al competitive advantages in 2015, especially in public 
tenders. Since many Western manufacturers were 
forced to protect their market shares by expanding 
production in Russia, foreign direct investment started 
increasing again in the non-banking sector. The capi-
tal flight appears to have ground to a halt and the ex-
change rate is likely to have stabilised. Despite the 
slump in commodity prices, Russia still has a positive 
trade balance. This, however, is also due to a sharp de-
cline in imports. Overall GDP probably declined by 
– 3.2 percent last year. 
1.2.5 The European economy
The cyclical situation
The economic recovery in Europe continued through-
out 2015. Since the end of the recession in the second 
quarter of 2013, the average annualised quarterly 
GDP growth rate in the European Union has amount-
ed to 1.6 percent. Although the degree of expansion 
weakened slightly, particularly during the summer 
half  of 2015, it still outperformed developments in 
2014 (see Figure 1.8). One reason for the slowdown in 
the recovery was increased uncertainty about the 
growth prospects of the Chinese economy and the as-
sociated financial turmoil during the summer months. 
In addition, contributions from France and Italy were 
once again below average, which was also due to unre-
solved structural problems. Favourable developments 
continued from the strong devaluation of the euro 
against the US dollar and the relatively low price of 
crude oil. The financing conditions for private busi-
nesses and households are extremely advantageous in 
most European countries and are still improving in 
the crisis-inflicted nations. This has allowed overall 
credit demand to slowly start increasing again.
The recovery in Europe has mainly been supported by 
an increase in private consumption to date (see 
Figure 1.9). One reason for this is the improvement in 
the budget positions of households caused by the 
sharp decline in energy prices. In addition, increased 
real economic activity also led to an easing of labour 
market conditions. The unemployment rate in the 
European Union fell from its peak of 11 percent in 
early 2013 to 9.3 percent in October 2015. Employment 
also increased substantially last year, almost reaching 
its all-time high from early 2008. When focusing on 
the euro area, these figures point in the same direction, 
albeit in a clearly less pronounced manner. Here, only 
half  of the job losses suffered in the wake of the finan-
cial and euro crises have so far been compensated for. 
In addition to the high level of structural unemploy-
ment, the rate of growth is still too low to bring about 
more rapid employment growth.
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Firms have also benefitted from reduced energy costs 
and the depreciation of the euro. Their improved price 
competitiveness resulted in a further strengthening of 
exports. The contribution of foreign trade to overall 
growth was more or less neutral last year, since im-
ports also continued to grow rapidly. Next to improve-
ments in the competitiveness situation, capacity utili-
sation in the manufacturing sector has also reached a 
level that makes equipment investments look more at-
tractive. Despite favourable refinancing conditions, 
only a moderate increase in equipment investments 
has occurred to date. With respect to construction in-
vestment, no noticeable revival has been observed. 
The existing overcapacity and 
con tinued decline in property 
prices in some European coun-
tries are the reasons behind this 
flat situation and are reflected in 
historically subdued business sen-
timent in the construction sector. 
The general price increase was 
still extremely low last year. In the 
euro area, the total annual infla-
tion rate in December 2015 was 
0.2 percent and thus well below 
the medium-term target of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) of 
below, but close to, 2 percent (see 
Figure 1.10). This low inflation 
rate is largely due to the marked 
decline in energy and commodity 
prices since the middle of 2014. 
The core inflation rate (headline 
inflation excluding energy, food 
alcohol and tobacco) has gradu-
ally recovered from its all-time 
low of 0.65 percent in April last 
year and reached almost 1  per-
cent by the end of the year. A sim-
ilar picture emerges when looking 
at the GDP deflator. The in-
creased utilisation of production 
capacities does give companies 
more scope for price increases.
Differences across Europe
Germany witnessed moderate, but 
stable growth during the course 
of last year. Its real GDP expand-
ed at a rate of about 1.5 percent.1 Overall capacity uti-
lisation increased only slightly. In industry (excluding 
food and beverages), production capacity utilisation 
even declined somewhat, but is still well above its long-
run average. 
The moderate economic recovery was largely driven 
by domestic demand, and particularly by private con-
sumption. Final consumption expenditure of house-
1 Please note that we are using seasonally and working-day adjusted 
data wherever possible. Normally these numbers do not differ much 
from data that is only seasonally adjusted (and not working-day ad-
justed). However, in terms of 2015, it does make a difference for 
Germany. Using seasonally adjusted data, the German GDP growth 
rate was probably 1.7 percent last year.
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on  1 January 2016.
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holds expanded at a rate of 1.9 percent, fostered by 
higher real incomes, a further expansion of employ-
ment and the recent wave of refugee migration. The 
massive influx of people seeking help from countries 
in the Balkans, as well as from civil war regions of the 
Middle East, also led to a significant increase in gov-
ernment consumption spending. More had to be spent 
on the provision of accommodation and in kind social 
transfers.
Compared to consumption, the development of in-
vestment was relatively disappointing in 2015. After 
seemingly speeding up last winter, it started to subse-
quently falter again. Equipment investment declined 
during summer. Given the weak order intake, particu-
larly from non-European countries, companies did 
not see scope for further expanding their investment 
activities. After a good start owing to favourable 
weather conditions, construction spending slipped 
into the red in spring last year. Investment in research 
and development in general fluctuates to a lesser ex-
tent than other investment types and thereby had a 
stabilising influence on aggregate investment. 
Apart from a temporary increase in the second quar-
ter of 2015, the contribution of foreign trade to real 
GDP was negligible in 2015. Thanks largely to the 
weakness of key emerging markets, exports basically 
kept pace with imports.
Labour demand remained relatively high, despite the 
introduction of  a nationwide legal minimum wage. 
While the number of  employed persons clearly in-
creased over the year, unemployment continued to 
decline. Refugee migration has not yet impacted the 
labour market to a significant 
degree. 
France has been facing structural 
weaknesses for some time. The 
tax burden is well above average 
and a substantial amount of price 
competitiveness has been lost 
over the years. As of 1999, im-
ports have continued to grow 
faster than exports, which has led 
to trade and current account defi-
cits. Structural weaknesses are 
particularly evident in weak in-
vestment developments. Current 
gross fixed capital formation is 
also basically at a level witnessed 
a decade ago. While private investment in machinery 
and equipment still provides a small positive contribu-
tion, private construction spending fell sharply last 
year. This is partly because real estate prices have been 
falling and there is excess capacity in the construction 
sector. Private and public consumption remained sup-
portive last year, expanding at relatively strong rates. 
Of the larger economies, it is the only country in which 
the upward trend in unemployment rates has not yet 
been broken. Real GDP growth only accelerated to a 
level of 1.1 percent last year, while the inflation rate 
basically stagnated at 0.1 percent.
Albeit at a slightly lower pace, the upswing that start-
ed early in 2013 in the United Kingdom continued 
throughout last year. Important growth contributions 
came from consumer spending and investment in ma-
chinery and equipment. Gross fixed capital formation 
gained momentum as the year progressed. Investment 
activity has shifted more towards the service sector, 
while the oil and gas industry continues to suffer from 
the fall in oil prices. Foreign trade provided a negative 
contribution to growth. Although exports rose, im-
ports rose much more steeply. One of the reasons for 
this was the development of the exchange rate. The 
value of the British pound rose substantially against 
the euro, while it depreciated somewhat against the 
US dollar. Given that the euro area is by far the most 
import market for British exports, the appreciation 
against the euro was not only stronger, it also weighed 
more on the economy. Whereas the unemployment 
rate remained largely unchanged at a level of 5.5 per-
cent during the first half  of the year, it started to de-
cline again and reached 5.1 percent by October. In 
2015, real GDP grew by 2.2 percent. 
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In view of low energy prices and the appreciation of 
the British pound, the price level remained virtually 
unchanged last year compared to 2014. Whereas the 
core inflation rate, which excludes energy, food, alco-
hol and tobacco, dropped markedly early on in the 
year, it subsequently started to increase again reaching 
1.4 percent by the end of the year.
After having been in a recession since mid-2011, the 
Italian economy started growing again at the start of 
2015. As elsewhere in Europe, this upswing was largely 
driven by an increase in private consumption. Some la-
bour market reforms were also implemented. Pro-
tection against dismissal was relaxed and settlement 
rules were unified. This should particularly promote 
opportunities for younger generations to (re-)enter the 
labour market. The unemployment rate declined, albe-
it slowly, as of summer 2015. Since the measures un-
dertaken apply only to new employment, it is no sur-
prise that the implemented reforms appear not to have 
made a big difference yet. Their impact is likely to be-
come visible in the course of time. For the time being, 
the pace of recovery is much too slow to enable a rapid 
increase in employment. The relatively high tax burden 
for firms, in addition to rigid labour and product mar-
kets, still implies a rather low potential growth rate for 
the Italian economy. These structural weaknesses were 
largely responsible for the loss in price competitiveness 
in the past, which led to a marked decline in Italy’s 
share of world trade in previous years. Last year was 
the first time in decades that Italy saw a sizeable in-
crease in its market share (see Table 1.1). All in all, 
Italy’s real GDP increased by 0.7 percent in 2015.
The Spanish economy was able to overcome its peren-
nial recession in the summer of 2013 and subsequently 
expanded at rising rates. The upswing reached almost 
all sectors of the economy. In particular, private invest-
Table	  1.1	  
	  
	  
	  
Labour costsa)	  
 
Compensation 
per 
employeeb) 
Real 
compen-
sation costsc) 
Labour 
productivity 
Unit labour 
costs 
Relative unit 
labour costsd) 
Export performancee) 
1999
– 
2009 
2010 
– 
2015 
1999
– 
2009 
2010
– 
2015 
1999
– 
2009 
2010
– 
2015 
1999
– 
2009 
2010
– 
2015 
1999
– 
2009 
2010
– 
2015 
1999
– 
2009 
2010
– 
2015 2015 
Germany 1.1 2.6 0.2 1.0 0.3 1.1 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 1.2 – 0.9 0.3 1.5 3.5 
France 2.7 1.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.4 – 1.2 0.4 – 1.2 – 2.2 0.4 3.9 
Italy 2.4 0.8 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1 1.5 – 1.4 1.5 – 1.4 – 3.9 0.0 2.0 
Spain 3.6 – 0.1 0.3 – 0.3 0.4 1.0 2.1 – 3.2 2.1 – 3.2 – 1.2 1.1 2.1 
Netherlands 3.2 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 – 2.1 0.9 – 2.1 – 0.3 0.3 1.1 
Belgium 2.8 2.0 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 – 1.1 0.6 – 1.1 – 1.1 0.4 0.8 
Austria 2.3 1.9 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 2.3 
Finland 3.2 2.1 1.6 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 – 1.1 0.3 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 3.0 1.0 
Greece 5.2 – 2.7 2.1 – 1.9 1.7 – 1.0 2.5 – 3.1 2.5 – 3.1 0.0 – 1.8 – 2.1 
Portugal 3.7 – 0.3 0.7 – 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 – 2.2 0.8 – 2.2 – 1.3 2.4 3.0 
Ireland 5.1 – 0.1 2.7 – 0.9 2.2 2.5 2.0 – 5.4 2.0 – 5.4 3.2 1.6 8.2 
Slovakia 7.7 2.7 3.7 2.1 3.7 2.3 3.4 – 1.1 3.4 – 1.1 4.3 3.7 2.0 
Slovenia 7.3 1.1 2.5 0.7 2.2 1.3 0.9 – 2.7 0.9 – 2.7 1.4 0.7 2.2 
Estonia         4.2 2.2 4.0 – 0.3 4.0 – 0.3 – 0.6 4.9 0.6 
United 
Kingdom 4.2 1.8 1.9 0.0 1.2 0.9 – 1.3 1.5 – 1.3 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 1.1 
Sweden 4.0 2.6 2.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 – 0.8 1.3 – 0.8 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.2 1.0 
Denmark 3.6 1.8 1.3 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.5 – 1.6 1.5 – 1.6 0.0 – 2.2 – 1.4 
Poland 5.5 3.7 1.9 2.2 3.7 2.4 – 0.7 0.1 – 0.7 0.1 2.5 2.4 2.5 
Czech Republic 5.9 2.0 3.5 1.2 3.0 1.3 3.8 – 1.7 3.8 – 1.7 4.5 2.3 3.3 
Hungary 8.5 2.2 2.4 – 0.4 2.6 0.5 3.3 – 1.8 3.3 – 1.8 5.5 1.4 4.9 
Switzerland 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.3 3.7 0.3 3.7 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 4.6 
Norway 5.0 3.8 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 2.7 0.6 2.7 0.6 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 0.6 
Iceland 6.8 5.8 1.3 2.0 2.4 – 0.1 – 3.7 5.9 – 3.7 5.9 1.4 0.1 4.9 
United States 3.7 2.2 1.5 0.6 1.8 0.9 – 1.6 1.4 – 1.6 1.4 – 1.8 – 0.7 0.2 
China             3.9 5.5 3.9 5.5 11.5 4.1 – 3.2 
Japan – 1.3 0.3 – 0.1 0.6 0.7 1.2 – 1.8 – 5.7 – 1.8 – 5.7 – 3.3 – 0.7 0.2 
a) Growth rates for the total economy. – b) Compensation per employee in the private sector. – c) Compensation per 
employee in the private sector deflated by the GDP deflator. – d) Competitiveness: weighted relative unit labour costs. –  
e) Ratio between export volumes and export markets for total goods and services. A positive number indicates gains in 
market shares and a negative number indicates a loss in market shares. 
Source: OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, Vol. 2015 Issue 2, November.	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ment in machinery and equipment has been increasing 
vigorously for some time now. Low lending rates and 
an increased willingness on the part of banks to in-
crease their lending portfolio have helped. In addition, 
external demand is high, not least because the price 
competitiveness of Spanish companies has improved. 
On the one hand, they benefitted from the significant 
depreciation of the euro against the US dollar. On the 
other hand, Spain has experienced one of the lowest 
inflation rates in the euro area for some time now. In 
addition, the private construction sector contributed 
positively again after a deep crisis and its recent reduc-
tion of immense overcapacities. Last but not least, pri-
vate consumption supported the upswing, partly be-
cause Spanish households, due to their relatively high 
debt burden, benefitted significantly from the lower in-
terest rates. Moreover, the favourable economic situa-
tion in association with the implemented structural re-
forms is having an increasingly positive effect on the 
labour market. The unemployment rate has declined 
by almost five percentage points since summer 2013 
and the number of employees has increased substan-
tially. Nevertheless, with an average unemployment 
rate of 22.2 percent in 2015, there is still ample room 
for further improvement (see Figure 1.11).
Of the crisis-inflicted countries, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece, only Greece has not yet entered 
recovery mode. On the contrary, the election outcome 
early in 2015 created an environment in which uncer-
tainty about future developments in Greece increased 
substantially. Up until the climax reached with the ref-
erendum and the subsequent setup of the 3rd bailout 
package with the European Union and the IMF in June 
and July, the increased uncertainty even supported eco-
nomic development somewhat, as it led to advanced 
spending by consumers amid fears of depositors suffer-
ing losses. During the second half of the year, the coun-
try slipped into recession as the negative consequences 
of the turmoil and the capital controls imposed became 
more apparent. Ireland, on the other hand, is in full re-
covery mode. Domestic demand and exports rebound-
ed, resulting in a growth rate of 6.9  percent in 2015. 
Albeit clearly not as strongly, Cyprus and Portugal also 
managed to pull out of recession and grew last year by 
1.4 and 1.5 percent, respectively.
In the Central and Eastern European member states of 
the European Union, the economy gained momentum 
throughout 2015. The region benefitted from the re-
covery in the euro area. Furthermore, cheap oil and 
low commodity prices acted as an additional economic 
stimulus. This led to a noticeable improvement in the 
labour market situation almost everywhere, which was 
accompanied by a significant drop in unemployment in 
many places. In addition, real household income in-
creased, not least because the price level rose only 
slightly and even declined in some places. Accordingly, 
consumer spending delivered a strong contribution to 
economic growth. Gross fixed capital formation rose 
sharply almost everywhere. This was triggered by the 
positive economic outlook on the one hand, and sig-
nificantly improved financing conditions on the other: 
interest rates remained extremely low throughout the 
year. In some countries exports also contributed posi-
tively to the economic recovery, which in line with the 
recovery of the euro area gained impetus somewhat. In 
Poland and the Baltic states on the other hand, exports 
developed less dynamically, because the recession in 
Russia was most noticeable in these countries.
1.3 Fiscal and monetary policy
1.3.1 Fiscal policy
Compared to 2015, fiscal policy is 
likely to act more or less neutrally 
in most advanced economies in 
2016 (see Figure 1.12). One clear 
exception is Japan. Here some 
large stimulus packages that were 
adopted in the years 2013 and 
2014, as part of the “Abenomics” 
programme to boost economic 
growth and inflation, are being 
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phased out. In the United King-
dom, as measured by the change 
in the structural deficit, the fiscal 
stance also has been and will re-
main restrictive. The summer 
budget submitted to the lower 
house after the general elections 
assumes a continuation of fiscal 
consolidation and a surplus in the 
fiscal year 2019/2020. After the 
government budget deficit was 
5.7  percent relative to GDP in 
2014, it was reduced to 4.3 per-
cent last year and is expected to 
decrease further this year to be-
low the 3 percent threshold. Both 
cuts in social spending and a cap 
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Public finances 
  Gross debta) Fiscal balancea) 
 
1999– 
2007 
2008/ 
2009 
2010– 
2014 2015 
1999– 
2007 
2008/ 
2009 
2010– 
2014 2015 
Germany 62.3 68.8 78.3 71.4 – 2.3 – 1.7 – 1.0 0.9 
France 62.6 73.5 88.9 96.5 – 2.5 – 5.2 – 4.9 – 3.8 
Italy 102.9 107.4 123.2 133.0 – 2.9 – 4.0 – 3.3 – 2.6 
Spain 48.2 46.1 81.6 100.8 0.2 – 7.7 – 8.4 – 4.7 
Netherlands 49.0 55.5 64.6 68.6 – 0.5 – 2.6 – 3.6 – 2.1 
Belgium 100.6 95.9 103.5 106.7 – 0.5 – 3.2 – 3.6 – 2.7 
Austria 66.2 74.1 82.3 86.6 – 2.2 – 3.4 – 2.6 – 1.9 
Finland 40.6 37.2 52.7 62.5 3.8 0.8 – 2.3 – 3.2 
Greece 102.4 118.0 166.6 194.8 – 5.3 – 12.7 – 9.3 – 4.6 
Portugal 59.6 77.6 118.6 128.2 – 4.3 – 6.8 – 7.2 – 3.0 
Ireland 30.9 52.1 108.8 99.8 1.6 – 10.4 – 12.5 – 2.2 
Slovakia 40.5 32.1 48.8 52.7 – 5.2 – 5.1 – 4.2 – 2.7 
Slovenia 25.7 28.1 58.0 84.2 – 2.2 – 3.6 – 7.3 – 2.9 
Luxembourg 6.7 14.9 21.4 22.3 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.0 
Lithuania 20.1 21.8 38.5 42.9 – 1.7 – 6.1 – 4.5 – 1.0 
Latvia 12.2 27.7 42.3 38.3 – 1.7 – 6.6 – 3.0 – 1.5 
Cyprus 59.1 49.5 82.4 106.7 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 6.0 – 0.7 
Estonia 5.0 5.8 8.5 10.0 0.9 – 2.4 0.3 0.2 
Malta 65.5 65.3 68.6 65.9 – 5.0 – 3.7 – 2.8 – 1.7 
Euro area 69.0 75.0 89.8 94.6 – 1.9 – 4.2 – 3.9 – 2.2 
United Kingdom 39.7 58.7 83.6 88.3 – 1.8 – 7.9 – 7.4 – 4.3 
Sweden 48.9 38.6 39.3 44.7 1.1 0.6 – 0.8 – 1.4 
Denmark 43.6 36.9 45.0 40.2 2.3 0.2 – 1.6 – 3.3 
Poland 42.7 48.2 53.6 51.4 – 3.9 – 5.5 – 4.7 – 2.8 
Czech Republic 24.6 31.4 42.1 41.0 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 2.9 – 1.9 
Romania 19.5 18.2 35.9 39.4 – 2.6 – 7.3 – 3.8 – 1.2 
Hungary 58.7 74.8 78.5 75.8 – 6.3 – 4.1 – 3.5 – 2.3 
Croatiab) 29.5 43.4 71.2 89.2 – 2.7 – 4.2 – 6.0 – 4.9 
Bulgaria 45.1 13.3 18.7 31.8 0.5 – 1.2 – 2.5 – 2.8 
European Union 61.8 67.6 84.2 87.8 – 1.7 – 4.6 – 4.3 – 2.4 
United Statesb) 47.2 79.4 101.2 104.9 – 2.4 – 9.9 – 7.4 – 3.8 
Japan 167.0 201.0 234.2 245.9 – 5.9 – 7.3 – 8.7 – 5.9 
Switzerland 60.6 48.3 47.6 46.2 0.1 1.1 0.1 – 0.2 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product. For the European countries, definitions according to the Maastricht Treaty. 
For the United States, Japan and Switzerland, definitions are according to the IMF. – b) Data on Croatia and the United 
States are only available from 2001 onwards. 
Sources: European Commission, Autumn 2015; IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2015. 
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on wage growth for civil servants 
are in the pipeline. At the same 
time, via a reduction in corporate 
taxes an increase in international 
competitiveness of UK firms is to 
be achieved.
In the United States, a balancing 
act has enabled fiscal policy to sup-
port GDP growth on the one hand, 
while reducing the government 
budget deficit relative to GDP on 
the other. After the deficit sur-
passed 13 percent of GDP in 2010, 
its highest level since the second 
World War, it decreased continu-
ously in the following years and is 
expected to have been 3.8 percent 
in 2015 (see Table 1.2). Additional 
spending on health care was offset 
by higher tax revenues and lower 
interest expenditure on govern-
ment debt. Total government gross 
debt amounted to approximately 
105 percent of GDP by the end of 
last year. After the debt ceiling for 
the federal level was reached in 
October Congress passed its repeal 
until March 2017. Political budget-
ary crises are therefore not to be 
expected this year.
In the emerging economies, fiscal 
policy is likely to be characterised 
by even greater heterogeneity 
than in previous years. In India 
and China public investment pro-
grammes will support the econo-
my. Government spending pro-
grammes have also been launched in Russia that are 
intended to mitigate the recession. Furthermore, the 
Russian government finances its budget deficit via a 
reserve fund accumulated during times of high oil 
prices and which will run out in 2017, according to of-
ficial projections. In Brazil, on the other hand, fiscal 
policy turned noticeably restrictive as early as last 
year. Cutbacks in social spending and subsidies, as 
well as various tax increases and the increase of many 
administered prices, have recently been adopted in 
Brazil. This year fiscal policy is projected to become 
gradually less restrictive, especially in the wake of the 
resignation of the pro-austerity finance minister in 
December 2015 and his replacement by a less hawkish 
individual.
The geo-political consequences of  the crises in the 
border regions of  the European Union are becoming 
increasingly visible and are having an impact on the 
public finance situation in Europe. Not only is the 
fear of  further terrorist attacks having direct conse-
quences on state finance but also – and to an even 
greater degree – the strong inflow of refugees. The 
number of  first-time applications for asylum has 
quadrupled within less than one and a half  years (see 
Figure 1.13).
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In the short run the increase in the inflow of  refugees 
will trigger additional government spending, and will 
thereby stimulate internal demand. Additional fund-
ing has also been made available at EU and national 
levels to support countries of  origin and transit. 
Several governments of  member countries cited the 
additional inflow as a reason for exceeding fiscal tar-
gets as early as 2015. As early as last autumn 
Germany projected an additional 0.5 percent of 
GDP per annum of  public spending in 2016 to meet 
the initial needs of  the newly arrived immigrants and 
to integrate them into the labour market. Similar fig-
ures for Austria and Sweden are 0.3 and 0.9 percent 
of  GDP, respectively. Estimates suggest that these 
near-term stimulus effects will amount to 0.1 or 
0.2  percentage points of  GDP growth for the 
European Union (see, e.g. OECD, 2015). Countries, 
however, are being hit quite differently. Whereas 
Germany is the country that has taken in by far the 
largest share of  refugees, relatively to country size 
Hungary, Sweden, Austria and Malta have also seen 
a relatively strong surge in the number of  first-time 
asylum applicants. 
Over time the new migrants will enter the labour mar-
ket and, depending on their skills, will start contribut-
ing to the welfare state. Over a horizon of a few years, 
the net contribution of these migrants is therefore un-
clear. However, the qualification structure of the refu-
gees appears to be less than average. This is bound to 
reduce average wage income, and therefore average tax 
and social security contributions. This is further ag-
gravated by a lower forecast of their labour force par-
ticipation rate, especially among women. In the longer 
run, the extent to which refugees will be able to con-
tribute to the sustainability of the welfare state will de-
pend on many factors, including their ease of access to 
the labour market.
Europe’s moderate recovery has allowed most mem-
ber states to slowly reduce their public deficits. For the 
euro area the aggregate public deficit as a percentage 
of GDP has decreased by about 0.4 percentage points 
when comparing last year with 2014. For the European 
Union the same figure amounts to 0.6 percentage 
points. Comparing longer time horizons shows strong-
er declines. The number of countries that are still in 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure has been reduced to 
9 at present, after 11 in early 2015 and 16 at the start 
of 2014. Two of these countries, namely Cyprus and 
Greece, are also following an economic adjustment 
programme.
The sharp fall in government bond yields in previous 
years has made it somewhat easier for governments to 
meet budget targets insofar as it has lowered refinanc-
ing costs. While the overall public deficit, for instance, 
continued to decline last year and is expected to con-
tinue to fall slowly, the primary balance, on the other 
hand, is expected to deteriorate slightly. The additional 
room to manoeuvre created by smaller interest rate 
payments is used to a fairly large extent to finance the 
additional costs associated with the increased inflow of 
refugees. However, unexpected drops in inflation can 
also make it harder for governments to meet their 
budgetary objectives, as revenues and expenditure are 
affected differently. Primary expenditure in general re-
acts less strongly to a change in inflation than revenues. 
Whereas, for instance, tax revenues are directly affected 
by the changing price level, most public spending is on 
service-related items that generally do witness relative 
price increases during phases of falling inflation rates, 
especially when these are unex pected.
Overall, however, the effects of lower inflation, through 
its impact on nominal interest rates, are probably hav-
ing a positive effect on the public finance situation. 
Those countries with a larger debt burden are likely to 
benefit more from the lower interest rates than they 
stand to lose through the differing impact of lower in-
flation on revenues and expenditure. However, these 
very countries also face the highest risk should interest 
rates start to normalise again. These countries in par-
ticular need to increase their efforts in order to secure 
the sustainability of their public finances. The new in-
terpretation of the Stability and Growth pact, as pub-
lished early 2015 by the European Commission, is giv-
ing member states of the euro area somewhat more fis-
cal room to manoeuvre, thereby creating an environ-
ment favourable for more myopic governments.
Consolidation efforts varied across member states in 
2015. The fiscal effort in 2015, as measured by the 
change in the primary balance, points to still a larger 
group of countries consolidating rather than loosen-
ing (see Figure 1.14). Consolidation ranged from over 
4 percentage points of GDP in Cyprus, Portugal and 
Bulgaria to a loosening of over 1 percentage point in 
Denmark and Luxembourg. Of the remaining mem-
ber states, most only saw small changes of below 
0.5  percentage points in either direction. The aggre-
gate improvement in the primary balance is largely 
due to the improved economic situation. From a struc-
tural point of view, hardly any improvement was no-
ticeable for 2015, nor is any expected for this year.
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1.3.2 Monetary conditions and financial markets
Monetary conditions
Although monetary policy in the major advanced 
economies remains accommodative, the degree of ex-
pansion continues to diverge. Whereas central banks 
in the United Kingdom and the United States stopped 
their programmes to buy securities as early as in mid-
2012 and October 2014, respectively, the European 
Central Bank (ECB), in view of Europe’s far more 
moderate economic momentum and excessively low 
inflation, initiated a bond-buying programme in 
March 2015 that was extended in December last year 
to last until March 2017 at the very least. The Bank of 
Japan also continued its massive quantitative easing 
programme in 2015. These latter two central banks 
have signalled their willingness to leave their key inter-
est rates at their current level near 
zero until at least 2017. After sev-
eral postponements, the US 
Federal Reserve increased its 
main policy rates by 25 basis 
points in December 2015 (see 
Figure 1.15). The Bank of Eng-
land is expected to start increas-
ing its interest rates early this 
year. As compared to the euro 
area, labour market conditions in 
both the United Kingdom and 
the United States are such that 
these turnarounds in monetary 
policy are clearly warranted, if  
not overdue. Nevertheless, it will 
still take a number of (further) in-
terest rate hikes before the monetary policy stance in 
these countries can no longer be considered as 
expansionary.
The monetary policy stance also started to diverge in 
the emerging markets last year. The central banks of 
many Asian countries (China, India, Thailand, and 
South Korea) took advantage of the leeway afforded 
by moderate inflation dynamics to initiate interest rate 
cuts. In China in particular monetary policy was re-
laxed quite strongly during the year. The key rate was 
lowered in five steps by a total of 125 basis points 
from 5.6 percent in February 2015 to 4.35 percent in 
October 2015. At the same time, the minimum reserve 
requirements of commercial banks were reduced 
sharply in three steps by a total of 2.0 percentage 
points, releasing large amounts of extra cash for the 
Chinese financial system. In addition, the central 
bank extended the bandwidth 
within which it tolerates exchange 
rate fluctuations and allowed a 
depreciation of the yuan by about 
5.5 percent against the US dollar 
in 2015. 
In Brazil, on the other hand, 
monetary policy was tightened 
significantly in order to counter-
act strong downward pressure on 
the domestic currency and the as-
sociated increase in inflation. The 
key policy rate was increased in 
several steps by 325 basis points 
from October 2014 to 14.25 per-
cent in July 2015. Besides fighting 
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inflation, the Brazilian central 
bank is also trying to reduce the 
increase in the real value of for-
eign debt – predominantly de-
nominated in US dollars – that 
constitutes an additional burden 
on the private and public sector. 
In the light of the interest rate de-
cision by the Federal Reserve, the 
central banks in Mexico and 
Chile also increased their main 
policy rates in December 2015. In 
the case of Chile, the increase fol-
lowed of an earlier hike in 
October.
In Russia, the relevant bench-
mark interest rate declined from 17 percent in early 
2015 to 11 percent as of August. Given an inflation 
rate that is still close to 16 percent, monetary policy 
can therefore no longer be considered restrictive. After 
a recovery in spring, the rouble again faced strong 
downward pressure during the rest of the year. In ad-
dition to the economic burdens caused by low raw ma-
terial prices, this was also due to the political rift be-
tween Russia and the West that prompted internation-
al investors to massively withdraw capital from Russia.
Monetary policy in the euro area is geared towards be-
ing persistently expansive. The ECB deems the overall 
inflation rate to be too low and fears a permanent de-
viation of inflation expectations from its medium-
term target of close to, but below 2 percent. In addi-
tion, the ECB aims to revitalise lending and bring 
about a better utilisation of production capacity by in-
creasing aggregate demand. It therefore decided early 
on in 2015 to have the euro system acquire govern-
ment bonds, covered bonds and asset-backed securi-
ties for a total of around EUR 60 billion per month as 
part of its purchasing programme starting March 
2015 (see Figure 1.16). At its meeting in December 
2015, the Governing Council decided to extend these 
purchases by another six months, i.e. until at least 
March 2017, and thereby intends to increase the total 
assets of the euro system by about 1.5 trillion euros. In 
addition, the deposit interest rate that banks have to 
pay on their deposits and excess reserves at the ECB 
was reduced from – 0.2 to – 0.3 percent. 
The adequacy of  the additional expansionary meas-
ures adopted by the ECB in December 2015 can be 
questioned. Although price pressures in the euro area 
were, with an overall inflation rate of  only 0.2 percent 
in November, extremely low, this was mainly due to 
the sharp fall in oil prices in mid-2015. The core infla-
tion rate on the other hand has, after reaching its 
trough with 0.6 percent in January last year, slowly 
but steadily increased, reaching 0.9 percent in 
December. The still negative output gap is slowly go-
ing to be reduced further throughout the year, and the 
effects of  lower commodity prices are likely to gradu-
ally phase out. The bank lending survey also conduct-
ed by the ECB at a quarterly frequency has already 
revealed for some time now that the borrowing condi-
tions for households and businesses are continuing to 
ease, and that demand for loans is rising. The ECB’s 
asset purchase programme, as well as its targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs), which 
are still running, were already supporting bank lend-
ing before the decision in December. Accordingly, 
core and total inflation could also have been expected 
to increase without additional monetary policy meas-
ures and would have reached a level that is compatible 
with the medium-term inflation objective of  the ECB 
by the end of  2017.
On the other hand, however, a substantial share of 
professional forecasters still attach a historically high 
probability to a low inflation, or even deflationary sce-
nario for the euro area. Furthermore, although mort-
gage loans have been steadily increasing for years now 
and consumer credit growth also seemed to have re-
turn to positive dynamics last year, looking at the hard 
data, loans to the corporate sector have merely been 
able to stabilise (see Figure 1.17). Hence, the improved 
situation in the banking sector and the further decline 
in lending rates have been insufficient to substantially 
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uplift credit aggregates to date. While the volume of 
outstanding loans increased only slightly in the euro 
area during 2015, those in the former crisis countries 
continued to fall.
Bonds, stocks and foreign exchange markets
After reaching troughs early last year, yields on bond 
markets in most advanced economies remain at his-
torically low levels. The weaker than expected recov-
ery during summer 2015 has, at least initially, brought 
the upward trend that had set early in the same year to 
a halt (see Figure 1.18). 
In the euro area, the interest rates on government 
bonds with the highest credit rating (AAA) fluctuated 
between 0.2 and 1.1 percent during the year. With the 
exception of Greece, the govern-
ment bond yields and creditwor-
thiness of weaker member states 
(Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) showed no clear trend over 
the year. Their risk premium to 
AAA borrowers was about 
1.1 percentage points on average. 
For Greece, the situation was dif-
ferent. The election results of 
January 2015 and the associated 
change in government led to a 
strong increase in uncertainty re-
garding its bailout programme 
and the continuation of Greece as 
a member of the euro area. 
Tensions escalated in June when 
the Greek government unilaterally broke off  negotia-
tions and called for a national referendum to approve 
or reject the achieved preliminary negotiation results. 
The Greek stock market closed and access to bank ac-
counts was limited. Early in July, a clear majority of 
Greek citizens voted to reject the bailout terms mak-
ing a Greek exit from the euro more likely than ever 
before. This was prevented mid-July by reaching a pro-
visional agreement on a third bailout programme to 
save Greece from bankruptcy. All this was reflected in 
a strong increase in the risk premium on Greek gov-
ernment bonds until July last year; although it did not, 
however, reach the levels seen in 2012, or cause any 
clear contagion of the yields on bonds issued by other 
crisis countries (see Figure 1.19).
During the course of 2015, the low funding costs of 
the banking sector also appear to have reached non-
financial corporations in the crisis 
countries. In Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, the lending rates for non-
financial corporations on new 
loans continued to fall during the 
year (see Figure 1.20). This sug-
gests that the creditworthiness of 
many companies in those coun-
tries improved, and that the sup-
ply-side constraints caused by 
high inventories of impaired 
loans may have started to abate. 
Indeed, the economies in some 
former crisis countries staged ma-
jor recoveries in 2015, increasing 
the profitability of local compa-
nies. According to several indica-
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tors, the situation in the banking 
sector also improved. For exam-
ple, in Ireland and Spain bank eq-
uity ratios were increased and the 
stock of loans at risk of default 
was reduced. From a monetary 
policy perspective, this implies 
that the disturbances in the mon-
etary transmission mechanisms 
became significantly less pro-
nounced over the year.
Given that the inflation rate is ex-
pected to gradually increase 
again, a moderate increase in gov-
ernment bond yields also appears 
likely this year. The ECB’s bond-
buying programmes will tend to 
limit the yield increases, since 
such programmes effectively re-
duce the supply of bonds availa-
ble to the private sector.
Although monetary policy in the 
major advanced economies re-
mained very expansionary last 
year, stock markets did not man-
age to benefit to the same extent 
as in 2014. On the contrary, most 
stock market indices experienced 
a bit of  a roller coaster ride dur-
ing 2015 and early this year. The 
Chinese stock market in particu-
lar saw markedly strong increas-
es and falls stirring up financial 
markets all around the world. 
After having increased by a stag-
gering 135 percent between May 
2014 and June 2015 in local cur-
rency (or 190 percent measured 
in euros), the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Composite fell by 
more than a third during the fol-
lowing three months and conse-
quently started to increase until 
the end of  the year to fall again 
in January. Over 2015, it never-
theless still gained 18.5 percent 
when measured in local currency. 
For the Nikkei 225 and the Euro 
STOXX 50, the increases were a 
mere 9.3 and 4.0 percent, respec-
-4
0
4
8
12
16
-10
0
10
20
30
40
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 Greece (left-hand scale)
 Portugal
 Ireland
 Italy
 Spain
 Belgium
 France
 Austria
 Finland
 Netherlands
 Germany
% points
Source: Datastream, last accessed on 1 January 2016.
Regional disparties in government bond yields in the euro area
Differences between 10-year national and synthetic euro area benchmark bond yields
% points
Figure 1.19
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 France  Germany  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Euribor
%
a) New loans to non-financial corporates up to one million euros using floating rates or up to 1 year initial rate 
fixation. The Euribor rate is based on secured interbank loans with a maturity of one year.
Source: European Central Bank, last accessed on 1 January 2016.
Interest rates on loans to businesses 
in selected countries of the euro areaa)
%
Figure 1.20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 DJ Industrial Average
 Shanghai SE Composite
 Nikkei 225
 FTSE 100
 Euro STOXX 50
Index (2007=100)
a) Stock market indexes outside the euro area are first converted into euros. 
Source: Datastream, last accessed on 23 January 2016.
Developments in international stock markets 
from a euro area perspectivea)
Index (2007=100)
Figure 1.21
33 EEAG Report 2016
Chapter 1
tively. The Dow Jones industrial 
average and the FTSE 100 actu-
ally lost some ground and de-
creased by –  1.2 and –  5.8 per-
cent, respectively. Given the ap-
preciation of  the US dollar and 
the British pound relative to the 
euro, some gains can still be re-
ported from a euro area perspec-
tive in 2015 (see Figure 1.21).
Most stock market indices with-
in the euro area are still well be-
low the levels reached before the 
start of  the financial crisis. By 
January the Athex (Greece) had 
returned to its low reached in 
June 2012, roughly 90 percent 
below the average value seen in 
2007 and over 30 percent below 
its value at the end of  2014 (see 
Figure 1.22). The IBEX 35 
(Spain) also lost ground during 
2015 and fell by 6.4 percent. 
Although largely nullified this 
January the other major stock 
market indices for the crisis 
economies and the large euro 
area countries mostly increased 
by almost 10  percent in 2015. 
The ISEQ (Ireland) once again 
outperformed the others and 
gained approximately 30 percent 
in 2015.
All in all, financing conditions 
for the private sector should re-
main favourable this year. The 
degree of  expansion of  monetary 
policy is expected to remain high 
and corporate bond and lending 
rates low. The situation in the 
banking sector is likely to contin-
ue to improve and demand for 
corporate credit should moder-
ately improve.
The divergence in monetary policy 
brought about significant changes 
in exchange rates last year. 
Whereas the euro and the Japanese 
yen continued to lose value when 
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comparing 2015 with 2014, the US dollar and the 
British pound experienced a strong upward trend (see 
Figure 1.23). 
As of mid-October 2015, the euro again depreciated 
considerably compared to the US dollar (see 
Figure 1.24). This was primarily due to the impression 
of financial market participants that the ECB would 
continue to increase its expansion plans as of the be-
ginning of 2016. As the ECB has often managed to 
surprise markets on the upside in recent years, i.e. by 
boosting the expansionary stance of monetary policy 
more strongly than expected, market expectations 
were very upbeat regarding the Governing Council de-
cisions of last December. In a sense, markets expected 
to be positively surprised again. Although monetary 
policy became clearly more expansionary thanks to 
the decisions taken in December, no real surprises 
were conveyed, which was interpreted as a negative 
surprise by many financial market participants, allow-
ing the euro to recoup some of its losses during the 
last weeks of 2015.
1.4 The macroeconomic outlook
1.4.1 Assumptions, risks and uncertainties 
The present forecast is based on the assumption that 
oil and energy prices will roughly remain at the levels 
seen early this year, which are substantially lower than 
those seen on average during 2015. Exchange rates are 
also assumed to remain fairly stable throughout the 
year and the status quo situation regarding world poli-
tics is maintained throughout the forecast. 
Of course, these assumptions all entail risks for our out-
look, and, as has become usual, these risks are tilted to 
the downside. A key risk for the global economy this 
year is founded on the political tensions in the Middle 
East and the unclear development of this conflict. 
Although the most recent attacks committed by one of 
these parties in Paris did not make a significant short-
term economic impact (see Box 1.1), the resulting politi-
cal reactions in France and other nations, however, do 
show how explosive the geopolitical situation in the 
Middle East is. A further escalation of the conflicts in 
that region could unsettle consumers, producers and in-
vestors around the world and thereby dampen world-
wide economic activity considerably. Further terrorist 
attacks in Europe unfortunately cannot be ruled out ei-
ther. Besides all kinds of obvious social problems, such 
a scenario could lead to a surge in oil prices because 
many of the countries in the Middle East are still among 
the main suppliers of this raw material and might fur-
ther increase the number of refugees entering Europe.
Risks also arise from the expected gradual tightening 
of monetary policy in the United States. Now that the 
Federal Reserve has made its first interest rate increase 
since June 2006 and is likely to continue increasing 
rates at a slow pace, the relative attractiveness of the 
United States for financial capital is increasing. This 
might attract portfolio shifts out of other regions. In 
extreme cases, this could again lead to substantial cap-
ital outflows from emerging markets, which could trig-
ger strong financial turmoil or even exchange rate cri-
ses. This could particularly strongly affect those coun-
tries that have a relatively high foreign debt denomi-
nated in US dollars (like Brazil, Indonesia and 
Turkey). For commodity-exporting emerging econo-
mies such as Russia and many Latin American coun-
tries that have already been struggling with the nega-
tive effects of lower commodity prices, the problems 
could also spark crises if  exacerbated.
The referendum on the United Kingdom’s member-
ship of the European Union is scheduled to take place 
before the end of 2017. It is already creating uncer-
tainty, especially in the United Kingdom, but also in 
Europe; as a potential Brexit constitutes a major risk 
regarding future political and economic developments 
in Europe. 
The adopted extension of the securities purchase pro-
gramme by the ECB carries risks for economic devel-
opment, and not only in the euro area. This provision 
of cheap money could create asset price bubbles, 
which, if  they burst, could lead to painful upheavals in 
the financial markets inside and outside Europe. In 
addition, the ECB’s government bond-buying pro-
gramme generates disincentives for fiscal policy to 
limit deficits. A number of European governments, in-
cluding those of Spain and Italy, are already able to 
emit bonds with negative interest rates. The resulting 
fiscal buffers are, however, often not used to further 
reduce government deficits, or even to reduce debt. 
For political reasons, this fiscal leeway is often used to 
increase spending or cut taxes. While these measures 
leave the current overall deficit in relation to GDP 
roughly unchanged, they do increase long-term struc-
tural deficits and thus permanently affect the debt sit-
uation in the public sector negatively. They thereby re-
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Box 1.1
The economic impact of terrorist attacks
Terrorist attacks involving deaths and injuries represent human tragedies. They can also influence the everyday behav-
iour of agents in the goods, services and financial markets. It is conceivable that terrorist attacks lead to a significant 
increase in uncertainty amongst these actors. This, in turn, could have a significant negative impact on economic de-
velopment, as consumer spending and investment are often postponed in times of heightened uncertainty. In addi-
tion, the risk premiums on the capital markets may increase, creating poorer financing conditions for businesses and 
households.
Here, in a purely descriptive manner, we compare the impact of  different terrorist attacks on a set of  aggregate eco-
nomic indicators to get a feel for the potential impact on the economy of the country hit. Specifically, we consider 
the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001 in the United States, those on a Madrid train station on March 11, 2004, 
the explosions on public transport in London on July 7, 2005 and the series of  assassinations in Paris on No-
vember 13, 2015. 
Figure 1.25 illustrates the development of key macroeconomic variables in a time window that extends over several 
months before and after each attack. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, a Tuesday, the stock market 
opened again the following Monday. On this day, the S&P 500 fell by 4.9 percent. Exactly one month later, the index 
recovered and returned to its pre-attack level. Over a longer period of time, the downward trend was unbroken. On 
the day of the Madrid attack (March 11, 2004) the Spanish stock index lost 2.2 percent; within four weeks, however, 
the index regained its pre-attack level and continued its upward trend. The British index lost 1.4 percent before con-
tinuing its upward trend. On the Paris Stock Exchange, no significant effect was apparent after the attacks. 
For capital market rates, qualitatively similar effects in the wake of the attacks can be observed in the four countries: 
while interest rates fell on the day of the attack, this neither altered their long-run trend nor led to a level shift. With 
the exception of the United 
States, some small depreciation 
in the local currencies was ob-
served after the terrorist attacks, 
which was, however, corrected 
within a few days.
Similar qualitative effects were 
seen in consumer and producer 
confidence: as a result of the at-
tacks neither a level shift nor a 
change in trend were observed. 
Although confidence in the short 
run declined more strongly in the 
United States, than in the other 
countries, it did return to its 
long-term course within a few 
months (see also Garner, 2002). 
In Spain and the United King-
dom, the confidence indicators 
continued their recent trend.
All in all, both financial market 
variables and confidence indica-
tors showed only a slight reaction 
to the terrorist attacks. The ob-
served effects are small and not 
exceptional in the context of 
their normal variation. In cases 
where effects are observed, these 
tend to be short-term. All indica-
tors return to their historical 
trend after a relatively short peri-
od of time. Of course, this is 
merely a simple descriptive anal-
ysis in which it is notoriously dif-
ficult to really isolate the effects 
of the different attacks. As usual, 
many other changes occurred si-
multaneously for which no cor-
rections were made in this 
analysis. 
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duce the future ability of many 
euro area countries to buffer ad-
verse shocks through fiscal policy 
interventions and make them 
more vulnerable to the changing 
whims of international capital 
markets. The risk of new crises 
and a revival of the European 
debt crisis is growing with these 
measures.
1.4.2 The global economy
Global economic expansion is ex-
pected to have continued this win-
ter at a similar moderate pace as 
last summer. This was supported 
by the development of several co-
incident and leading indicators. 
Although these were mostly at 
above-average levels, the decline of 
the Ifo World Economic Climate 
during the second half of last year 
suggests that no acceleration of 
economic growth is to be expected 
these winter months (see Figure 
1.26). During the first half of 
2016, growth will increase again, 
partly because the positive effects 
of the fall in oil prices will materi-
alise to a growing extent. The posi-
tive effect on the oil-importing 
countries through their higher 
willingness to spend is likely to be 
stronger than the economic bur-
den falling on oil-exporting economies. Since these ef-
fects are due to expire slowly over the year, the global 
rate of expansion will subsequently subside somewhat.
Macroeconomic developments in the major advanced 
economies will also be shaped by nominal exchange 
rate movements. Whereas US export growth is bound 
to remain subdued due to the strengthening of the US 
dollar, the demand for goods and services from the 
euro area and Japan is, given the depreciation of the 
euro and the yen, likely to accelerate further. Never-
theless, the aggregate economic performance of the 
United States will improve more vigorously than that 
of the euro area and Japan respectively in 2016. 
Although the resulting costs associated with both re-
forms in the banking sector, as well as in labour and 
product markets in many countries are gradually de-
creasing, economic development in the euro area con-
tinues to be weakened by a number of structural prob-
lems. Japan is also expected to expand only moderate-
ly this year. Although monetary policy is extremely ex-
pansionary, and the planned gradual commissioning 
of a number of nuclear power plants is likely to reduce 
the need for energy imports, restrictive fiscal policy as 
well as structural factors, such as a shrinking potential 
labour force and relatively low productivity growth, 
will prevent a stronger recovery.
Overall, the pace of expansion in emerging markets is 
unlikely to change significantly compared to last year. 
While Brazil and Russia will overcome their recessions 
in the course of the year, and the low oil price will pos-
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itively impact China, India and many other East 
Asian economies, this is likely to be offset by forces 
that are preventing a significant economic upturn. For 
instance, the structural slowdown of economic growth 
in China is likely to continue. Furthermore, slowly ris-
ing long-term interest rates, particularly in the United 
States, will deteriorate financing conditions for emerg-
ing markets. Nevertheless, the growth contribution 
made by emerging markets to world GDP will also 
outstrip that of advanced economies in 2016 (see 
Figure 1.27).
All in all, world GDP will pick up a little momentum 
in 2016 and is forecasted to grow at a rate of 3.3 per-
cent, which is slightly higher than in previous years. 
World trade is expected to expand by 3.2 percent this 
year. The current account balances of most commod-
ity-exporting emerging economies will deteriorate. 
Given the strong US dollar, exports are expected to 
expand significantly slower than 
imports in the United States. In 
the euro area and Japan, by con-
trast, the current account balance 
will improve.
1.4.3 United States
Not only have the expectations in 
the Ifo World Economic Survey 
for North America shown some 
volatility in recent quarters, but 
other indicators also paint a more 
mixed picture regarding this win-
ter (see Figure 1.28). The Pur-
chasing Managers’ Index (PMI) 
deteriorated in December for the 
sixth consecutive month in a row 
to 48.2 points. It thereby fell be-
low the expansion threshold of 
50 points for the first time in three 
years. In fact, industrial produc-
tion in October decreased slightly 
compared to the previous month. 
New orders in manufacturing (ex-
cluding defence equipment) in 
October were also only 0.4 per-
cent higher than a year before. 
The strong US dollar dampened 
signals coming from foreign 
trade. Furthermore, the United 
States is also not immune to the 
recent economic slowdown in emerging markets. More 
importantly for the US economy, however, is the de-
velopment of domestic demand. Although private 
consumption was weak during the autumn, the up-
turn in the United States will continue. Positive signs 
underpin private consumption; as reflected by increas-
ing consumer confidence, it is supported by the in-
crease in real disposable income and good labour mar-
ket conditions. Overall, the available economic indica-
tors suggest that the pace of economic growth will 
continue during the first half  of this year.
In the current year, real GDP is expected to increase 
at a similar pace as last year, i.e. by 2.5 percent (see 
Figure 1.29), so the moderate upturn will continue. 
Since the dampening effects of  the dollar apprecia-
tion will run out of  steam and, as a result of  increas-
ing capacity utilisation, business investment will be 
able to expand more strongly again, economic devel-
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opment is expected to accelerate slightly during the 
summer of  2016. The unemployment rate has now 
fallen to what can be considered its long-run level. It 
will therefore only drop slightly to an average of  4.9 
percent this year. As the effects of  lower energy prices 
will abate wages will start rising somewhat faster; the 
inflation rate should increase to an average of  1.1 per-
cent this year.
1.4.4 Asia
This year, the central bank of China is likely to focus 
on limiting the build-up of debt in the corporate sec-
tor, without causing a noticeable economic slowdown. 
It will continue to limit lending in some targeted areas, 
while trying to reduce the current high costs of financ-
ing for smaller private companies.
Recent developments in industrial production and 
the purchasing managers’ index suggest that aggre-
gate output should expand at about the same pace in 
early 2016 as seen during the second half  of  2015. 
The fall in energy and commodity prices also sup-
ports economic activity; but this effect is likely to 
fade gradually. Positive impulses are currently gen-
erated by fiscal policy. Additional investment in the 
rail network, as well as in environmental protection 
projects, will stimulate production this year. Should 
the development in housing and equipment invest-
ment unexpectedly deteriorate sharply, then it is 
highly likely that fiscal policy will provide additional 
impetus with further infrastructure projects. The 
turbulence in the stock market will barely slow down 
private consumption, and will thus have a marginal 
impact at most on aggregate de-
mand. The shrinking labour 
force due to demographics is 
likely to have a negative effect on 
the growth trend. The transition 
towards a more service-oriented 
economy will also continue. This 
implies a further slowdown in 
the growth rates of  industrial 
production combined with ac-
celerating momentum in the ser-
vice sector. Overall, real GDP is 
expected to rise by 6.8 percent 
this year.
The low unemployment rate in 
Japan will lead to some upward 
pressure on nominal wages. Although an increasing 
share of the labour force has temporary contracts as 
opposed to permanent ones, which is constraining 
wage pressure somewhat, the labour market condi-
tions do suggest that wages will rise slightly faster this 
year than in 2015. Despite the upward pressure that 
this implies for inflation dynamics, it cannot be ruled 
out that the Bank of Japan will loosen monetary poli-
cy further.
At the same time, fiscal policy remains restrictive 
against a backdrop of  high public debt. Although a 
multi-stage reduction of  corporate taxes has been 
implemented to promote the willingness to invest, 
this is more than compensated for by strong cuts in 
government spending. The biggest cuts are expected 
to be in public investments. These will steadily de-
crease from about 5 percent in relation to GDP in 
2014 to about 3  percent in 2017. The decisive factor 
is the phasing out of  large stimulus packages, which 
were adopted as part of  the “Abenomics” programme 
to stimulate overall production and support lower in-
come households. In addition, the VAT rate is to be 
increased from 8 to 10 percent again in April 2017, 
which will already lead to some anticipatory effects 
this year.
This year the Japanese economy will pick up slightly. 
The rising income of households is likely to fuel pri-
vate consumption. In addition, companies will expand 
their investment given their high capacity utilisation 
levels. This is favoured by the reduction in corporate 
tax rates and record high profits. The gradual acceler-
ation of economic growth in the East Asian emerging 
economies and the low external value of the Yen is ex-
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pected to support demand for Japanese products and 
stimulate exports slightly. Structural factors, like a 
shrinking population, very rigid labour market condi-
tions with lifelong employment guarantees, and over-
regulation in many product and service markets, will 
hold back the increase in production. Overall, total 
economic output is expected to rise by around 0.6 per-
cent this year. Inflation is expected to rise steadily to 
an average of 1.0 percent this year.
In India, recent developments in new orders in the 
manufacturing sector, industrial production and ex-
ports do not indicate a further acceleration of  eco-
nomic growth in the months ahead. During the rest 
of  the year production is likely to expand at a slightly 
increasing pace due to firming domestic demand. 
Nevertheless, the stimulating effects of  lower oil pric-
es will gradually be phased out in the course of  the 
year. In addition, owing to the large number of  bad 
loans and the high level of  indebtedness of  many 
companies, investment growth will slow down. On the 
other hand, fiscal policy is still giving out positive im-
pulses. The drop in oil prices has made it possible for 
the government to raise energy taxes and reduce dif-
ferent subsidies, such as those on fuel. However, sub-
stantial investments to improve the transport and en-
ergy infrastructure have been announced and do 
more than compensate for this. In addition, there are 
plans to reduce corporate taxes over the next four 
years from 30 to 25 percent in order to encourage pri-
vate investment. All in all, real GDP will grow by 
7.5 percent this year.
The outlook for the remaining East Asian economies 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong) is more opti-
mistic compared to last year. In many places, domestic 
demand is expected to increase faster. Private con-
sumption and investment is thereby going to benefit 
from an improved financial situation among house-
holds and businesses in the Asian Tiger economies 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). 
In South Korea, the expansionary fiscal policy will 
support the economic situation. The government of 
Indonesia, which still has enough fiscal space to ma-
noeuvre, plans to increase public spending. Moreover, 
exports will, especially in light of the expected slight 
acceleration of the world economy and the significant 
depreciation of the exchange rates of emerging econo-
mies, expand at a rapid pace. All in all, real GDP is 
expected to grow by 4.0 percent in these East Asian 
countries this year.
1.4.5 Latin America and Russia
Over the course of  the year, the Latin-American re-
gion will move out of  recession. Whereas the reces-
sion is likely to continue in Brazil and Venezuela, the 
other countries of  the region will manage to more 
than compensate for this. Indeed, the recession in 
Brazil will lose its sting during the year, but the return 
to positive annual growth is not expected until 2017. 
In Mexico, Colombia and Chile, by contrast, the ro-
bust labour market and growing consumer confidence 
presently point to strong domestic growth through-
out the year. In addition, Mexico is likely to benefit 
from the positive economic outlook of  its main trad-
ing partner, the United States. Overall, the region’s 
real GDP will with a growth rate of  – 0.1 percent ba-
sically stagnate this year. 
In Russia, business confidence stabilised at a low lev-
el. Even if  the recession ended this winter, a quick re-
covery is not to be expected. Rising unemployment, 
falling real incomes and high inflation rates (of  cur-
rently around 15 percent) have led to substantial loss-
es in purchasing power. Although the key monetary 
policy rate, the CBR key rate, was gradually reduced 
from 17 percent at the end of  2014 by 6 percentage 
points during the first half  of  2015, the cost of  debt 
financing remains high. In addition, Russian banks 
still have very limited opportunities to refinance on 
international capital markets. Given the high inflation 
rate and poor financing conditions, private consump-
tion and investment are hardly going to support 
growth. Positive impulses continue to result from the 
enforced import substitution programme that is fund-
ed through the State Reserve Fund and the National 
Prosperity Fund (the volume of both funds totals ap-
proximately 150 billion US dollars, and 12 percent of 
GDP). Through the weak ruble, foreign trade is ex-
pected to contribute positively to GDP growth. 
Overall the slight upward trend nevertheless results in 
a negative growth rate of  – 0.2 percent for this year. 
However, much will depend on the evolution of  com-
modity prices and the geopolitical situation. The 
downside risks therefore remain high.
1.4.6 The European economy
The cyclical situation
Recent business and consumer tendency surveys indi-
cate that real GDP in Europe is expected to increase at 
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a slightly accelerated pace during 
the first half  of the year (see 
Figure 1.30). Albeit at a slightly 
reduced pace, the recovery will 
continue throughout the re-
maining year and will allow the 
output gap to close slowly (see 
Figure 1.31).
Domestic demand, and in par-
ticular private consumption, will 
be the main driver behind the on-
going recovery (see Figu re 1.32). 
Households continue to benefit 
from comparatively low energy 
prices and associated low infla-
tion rates. Furthermore, the situ-
ation in the labour market is ex-
pected to improve further, mak-
ing moderate wage increases pos-
sible. Employment will continue 
to grow and the unemployment 
rate will fall from an average of 
9.5 percent in 2015 to 9.1 percent 
this year (see Figu res  1.33 and 
1.34). In addition to rising real 
incomes, low interest rates will 
contribute to a continuing revival 
of  demand for consumer goods.
Fiscal policy, via additional pub-
lic consumption and investment 
spending, is also likely to directly 
contribute to an increase in over-
all demand. Firstly, government 
bond yields are still very low and 
as such, loosen the budget con-
straints of European countries. 
Secondly, since the beginning of 
2015, the EU Commission has 
started tolerating higher structur-
al deficits if  accompanied by in-
creased public investment activi-
ties. Thirdly, some European 
countries have announced addi-
tional spending on military oper-
ations as well as terrorism preven-
tion. Despite the ongoing recov-
ery, budget deficits will only de-
cline moderately, especially in the 
euro area. Whereas the total gov-
ernment deficit will fall from 
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2.5 to 2.0 percent in the EU at large, it will only decline 
from 2.0 to 1.8 percent in the euro area this year.
Favourable conditions for private investment abound. 
Firstly, companies stand to benefit from the deprecia-
tion of the euro against the US dollar. This has im-
proved cost competitiveness and sales prospects, par-
ticularly in the United States. Secondly, the oil price is 
still extremely low, so energy costs have dropped for 
many companies. Thirdly, the profitability of firms 
and their access to bank loans has improved. Lending 
rates are low and banks are increasingly willing to sat-
isfy an increase in demand for credit. Last but not 
least, the increase in capacity utilisation and the clos-
ing of the output gap are gradually making investing 
in additional capacities more attractive. Nevertheless, 
no real investment boom is to be expected. Structural 
problems and related uncertainty over how to solve 
them persists in many countries 
and areas within Europe, damp-
ening the willingness of firms to 
invest.
Although the low value of the euro 
is supporting exports to the United 
States in particular, imports are 
due to the increase in domestic de-
mand expected to rise as such that 
net exports will hardly contribute 
to European GDP growth. All in 
all, real GDP in the European 
Union is expected to grow by 1.9 
percent this year. For the euro area 
this amounts to 1.7 percent.
Inflation is expected to gradually increase as the ef-
fects of  sequential energy price drops will fade and 
the output gap closes. Assuming constant real energy 
and food prices and an unchanged exchange rate vis-
à-vis the United States, the headline inflation is pro-
jected to average at 0.9 percent this year in both the 
euro area and the European Union (see Tables 1.A.3 
and 1.A.4).
Differences across Europe
With the exception of Finland and Greece, the econo-
mies of the member states of the European Union are 
all on a recovery course. The pace of this recovery, 
however, differs from country to country. Whereas 
real GDP in Germany is increasing at a moderate rate, 
the recovery is somewhat bumpier in France and Italy. 
Spain, on the other hand, is wit-
nessing a strong upturn.
As indicated by coincident and 
leading indicators like the results 
of the Ifo World Economic Sur-
vey, the German economy is con-
tinuing to expand moderately 
throughout the winter. Domestic 
and foreign incoming orders are 
on the rise again. In addition, fis-
cal impulses owing to the strong 
influx of refugees and which are 
associated with an increase in 
government spending not backed 
up by additional revenues or 
spending cuts elsewhere therefore 
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do fully impact aggregate demand. In addition, the 
economy is still benefitting from terms-of-trade gains 
caused by the decline in crude oil prices. Economic ex-
pansion will be supported by the service, retail and 
wholesale trade sectors this winter; industrial activity, 
on the other hand, will continue to be weak given that 
order levels remain low. However, the Ifo Business 
Climate indicator for the manufacturing sector, and 
specifically fairly optimistic business expectations, 
also indicate a turn for the better here.
During the course of the year, the upswing will con-
tinue. Decisive in this respect are the continued favour-
able conditions faced by the German economy. 
Monetary policy continues to have an exceptionally 
expansionary impact, with interest rates that are ex-
pected to remain low. The financing conditions for 
new business and construction investments are there-
fore extremely advantageous. In addition, the govern-
ment will increase its expansionary impetus, not least 
due to the significant rise in public consumption and 
transfers caused by refugee migration. Finally, con-
sumers are still benefitting from low energy prices. 
This is another reason why private consumption is 
likely to remain the main pillar of the recovery, which 
is also promoted by rising labour and transfer income 
and a decline in the net tax burden of households. 
Furthermore, the export industry is only expanding at 
a moderate pace. Although exports will rise somewhat 
faster during the first half  of this year, since the eco-
nomic situation in major trading partner countries 
will improve and the impact of the strong depreciation 
in the euro during 2015 is still to be felt, the global 
economic expansion, and thus the average growth 
rates of German exports, will remain far behind those 
of previous upswings. As a result, investment in ma-
chinery and equipment will grow only modestly, de-
spite favourable financing conditions and the largely 
normal capacity utilisation rates. Cons truction invest-
ment, on the other hand, should pick up again this 
year. As imports will grow stronger than exports, in 
view of the strong domestic demand forecast, impetus 
will mainly come from the domestic economy, rather 
than foreign trade this year. Overall, real GDP growth 
is expected to rise to 1.9 percent in 2016. This includes 
a significant growth contribution from the additional 
demand created by the inflow of refugees. The price-
dampening effects of lower energy prices will wear out 
and homemade inflation will intensify gradually. 
Consumer prices are thereby expected to rise by 
0.9 percent this year.
The inflow of refugees will have a substantial impact 
on the German labour market over time. Although 
companies’ high demand for labour will continue, the 
labour supply will increase much faster through the in-
creasing number of recognised asylum seekers enter-
ing the labour market. As the qualification level of the 
refugees is mainly low, there is likely to be a mismatch 
between demand and supply that is further aggravated 
by the nationwide minimum wage that was introduced 
in early 2015. As a result, unemployment is expected 
to rise again over the course of the year. 
The French economy is expected to witness another 
year of below-average growth and only slowly declin-
ing unemployment rates. Previous attempts to reduce 
labour costs for businesses and to improve price com-
petitiveness have by no means been sufficient to in-
crease long-term growth potential and did not trigger 
positive short-term developments. Private and public 
consumption are the main drivers of growth. The lat-
ter are also on the increase as the government has ini-
tiated additional spending on military operations to 
counter terrorism.
Although leading indicators suggest a certain slow-
down in economic momentum during this winter, the 
upturn in the United Kingdom is likely to continue and 
will mainly be supported by private consumption. 
Although nominal wage growth remains moderate 
from an historical perspective, real incomes are bene-
fitting from stable prices. In addition, tax relief  and 
the increase in the minimum wage in the context of the 
introduction of the “living wage” are primarily bene-
fitting lower income groups. These have a relatively 
high propensity to consume. 
As corporate profits, particularly in the service sector, 
have been picking up and borrowing costs remain low, 
investment should continue to gain momentum this 
year. The expected turnaround in policy interest rates 
is only going to be gradual, leaving the overall still ex-
pansionary monetary policy to further support eco-
nomic growth throughout the year. However, fiscal 
policy will have a restrictive effect in 2016. 
Overall, the British economy is likely to expand fur-
ther in 2016 at a rate of 2.2 percent, which is moderate 
compared to previous years. The unemployment rate 
will continue to decline slightly. On average it will 
reach 5.1 percent this year. Due to rising wages and 
the expiring effects of fallen energy prices, the infla-
tion rate will increase slightly to 1.0 percent this year.
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In Italy a wide-range of reforms 
regarding electoral law and the 
constitution are in the pipeline. 
These reforms aim to accelerate 
the political decision-making pro-
cess considerably. However, they 
are merely one step towards im-
plementing reforms that may lead 
to sustainably higher growth 
rates. The recovery of the Italian 
banking sector, for instance, has 
made little progress to date. The 
stock of non-performing loans, 
however, has increased markedly 
over the year and there are no 
signs that this will start falling 
soon. Previous attempts to relieve 
the banking sector through gov-
ernment intervention were mostly 
limited to smaller financial insti-
tutions. This was partly because 
the financial flexibility of the 
Italian state is – given the high 
level of government debt – limit-
ed and Italy has received no direct 
financial aid to date from the 
European Union. These structur-
al problems do imply that Italy’s 
recovery will continue to lag be-
hind upturns in other European 
countries. GDP is expected to 
grow at 1.1 percent in 2016, which 
is well below the average for the 
euro area (see Figure 1.35). 
This year, Spain is expected to 
continue to expand faster than 
the other large member states. 
This is partly because the bank-
ing sector is likely to gradually overcome its serious 
crisis. Thanks to the economic situation, the stock of 
non-performing loans has fallen substantially since 
the end of  2013. In addition, a substantial amount of 
very high-risk assets were outsourced to a bad bank 
back in 2012. Furthermore, financial aid has been 
granted by the European Union, allowing Spanish 
banks to increase their capital ratios significantly. 
With a forecast growth rate of  2.8 percent this year, 
labour market conditions continue to improve in 
Spain and the unemployment rate is expected to de-
cline further to an average rate of  21.0 percent. Given 
persistent large overcapacities in the system, the in-
flation rate will remain subdued and should reach an 
average of  0.5 percent this year.
For Greece, the first glimmers of  hope are on the ho-
rizon: early indicators pointing towards some ex-
pansion. Greece is still nevertheless a long way from 
recovery, with domestic and foreign orders still 
shrinking. Although the government intends to lift 
capital controls this spring, the country currently 
still clearly suffers from them. Amid negative carry-
over effects from last year, the economy is still pro-
jected to contract by –  0.6 percent this year (see 
Table 1.A.2).
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The conditions for a continuation of the economic re-
covery in Central and Eastern Europe are generally fa-
vourable. Inflation rates and exchange rates are stable, 
and interest rates remain low. Lending to businesses 
and households will gain momentum in many places 
(especially in Poland and the Czech Republic), which, 
in turn, can be expected to have a positive effect on do-
mestic demand. Economic stimulus is also coming 
from the public sector, which in most countries is in a 
fiscally sound shape. 
In addition, countries in the region are eligible to re-
ceive substantial funding from the five structural and 
investment funds of the European Union (ESIF) until 
2020 (around 190 billion euros alone for the six coun-
tries outside the euro area: Poland, Romania, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Croatia). 
Since these funds are granted according to the princi-
ple of co-financing, they must be accompanied by 
public funds from the country applying. Accordingly, 
fiscal policy will tend to be expansionary, especially in 
the region’s three major economies (Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary).
Overall, the pace of expansion in the majority of 
Central and Eastern European EU member states 
should accelerate slightly this year. The economic out-
look is only cloudier in the Baltic States (Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia); these economies are feeling the 
impact of Russian sanctions against the European 
Union and are more sensitive to the Russian import 
substitution programme.
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Appendix 1.A
Forecasting Tables
Table	  1.A.1	  
	  
	  
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in various countries 
 
Share 
of 
total 
GDP 
in % 
GDP growth CPI inflation 
Unemployment 
rated) 
in % in % 
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
Industrialised countries:               
  
  
EU 28 27.4   1.4   1.8   1.9   0.6   0.0   0.9   10.2   9.5   9.1   
Euro Area 19.9   0.9   1.5   1.7   0.4   0.0   0.9   11.6   10.9   10.6   
Switzerland 1.0   1.9   0.7   1.1   0.0   – 1.1   – 0.5   4.5   4.5   4.7   
Norway 0.8   2.2   1.2   1.5   2.0   2.1   2.3   3.5   3.7   3.8   
Western and Central Europe 29.2   1.4   1.7   1.9   0.6   0.1   0.9   10.1   9.4   9.0   
US 25.8   2.4   2.5   2.5   1.6   0.1   1.1   6.2   5.3   4.9   
Japan 6.8   – 0.1   0.6   0.6   2.7   0.9   1.0   3.6   3.4   3.2   
Canada 2.7   2.4   1.1   2.0   1.9   1.1   1.9   6.9   6.9   7.0   
Industrialised countries (total) 64.4   1.7   1.9   2.0   1.3   0.2   1.0   7.8   7.1   6.8   
Newly industrialised countries:     
  
  
 
  
  
  
Russia 2.8   0.6   – 3.2   – 0.2   7.8   15.7   10.8   . . . 
China 15.4   7.3   6.9   6.8   2.0   1.5   2.2   . . . 
India 3.1   7.1   7.3   7.5   7.2   5.1   5.6   . . . 
East Asiaa) 6.5   3.7   3.2   4.0   3.4   1.9   2.5   . . . 
Latin Americab) 7.9   0.9 – 0.7 – 0.1 10.9 19.4 12.6 . . . 
Newly industrialised countries 
(total) 
35.6   4.7   3.7   4.3   5.1   7.0   5.5   . . . 
Totalc) 100.0   2.8   2.5   2.8e) . . . . . . 
World trade growth in %   3.4   2.6   3.2         
a) Weighted average of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Weighted with the 2013 levels of GDP in US dollars. – b) Weighted average of Brasil, Mexico, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Chile. Weighted with the 2013 level of GDP in US dollars. – c) Weighted average of the 
listed groups of countries. – d) Standardised unemployment rate. – e) 3.3 percent when using purchasing-power-
parity adjusted weights. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, IMF, ILO, National Statistical Offices, 2015 and 2016: EEAG forecast. 
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Table	  1.A.2	  
	  
	  
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in the European countries 
  
  
  
Share 
of 
total 
GDP 
in % 
GDP growtha) Inflationb) Unemployment ratec) 
 in % in % 
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
Germany 20.8 1.6 1.5 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.9 5.0 4.6 5.1 
France 15.6 0.2 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.1 0.8 10.3 10.4 10.3 
Italy 12.0 – 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 12.7 11.9 11.4 
Spain 7.8 1.4 3.1 2.8 – 0.2 – 0.6 0.5 24.5 22.2 21.0 
Netherlands 4.8 1.0 1.9 1.9 0.3 0.2 0.9 7.4 6.9 6.5 
Belgium 2.9 1.3 1.4 1.5 0.5 0.6 1.6 8.5 8.3 7.7 
Austria 2.4 0.4 0.9 1.6 1.5 0.8 1.3 5.6 5.7 5.7 
Finland 1.5 – 0.4 0.2 1.1 1.2 – 0.1 0.5 8.7 9.4 9.4 
Greece 1.3 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 1.4 – 1.1 0.1 26.5 25.1 24.9 
Portugal 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.6 – 0.2 0.5 0.7 14.1 12.7 12.1 
Ireland 1.3 5.2 6.9 4.1 0.3 – 0.1 0.7 11.3 9.4 8.7 
Slovakia 0.5 2.5 3.4 3.7 – 0.1 – 0.3 1.0 13.2 11.5 10.1 
Slovenia 0.3 3.0 2.5 2.3 0.4 – 0.8 0.7 9.7 9.1 8.5 
Luxembourg 0.3 4.1 2.6 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.9 6.0 6.2 5.7 
Lithuania 0.3 3.0 1.6 2.1 0.2 – 0.7 0.8 10.7 9.1 8.4 
Latvia 0.2 2.4 3.0 3.2 0.7 0.2 1.1 10.8 9.9 9.6 
Cyprus 0.1 – 2.5 1.4 2.5 – 0.3 – 1.6 0.0 16.1 15.6 15.1 
Estonia 0.1 2.9 0.9 1.8 0.5 0.1 1.0 7.4 6.1 6.0 
Malta 0.1 4.1 5.1 3.8 0.8 1.2 1.4 5.9 5.4 5.1 
Euro aread) 73.5 0.9 1.5 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.9 11.6 10.9 10.6 
United Kingdom 14.9 2.9 2.2 2.2 1.5 0.1 1.0 6.1 5.4 5.1 
Sweden 3.2 2.3 3.4 3.0 0.2 0.7 1.3 7.9 7.4 7.0 
Denmark 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.7 0.3 0.2 1.0 6.6 6.2 6.2 
EU 22c) 93.5 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.9 10.5 9.8 9.6 
Poland 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 0.1 – 0.7 0.9 9.0 7.5 6.7 
Czech Rpublic 1.2 2.0 4.5 2.4 0.4 0.3 1.1 6.1 5.1 4.5 
Romania 1.1 2.9 3.7 3.5 1.4 – 0.4 0.6 6.8 6.8 6.4 
Hungary 0.7 3.7 2.5 2.3 0.0 0.1 1.4 7.7 6.9 6.3 
Croatia 0.3 – 0.4 1.8 2.2 0.2 – 0.5 0.5 17.3 16.6 16.2 
Bulgaria 0.3 1.5 2.7 2.8 – 1.6 – 1.0 0.7 11.4 9.4 8.6 
New Memberse) 7.9 2.8 3.3 3.1 0.3 – 0.4 0.9 8.9 7.9 7.2 
EU 28d) 100.0 1.4 1.8 1.9 0.6 0.0 0.9 10.2 9.5 9.1 
a) GDP growth rates are based on the calender adjusted series except for Ireland, Slovakia and Romania for which 
Eurostat does not provide working-day adjusted GDP series. – b) Harmonised consumer price index (HICP). –  
c) Standardised unemployment rate. – d) Weighted average of the listed countries. – e) Weighted average over 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Croatia and 
Bulgaria. 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 and 2016: EEAG forecast. 
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Table	  1.A.3	  
	  
	  
Key forecast figures for the European Union 
        2014 2015 2016 
      
 
Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product 
 
1.4 1.8 1.9 
   Private consumption 
  
1.3 2.1 1.8 
   Government   consumption 1.1 1.6 1.0 
   Gross fixed capital formation 
 
1.4 2.6 1.7 
   Net exportsa) 
  
– 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Consumer pricesb)  
 
0.6 0.0 0.9 
        
Percentage of nominal gross domestic 
product 
Government fiscal balancec) 
 
– 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.0 
        Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rated)     10.2 9.5 9.1 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous 
year). – b) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – c) 2014 and 2015: 
forecasts of the European Commission. – d) Standardised unemployment 
rate. 
Source: Eurostat; 2015 and 2016: EEAG forecast. 
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Table	  1.A.4	  
	  
	  
Key forecast figures for the euro area 
        2014 2015 2016 
      
 
Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product 
 
0.9 1.5 1.7 
   Private consumption 
  
0.8 1.7 1.5 
   Government consumption 0.9 1.4 1.0 
   Gross fixed capital formation 
 
1.3 2.2 1.3 
   Net exportsa) 
  
0.0 0.1 0.3 
Consumer pricesb)  
 
0.4 0.0 0.9 
        
Percentage of nominal gross domestic 
product 
Government fiscal balancec) 
 
– 2.6 – 2.0 – 1.8 
Unemployment rated)     11.6 10.9 10.7 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous 
year). – b) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – c) 2014 and 2015: 
forecasts of the European Commission. – d) Standardised unemployment 
rate. 
Source: Eurostat; 2015 and 2016: EEAG forecast. 
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Appendix 1.B
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES) assesses 
worldwide economic trends by polling transnational 
as well as national organisations worldwide about cur-
rent economic developments in the respective country. 
This allows for a rapid, up-to-date assessment of the 
economic situation prevailing around the world. In 
January 2016, 1,071 economic experts in 117 countries 
were polled. WES is conducted in co-operation with 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 
Paris.
The survey questionnaire focuses on qualitative infor-
mation: on assessment of a country’s general econom-
ic situation and expectations regarding important eco-
nomic indicators. It has proved to be a useful tool, 
since economic changes are revealed earlier than by 
ifo World econoMic survey (Wes)
traditional business statistics. The individual replies 
are combined for each country without weighting. 
The “grading” procedure consists in giving a grade of 
9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent re-
plies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative (–) replies. 
Grades within the range of 5 to 9 indicate that positive 
answers prevail or that a majority expects trends to in-
crease, whereas grades within the range of 1 to 5 reveal 
predominantly negative replies or expectations of de-
creasing trends. The survey results are published as ag-
gregated data. The aggregation procedure is based on 
country classifications. Within each country group or 
region, the country results are weighted according to 
the share of the specific country’s exports and imports 
in total world trade.
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IntergeneratIonal FaIrness
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the interaction of gen-
erations, the way that generational clashes are trans-
lated through the political system, and their long-term 
consequences for the sustainability of the economy 
and society. It concludes with a consideration of 
whether the generational contract is safer on a nation-
al or a supranational (including a European) level.
The idea that a contract between the generations lies 
at the basis of society is fundamental to visions of a 
just social order. It is also at the heart of any notion of 
social stability and sustainability. The conservative 
theorist Edmund Burke famously put the generational 
contract in a larger perspective: “Society is a con-
tract… a partnership not only between those who are 
living but between those who are dead, those who are 
living, and those who are to be born.” (Burke, 1790) 
Burke essentially saw a private contract that was vio-
lated by the dramatic political action of the French 
revolutionaries. The character of the contract has 
changed remarkably since Burke’s time. In modern 
Europe, families no longer invest in children with the 
goal of securing their own position in old age, but 
have collectivised or socialised Burke’s social contract 
(Becker, 1992). In our modern society, government be-
comes a vital element in the contract. The father of 
modern welfare economics, Arthur Pigou, envisaged 
the state as representing those who are “absent” from 
the discussion: “There is wide agreement that the State 
should protect the interests of the future in some de-
gree against the effects of our irrational discounting 
and of our preference for ourselves over our descend-
ants. The whole movement for ‘conservation’ in the 
United States is based on this conviction. It is the clear 
duty of Government, which is the trustee for unborn 
generations as well as for its present citizens, to watch 
over, and, if  need be, by legislative enactment, to de-
fend, the exhaustible natural resources of the country 
from rash and reckless spoliation.” (Pigou, 1932, 
pp. 29f.) But we also know after a century of experi-
ence that the state is very likely to be captured by those 
who are present. In that sense, states fail to live up to 
the promise of yielding an equitable result. 
The welfare state is an institutional and formalised 
version of the contract, the medium for making gen-
erational transfers. A welfare state reallocates resourc-
es at both ends of an individual’s life span, replacing 
choices in spending that had previously been personal 
or private. As Becker (1992) put it, “Both the elderly 
and children need care – in one case because of declin-
ing health and energy, and in the other because of bio-
logical growth and dependency.” The level of invest-
ment in children has a powerful effect on future out-
comes: on individual well-being, but also on the health 
and dynamism of society. In the past parents had seen 
raising the human capital of their children as a way of 
securing their own security when they became incapa-
ble of working and earning. That is no longer needed, 
because the parents see the burden of their future sup-
port as collectivised. The result might well be expected 
to be that many resource-constrained parents no long-
er see any advantage to themselves in increasing the 
earning capacity and economic potential of their chil-
dren. Decisions on educational spending thus need to 
be left to public authority: in its absence there is a risk 
of substantial under-spending. The forward-looking 
aspect of the socialised contract can be seen as invest-
ment in future generations. 
Working age adults accumulate either private assets or 
claims on public support in anticipation of their own 
old age. The socialisation of old age provision is seen 
as a backward-looking corollary to the investment in 
the young. The calculation reflects a need to save for 
the future of the presently middle-aged generation 
that is currently investing in education for the future. 
In the new socialised contract, that saving is the com-
pensation for the incomes foregone as working people 
finance the educational investment for the future. The 
socialised contract in nature is Pay As You Go: it im-
plies an implicit return equal to wage sum growth – 
when fertility goes down, the return falls; when lon-
gevity goes up, individuals draw more on the contract 
(Boldrin and Montes, 2005; Andersen and 
Bhattacharya, 2015).
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Historically, the socialisation of payments for the first 
part of the life cycle came earlier than the provision of 
old age provision. Public investment in education was 
motivated by the observation that poor people would 
try to gain from their children as early as they could 
(in an era of child labour), and that there was a public 
good in raising levels of skill and sociability. The sec-
ond half  of the nineteenth century was, as a result, at 
least in some areas of higher education and in skill lev-
els, a period of substantial economic growth, with ris-
ing social investment and substantial increases in lit-
eracy and skills. Old age pensions – first introduced in 
Denmark and in Germany – were a way of buying off  
political discontent that looked relatively cheap, as 
many industrial workers could not expect to live until 
the retirement age. Nutritional and medical advances 
in the twentieth century led to large gains in longevity, 
and made this side of the bargain more expensive.
The generational distribution of the socialised con-
tract occurs principally in the framework of a national 
context. Historically, the large expansion of the pen-
sions system and of pension entitlements, usually 
funded on a Pay As You Go system (PAYG) with de-
fined benefits, took place in the middle of the twenti-
eth century, especially in the third quarter, when bor-
ders were very important and there were substantial 
restrictions to international migration. Productivity 
increases and population growth together drove wage 
increases that allowed PAYG to work unproblemati-
cally. Then came globalisation, and larger migratory 
flows. The ability to exit and enter the national setting, 
however, alters the calculation on which the lifetime 
promise was built. The nature of the contract will 
change because of the effects of migration. Emigrants 
are the beneficiaries of invest-
ment in early education, but may 
be seen as opting out of the re-
payment phase of the contract 
(while sometimes still expecting 
private inheritances, and even 
public pensions if  they re-enter 
on old age). A society with a great 
deal of emigration is likely to 
have additional incentives to un-
derinvest in education. It might 
be expected that a society that is 
highly concerned with its old age 
future might be enthusiastic 
about immigration. But there are 
many kinds of migrants, includ-
ing workers, students, family 
members seeking family reunification, and asylum 
seekers, and each group interacts differently with the 
labour market. In reality the debate is also frequently 
dominated by cultural concerns about the conse-
quences of immigration and fear that open borders 
mean low skill immigration and a higher degree of de-
pendency on welfare payments. A declining trend in 
productivity growth and in fertility also threatens 
PAYG. In short, the social contract is an implicit in-
surance contract, and migration holds out the possi-
bility of adverse selection, with selection mechanisms 
that can undermine or even destroy the contract. 
The individualisation of society, and the increasing 
disintegration of traditional families, have created the 
expectation that the state should serve as a replace-
ment for the family. It is the public sector that pays 
considerable amounts for educating young people, 
and maintaining old people; while the middle genera-
tion pays in so as to provide the support for juniors 
and seniors. There are obvious differences between 
countries, and Scandinavian countries are especially 
generous in their transfers to the elderly, but the basic 
profile is similar across the industrial world (see 
Figure 2.1). 
How does behaviour respond to the incentives created 
by the availability of transfers? The arrangement of 
benefits and costs creates inducements for the young 
to extend education/student life as long as possible, so 
as to extend their benefits; for them to then exit quick-
ly so as not to pay the costs; and for the middle-aged 
to retire as soon as they can, in order to extend their 
benefits. Meanwhile, those still trapped in the working 
middle feel squeezed, and may not have the same af-
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fection for the public sector or the state as middle-
aged people in previous centuries developed for their 
families. States are also expected to make complicated 
selections of the appropriate kind of immigrant, and 
are blamed when the “wrong” immigrants arrive and 
the welfare state provisions are depleted rather than 
replenished.
Children don’t expect to support their elderly parents, 
but on the contrary hope for an inheritance from 
them. The result of socialising the costs of ageing but 
keeping the benefits of wealth accumulation private 
has shifted the nature of the generational contract be-
yond recognition. 
Socialising the generational contract has had unantic-
ipated and unintended effects, which interact, through 
the political system, with long-term demographic de-
velopments. Modern Europe is ageing rapidly. The 
changing demographic pyramid may give politicians 
incentives to cater for the demands of the elderly, since 
they are becoming numerically ever more dominant, 
and to overlook the concerns of young people. They 
may be encouraged to focus more on paying out sav-
ings than in the investment for the future. In many 
European countries, a majority of voters are either re-
tired or expect to retire within the next legislative pe-
riod of the elected parliaments. These voters are very 
heavily focused on the provision of payouts. In addi-
tion, younger citizens have lower voting rates. As a re-
sult, the political structure is often described as a 
gerontocracy, and that perception may feed into the 
sense of younger potential voters that they are disen-
franchised. Voting ratios may thus fall even further, in-
dicating that young people wish to opt out of the po-
litical system, and further confirming its character as a 
gerontocracy. Pensions and old age care are more sali-
ent politically than education provision, which in 
some (not all) European countries is quite neglected. 
Speaking to the European Parliament, Pope Francis 
memorably described Europe as producing the “gen-
eral impression of weariness and ageing, of a Europe 
that is now a ‘grandmother’, no longer fertile and 
vibrant.”1 These effects – the marginalisation of the 
young and the assertion of the self-interest of the old 
– interact, and these interactions form the subject of 
this chapter.
It might be objected that a rational middle-aged voter 
– or even a late middle-aged or early retired voter – 
1 Ball, D., “Pope Describes Europe as ‘Elderly and Haggard’,” Wall 
Street Journal, 25 November 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
pope-says-europe-needs-new-sense-of-purpose-1416915190.
might have a far-sighted motive in pushing for more 
investment in the education of the young in order to 
guarantee higher returns, and thus facilitate existence 
in their high old age – in the future. That incentive is 
reduced, however, by the time gap between the deci-
sion and the expected outcome: the rational voter 
might either hope that technical change may produce 
unexpected windfalls that make old age more support-
able, even on reduced incomes compared to present-
levels; or fear that investments are no longer generat-
ing the returns that were available in the past. The 
forecast of a secular stagnation made by John 
Maynard Keynes and Alvin Hansen in the 1930s has 
recently found new and influential advocates such as 
Larry Summers.
The extent to which the balance has shifted in favour 
of the older cohorts varies from country to country, 
and is driven by demography, changes in fertility and 
mortality, but also by migration. One of the most 
striking developments of post-war Europe has been 
the increase in life expectancy, with the result that 
most Europeans look forward to a long period after 
their retirement, or after they cease to be economically 
active. Evidence from the second half  of the twentieth 
century shows that increased life expectancy has no 
positive effect on enhancing per-capita income 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007). By living longer, peo-
ple have placed themselves in the position of extract-
ing more resources from the contractual pool. 
Since labour mobility is a key feature of the European 
Union, it might be anticipated that the young will use 
the exit option from the most gerontocratic societies, 
making their already problematic social imbalance 
even more lop-sided and ultimately unsustainable. 
Gerontocracies thus create a vicious feedback loop, 
through which they constrain the only sources that 
could provide a basis for continuation.
2.2 Generational conflict and class conflict
In the nineteenth century, European politics was char-
acterised by class conflict, in which a propertied upper 
class used the levers of political power to perpetuate 
its advantages. That polarisation persisted through the 
twentieth century, although by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, observers increasingly found that 
the old ideological divisions had become obsolete. 
Today, there is a new mood of intergenerational con-
flict, and a questioning of the way that the current 
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contract has been constructed. The class conflict of 
previous centuries is reasserting itself  in the genera-
tional clash in a new way. Since it is the well-educated 
and affluent, the major beneficiaries of the state’s ex-
penditure in the early life phase, that follow healthier 
life styles, they also live longer. So they are the benefi-
ciaries of the transfer payments in old age. Striking 
new data (Case and Deaton, 2015) shows for the US – 
but not for Europe – an increase in middle-aged mor-
tality, particularly in lower income groups, as a result 
of suicides, drug and alcohol poisoning. The possibil-
ity of analogous developments in response to eco-
nomic downturns in Europe is clearly worrying. 
Education and longer life expectancy have generally 
become the levers used by the privileged to secure and 
perpetuate their advantages. They live longer, extract 
greater resources in pensions and medical care, and 
then expect to leave larger legacies to their children. 
The most powerful protest movements may be expect-
ed to arise precisely where the gerontocracy is strong-
est, primarily involving a mobilisation of younger 
generation voters, and the old-established political 
parties may prove unable to mobilise the young pre-
cisely in these areas.
Moreover, there is an asymmetric sharing of longevity 
risk between the individual and the welfare state. 
Welfare state provisions like pensions and health are 
effectively life-annuities, and hence the welfare state 
carries the burden if  an individual lives for a long time. 
In the opposite case, a large bequest is made to the de-
ceased’s heirs, since inheritance taxes are relatively low 
in most countries.
The housing lock-in also creates a hold-up problem in 
property taxation. There are powerful arguments why 
property should be taxed, but such taxes are very un-
popular, and old voters in particular strongly argue 
against such taxes. This problem becomes larger the 
more the old are locked-in with large owner-occupied 
houses/apartments. In this way the existence of  the 
lock-in blocks tax reforms, shifting tax from labour 
income to property. There is an additional reason why 
a lenient taxation of  housing is not youth friendly: 
such taxes are capitalised in housing prices, and high-
er property taxation would thus reduce housing val-
ues for the old, and lower house prices to the benefit 
of  the young. 
A powerful mechanism cementing inter-generation-
al stability in the twentieth century derived from 
productivity increases. Economic growth could en-
sure that each generation would realise that it was 
better off  than previous generations, and thus could 
easily and unproblematically afford to pay for the 
old. At the height of  this confidence, it was easy to 
agree on a principle of  dynamic pensions, in which 
pensions were regularly adjusted not just to cost of 
living increases, but also to productivity increases. 
They were spectacularly popular politically: the 
West German election of  1957, that followed imme-
diately after the introduction of  the dynamic pen-
sion principle, is the only one in German history 
where a party (the ruling party) received an absolute 
majority of  votes. As productivity faded, however, 
the promises incurred at this time began to look as if  
they were too much of  a burden. Falling productivi-
ty growth reduces both market returns (real interest 
rates) and the implicit return in PAYG. But even in 
absence of  the productivity slowdown, the changing 
demographic composition of  the population was to 
have adverse effects – the implicit return in PAYG 
schemes falls when fertility goes down (longevity 
goes up). 
The advantages of the old, and the under-privileging 
of the young, in modern Europe take the following 
forms:
1. Labour regulations giving security of employment 
that fundamentally benefit older workers, and es-
tablish disincentives for employers to hire younger 
people (the dual labour market, that especially 
characterises Mediterranean Europe).
2. Property ownership, in which older people have 
real estate, and younger purchasers (especially in 
urban centers) are deterred by rising prices (and 
cannot get onto the lower rungs of the “property 
ladder”).
3. Pension schemes, mostly originally designed as 
PAYG systems, in which the funding of  the pen-
sion entitlements of  younger people looks precar-
ious as demographic projections predict that there 
will be fewer new earners paying in (“as you go”).
4. Socialised medical insurance systems, in which in-
creasingly expensive care for older people domi-
nates the cost structure.
5. Government debt, in many cases incurred in or-
der to maintain the advantages of  the elderly, 
may become unsustainable, so that the following 
cohorts may not be able to fund themselves in the 
same way.
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6. Environmental damage, in which present output is 
obtained cheaply at the cost of future generations, 
who have to bear the burden of the clean-up costs.
2.3 “Bank Papa”: how the dual labour market creates 
dependence
Perhaps the most obvious and politically explosive 
breach in the principle of the modern social contract 
is that large numbers of expensively trained or edu-
cated young people are excluded from the labour mar-
ket, and in the course of unemployment or underem-
ployment or engagement in low productivity occupa-
tions, suffer a deskilling that reduces their long-term 
chances of productive employment, and hence their 
capacity to repay as part of the contract. They have 
received expensive training (perhaps not enough of it), 
but they are in no position to repay into the social con-
tract. Relatively high rates of youth and younger gen-
eration unemployment have been a phenomenon of 
crisis economics, but the phenomenon of high rates of 
exclusion in some parts of Europe preceded the crisis. 
Even in high pre-crisis employment countries such as 
Spain, employment growth was concentrated in low-
skilled sectors (such as construction) in which there 
was little stability or potential for skill enhancement. 
The conjunction of employment guarantees for estab-
lished employees together with poorly developed so-
cial security systems is a feature of southern European 
labour markets, while northern Europe has moved to 
greater overall flexibility in labour contracts while 
maintaining security (protecting people rather than 
jobs). The difficulty of dismissing established employ-
ees can mean that poorly motivated workers are 
trapped in low productivity jobs, and that employers 
are reluctant or unwilling to hire new workers. Both 
effects depress the possibility of economic growth, 
and thus limit society’s capacity to create and open 
new opportunities for a next generation. Younger 
workers are excluded from the regular or protected 
market, are frequently unemployed, and when they do 
find employment move rapidly through a succession 
of short-term contracts, in which it is harder to accu-
mulate skills. 
But this development is not only characteristic of 
southern Europe. Throughout the industrial world, 
the development among young people of a culture of 
short-term “gigs” fosters the development of what is 
often termed the “precariat” (Sennett, 2006; Standing, 
2014). Changes in economic structure and the advent 
of new technologies have produced a corporate insta-
bility, which means that the old assumptions of secure 
life time employment with one employer are no longer 
realistic. In some cases, “gigs” are presented as lowly 
paid, or unpaid internships, in which the sole motivat-
ing goal for the young worker is supposed to be a valu-
able work experience, but where interns require finan-
cial support, usually from parents. 
The problem of excessive job security as a source of 
inflexibility has been recognised for a long time, and in 
most southern European countries during the 1990s 
and 2000s there was a vigorous debate about reforms 
to create more flexible labour markets. But it remained 
a largely theoretical debate. Tackling the issue re-
quired real courage: indeed, in Italy just as anti-mafia 
judges and prosecutors were assassinated, there were 
two notorious cases in which economists were killed 
because of their identification with the cause of la-
bour market reform. In May 1999, during the Romano 
Prodi administration, Massimo D’Antona, a centre-
left law professor who advised the Minister of Labour 
on reform, was killed in Rome. In 2002, under the cen-
tre-right Berlusconi government, Marco Biagi, was 
killed as he cycled to work in Bologna. He had been 
calling publicly for a reform of the pension system, 
but also for a reform of Article 18 of the 1970 Labour 
Statute, which required the reinstatement of dismissed 
workers if  the dismissal was judged unfair by an adju-
dication panel. The Biagi case in particular highlight-
ed the variety of the opposition to reform. Biagi, like 
D’Antona, was killed by left-wing terrorists, the so-
called New Red Brigades; but Biagi had received mul-
tiple threats, and the Minister of the Interior withdrew 
his police protection a few months before the killing.
The failure to reform before the crisis is one explana-
tion for the striking rise in youth unemployment dur-
ing the economic crisis, which was most characteristic 
of southern European crisis countries, but was also 
evident in central and eastern Europe (see Figure 2.2). 
In both areas, it has produced a widespread sentiment 
that political process is failing younger people. By 
contrast, the Scandinavian countries, the Baltics and 
Germany are doing much better, and they look like 
more of a magnet for the young (see Chapter 4). 
Statistics on youth unemployment tell a similar story 
to the measured ratio of those not in employment or 
education; in other words those who are so discour-
aged that they opt out of the formal labour market 
and training altogether (see Figure 2.3). But even the 
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continued education of the non-NEETS may not be 
an altogether positive sign, as it may simply represent 
a way of escaping the dismal realities of the labour 
market. The cyclical response of youth unemployment 
(relative to aggregate unemployment) was generally 
not that different during the Great Recession to past 
business cycles – but clearly the large number makes 
the problem more visible. The Great Recession thus 
highlighted a fundamental pre-existing weakness (and 
perhaps spurred reform initiatives). 
The stasis and rigidity of labour markets also interacts 
with a deficiency in human capital. It is difficult to es-
tablish which is cause and effect: it could be either that 
poor employment prospects act as a deterrent to ob-
taining better qualifications, or that the absence of 
qualifications makes young people less attractive on 
the labour market. Improving education might be a 
way around the problem of the 
gerontocratic society and polity, 
but it obviously needs to be the 
right education and not simply a 
diversionary substitute in the ab-
sence of employment (see Chap-
ter 3). Educational attainment in 
Italy was poor by international 
comparison: in 2000, only 36 per-
cent of adults had finished sec-
ondary education, compared to 
an EU average of 42 percent; for 
higher education the figures were 
10 and 20 percent respectively (al-
though there has since been some 
improvement in the Italian fig-
ures: the respective proportions 
were 42 and 16 percent in 2012). Other indicators of 
skill levels demonstrated a lag compared with north-
ern Europe. Three quarters of Italian enterprises car-
ried out no vocational training. 
But we do know what happens to the most skilled 
young people: many of them emigrate from societies 
with high levels of youth unemployment, indicating 
that the causation may flow from the institutional fea-
tures of the labour market to the proclivity to seek 
qualifications. About 60,000 young people are thought 
to emigrate annually from Italy, over two thirds of them 
with college degrees. The outflow of the young is driven 
partly by very high rates of youth unemployment; but 
also by a sense that society is organised to marginalise 
them. The high rates of outflow are also characteristic 
of central and eastern Europe, where the “brain over-
flow” even affects economically dynamic countries such 
as Poland (Kaczmarczyk and 
Okólski, 2008). 
The figures on the flows are very 
unreliable, and thus only give a 
rather impressionistic view of the 
phenomenon. The data in the 
countries of origin are strikingly 
incomplete, as many of the emi-
grants (unlike in the classic emi-
grations of the nineteenth centu-
ry) do not announce their inten-
tion to emigrate. A comparison 
between the official Italian figures 
and applications by Italians for 
United Kingdom National In-
surance Numbers (NINos) shows 
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a discrepancy of a factor of four, as well as different 
trends: the United Kingdom data suggests a consistent 
rise in outflows during the period of the financial crisis 
(see Figures 2.4 and 2.5). The overwhelming (and in-
creasing) share of this outflow is young, aged 18–24, 
with a smaller share of 25–34. There are almost no 
over-35s. This data is merely illustrative: the United 
Kingdom receives fewer Italian immigrants than 
Germany, Switzerland, France and Belgium. 
The emigration of the young and talented makes the 
demographic pyramid even more problematical, and 
raises the question of how social security systems will 
be financed in the future.
The phenomenon of youth exit as a response to geron-
tocracy was evident even prior to the euro crisis. In a 
widely discussed public letter to his son published in 
2009 in the newspaper La Repubblica, the head of 
Rome’s LUISS university Pier 
Luigi Celli wrote: “This country, 
your country, is no longer a place 
where it’s possible to stay with 
pride ... That’s why, with my heart 
suffering more than ever, my ad-
vice is that you, having finished 
your studies, take the road 
abroad. Choose to go where they 
still value loyalty, respect and the 
recognition of merit and results.”2 
After the outbreak of the crisis, 
the exodus increased. 
The exodus of the young is obvi-
ously a phenomenon that could 
be reversed: Ireland, for instance, 
suffered from this problem in the 1980s, but as the 
economy grew sharply at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, many skilled Irish workers returned and contrib-
uted to economic growth. In order for that reversal to 
take place, however, the societies of origin have to 
change in order to become more open and more inno-
vative. The more their politics is under the sway of the 
old, the less likely that is to happen. This is the first 
feedback loop that makes for the self-reinforcement of 
the gerontocracy.
The newer northern European model of greater la-
bour market flexibility with higher benefits for those 
seeking work (a safety network) has been more effec-
tive in reducing the potential for the exclusion of 
younger people from the social contract. That model 
also deals more successfully with the education part of 
the social contract. By contrast, the gerontocratic pol-
itics of southern Europe protect vested (middle-aged) 
interests, and have been counter-
productive and endanger long-
term sustainability.
2.4 “Hotel Mama”: property 
ownership 
If  the labour market in geronto-
cratic countries pushes young 
people out, they are sometimes 
kept back by the structure of 
2   Celli, P. L., “Figlio Mio, Lascia Questo 
Paese,” La Repubblica, 30 No vember 2009, 
http://www.repubblica.it/2009/11/sezioni/
scuola_e_universita/servizi/celli-lettera/celli-
lettera/celli-lettera.html.
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property ownership: not that they 
own property, but rather that they 
expect to inherit property. 
Property accumulations are held 
largely by older people, who 
might be thought to provide for 
their old age in realising the assets 
accumulated over their lifetime. 
But home ownership is particu-
larly problematic. In the absence 
of financial innovations such as 
reverse mortgages it is hard for 
the elderly to realise their assets; 
and old people may be locked 
into over-ample housing that they 
cannot use and, in some cases, 
even maintain as a result. Habit 
formation may imply that the old stay on in “large” 
houses/apartments – or smaller alternatives may not 
be available in the neighbourhood. There is thus an in-
efficient allocation of housing resources, with dwell-
ings that are too big for the old and unavailable to the 
young. The locking in of property means that it be-
comes harder for subsequent generations to make 
their own starts on the property ladder; and the 
younger employed or unemployed (Section 2.3) are es-
pecially disadvantaged. 
These developments and their effects differ substan-
tially throughout Europe. Property ownership, and in 
particular real estate, plays an important part in the 
accumulation of family wealth, but not everywhere. 
Real estate ownership varies substantially from coun-
try to country; it is notoriously low in Germany and 
Austria, relatively low in France, but higher in south-
ern and (perhaps surprisingly) in 
eastern Europe (see Figure 2.6).
The ownership is concentrated in 
the older age cohorts. It falls off  
after the age range 55–64, but by 
less than the classic life-cycle hy-
pothesis of Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954) would lead us to 
expect: in other words, heads of 
household tend to retain substan-
tial assets that they intend to pass 
on to future generations.
The phenomenon of high con-
centration of property in older 
cohorts is particularly striking in 
the Benelux countries, but also in some Mediterranean 
countries (see Figure 2.7). In Germany and Austria, 
the wealth of the 75+ year-old age group is strikingly 
lower than elsewhere, a phenomenon which the 
Bundesbank has tried – slightly oddly – to explain in 
terms of the legacy of a wartime generation (the 75+s 
in 2010 were born before 1935) that was not able to 
make an initial accumulation of wealth because of mi-
gration; more importantly perhaps, this generation 
did not inherit substantial amounts from its predeces-
sor (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013, p. 23).
Children have to “wait” a long time, often until late 
middle age or even after their own retirement, before 
they can realise the wealth that they think of as part 
of the family contract. With increased longevity, the 
waiting period grows longer. In the classic form of the 
family transfer union, the children are thus held in a 
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state of dependency for a long time (unless they seek 
to escape).
In the gerontocratic societies in particular, young peo-
ple find it hard to afford housing, and young men in 
particular often stay at “Hotel Mama” into their thir-
ties or forties as a result. They form a “boomerang 
generation” or “jilted generation”, gathered in “accor-
dion families” (i.e. they are continually contracting 
and expanding). In France, the outcome is known as 
the “phenomène Tanguy” (after a popular film depict-
ing a nerdy son), while in Japan it is referred to as that 
of “parasite singles”. This pattern of behaviour is 
common to both southern and eastern Europe (for-
merly communist economies), with surprisingly high 
proportions of 25–24 year olds living with their par-
ents; it is rather rare in northern Europe. The United 
States and Japan lie in between these extremes. In eve-
ry country, men are more likely to boomerang than 
women. The Hotel Mama occupants are also less 
skilled, and more likely to be unemployed. 
There may be reasons to think that Hotel Mama is a 
good outcome in that it strengthens inter-generational 
solidarity. Multi-generational households were also a 
striking feature of the pre-industrial world. But today, 
it generally does not look like a very attractive option, 
and in reality, it often coincides with family breakdown 
that is more characteristic of lower income groups. As 
the rapper Macklemore put it: “It’s not dope to be 
25 and move back to your parents’ basement.”3
In fact, the Hotel Mama phenomenon is part of the 
overall individualisation of society, and a reflection of 
the increasing fragility and disintegration of the con-
cept of the modern nuclear family: however unattrac-
tive the return to the parental home is, it is easier than 
leaving it to form a new couple/family. The marrying 
age rises sharply, and the formation of family units de-
creases. The family – a central part of the traditional 
picture of the contract across generations – is thus 
subject to what amounts to an effective penalty, a pen-
alty that is higher in lower income groups and that, in 
this sense, contributes to enhanced inequality. 
Many explanations have been given for the rise of 
Hotel Mama. They include shortages of affordable 
housing, including rentals, as well as difficulties in reg-
istering new residences. Rent control can obstruct an 
adequate supply of new apartments. Declining rates of 
marriage and higher ages at first marriage might play a 
3 From the song “Otherside”.
role. There are more singles among the middle and old 
age groups, and city living (agglomeration) seems to 
make a single existence more attractive. The non-avail-
ability of child care could also be a factor in keeping 
married children with their parents (an especially east-
ern European phenomenon). The property price trap 
particularly affects the inhabitants of big booming 
metropolitan centers; it can scarcely hold true for a 
great deal of rural Europe, where – out of easy range 
of big cities – property prices are falling, and villages 
and small towns are being depopulated. But in the 
United Kingdom, London has the lowest proportion 
of adult children living with their parents. The precari-
ous labour market for young people is also to blame 
(see Section 2.1). Some argue that the phenomenon of 
the precariat that produces this outcome is the result of 
big companies and globalised capitalism; and that only 
effective Nordic welfare states can provide any amelio-
ration (Newman, 2012). There are also cultural expla-
nations that seem much older: for instance that Italy 
has a well-developed culture of mammismo. 
Here we can identify a second vicious cycle diametri-
cally opposed to the first: in this cycle, young people 
are trapped by the interaction between the labour 
market and the housing market, so that they stay at 
home, and do not search for the kind of jobs that 
might generate greater overall prosperity. If  the first 
cycle identified was that of the exit or exile option, this 
is the internal exile choice. 
Ultimately, the phenomenon reflects some aspect of 
the inadequate economic opportunities and capacities 
open to young people. Some analysts conclude that 
the state has a responsibility to make expand those op-
portunities, by orienting the welfare state more to-
wards the young and by providing greater encourage-
ment of job training and searching for productive 
employment.
The discussion of how the welfare state might contrib-
ute to the hotel mama phenomenon requires some re-
finement. It is in cases where the principal element of 
the welfare state consists in payments to the old – 
largely through pensions – that the mobility of young 
people and their ability to set up independent house-
holds are most reduced.
The over-dependence on property, and particularly on 
real estate as the preferred safe and high yielding 
mode of asset accumulation, leads to a misallocation 
of resources and a trap that helps to keep young peo-
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ple at home. Incentives to reduce the blocking of 
housing by the old include the possibility of reverse 
mortgages, but also higher rates of property taxes 
(which are often a political taboo in southern Europe). 
The generational allocation of housing is another area 
where the northern or Scandinavian social model per-
forms better (see Figure 2.8). 
2.5 “Bank Grampers”: pensions 
Old age pensions amount to a considerable part of 
government spending on social transfers. In most 
countries – the exceptions are Italy and Spain (where 
the share falls dramatically after 2000) – the tendency 
is for that proportion to rise. There are two causes of 
this tendency. In part the trend simply reflects the age-
ing demographic pyramid, but this fact and the gen-
eral improvement of health in late 
middle age in industrial societies 
suggest an obvious solution to the 
problem: that retirement ages 
should be raised. This conclusion 
has been reached by almost every 
commission or think tank that is-
sues reports on the pension fund-
ing problem (for example Pen-
sions Commission, 2004), and 
many countries have introduced 
some form of age indexation 
pushing up pensionable ages. 
In addition, pensions have in-
creased because of provisions 
that often both index and guaran-
tee a certain increase, even when 
there is a low cost of living in-
crease. Between 2007 and 2014, in 
every European country except 
Poland (where there was a slight 
decline) and Malta (no change), 
the relative median income of 
pensioners has risen, in many cas-
es significantly. In France, Greece, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, Romania 
and Spain the ratio is over 1. In 
many countries, the increase was 
a result of the phasing in of la-
bour market pension schemes, 
and was thus an intended conse-
quence to increase replacement 
rates. In the United Kingdom, 
where the Eurostat figure for the ratio is only 0.86 for 
2015 the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimated that the 
median income of pensioners (394 British Pounds per 
week) was higher than the median income of the rest 
of the population (385 British Pounds per week). A 
prominent conservative politician David Willetts re-
sponded to the publication with the comment that the 
United Kingdom had become “a country for older 
generations.”4 In many countries, including Europe’s 
most dynamic economies, the cost of the financial cri-
sis in terms of reduced earnings has fallen on the 
young, rather than the old (see Figure 2.9). A recent 
report by the Resolution Foundation (United 
Kingdom) on the income effects of the financial crisis 
accordingly reported a 12.5 percent decline in the in-
4 Willets, D., “Pensioners Prosper, the Young Suffer. Britain’s Social 
Contract Is Breaking,” The Guardian, 24 October 2015, 
http: / /www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/24/
young-bear-burden-of-pensioner-prosperity.
Proportion of 25–34 year olds at home in 2014
Source: Eurostat.
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comes of 22–29 year olds between 2009 and 2014, and 
identifies them as a “jinxed generation;” while the in-
comes of over-60 year olds only fell by 3.7 percent.5
The problem is not simply one resulting from the fi-
nancial crisis, but also a longer term question of the 
adjustment of pensions in the light of changes in eco-
nomics and demography (lower expectations of 
growth, higher longevity). Many countries are trying 
to tackle pension sustainability by moving away from 
defined benefits systems to defined contributions for 
supplementary pensions (above a welfare minimum), 
in other words by transiting from PAYG to funded 
schemes. The debate over raising retirement ages is go-
ing on almost everywhere. But social benefits for old 
age as a proportion of total social payments have been 
rising in many countries (with the striking exceptions 
of Germany and Greece) (see Figure 2.10).
There are two obstacles to tackling even a simple issue 
such as adjusting the retirement age to demographic 
development. One is actuarial, and follows from the 
uncertainty surrounding projections of future life ex-
pectancy. It is hard to predict the future development 
of mortality and longevity, and hence to calculate an 
appropriate pension base. Thus an OECD calculation 
suggests a 4.5 year increase in longevity by 2050, with 
an implication of an increased pension cost of 3.4 per-
cent of GDP, while an alternative calculation by 
Tuljapukar et al. (2000) suggests 7.5 years and a cost 
of 4.4 percent; and a simple extrapolation of the linear 
trend in declining mortality gives 11.0 years and 5 per-
5 See Resolution Foundation (2015) and Cosslett, R. L., “Does the 
Government Hate Young People? It Certainly Feels that Way,” The 
Guardian, 16 October 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2015/oct/16/government-young-people-student-loans-housing.
cent (Lee 2007). Population projections in recent years 
have tended to be upwardly adjusted as regards lon-
gevity, i.e. increases in longevity have been higher than 
anticipated.
The second barrier to tackling the retirement age is 
the fact that the future of public pensions is intrinsi-
cally connected to developments in other modes of 
pension provision: company schemes and individual 
pension savings plans. Both were widely hailed as a de-
sirable reform that would secure the adequate funding 
of retirement in a new demographic environment, and 
were at the heart of many countries’ pension reform 
plans that sought to move away from a dependence on 
publicly-funded PAYG schemes. The adoption of al-
ternatives was part of an attempt to move away from 
defined benefits. But both the alternatives are current-
ly under pressure. Public policy requirements that 
company pensions (the second pillar) meet certain 
guaranteed performance criteria have made it increas-
ingly unattractive for companies to offer such provi-
sions. While older workers may be grandfathered into 
older and more generous schemes, these are not avail-
able to new hires. Private pension schemes will equally 
be endangered by continued low interest rates. Both 
developments mean that more retirees will be depend-
ent on public schemes, and the political pressure not 
to cut such schemes is higher.
In normal times pensions became a political third rail: 
an attempt at adjustment (by raising the retirement 
age, for instance) was politically impossible. Some 
countries that introduced such a reform later had to re-
tract the change, because opposition featured promi-
nently in the election campaigns of parties that were 
propelled into government by the 
voters of the elderly. Germany un-
dertook such a move in 2007, with 
a provision for a gradual raising 
of the retirement age from 65 to 
67. After the formation of a new 
Great Coalition government in 
2014, the measure was retracted 
and provisions introduced for full 
pensions – under certain circum-
stances – at 63. In 2015, as one of 
its first acts, the newly elected 
right populist Law and Justice 
(PiS) government in Poland re-
versed the 2012 pension age in-
crease. Other countries like the 
United Kingdom have introduced 
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special pensioners’ bonds that pay a higher rate of re-
turn in order to try to preserve private pensioner earn-
ings in the face of the general reduction of interest 
rates. It is not difficult to see that both the German and 
the United Kingdom measures are driven by competi-
tive electoral pressures to woo the “grey vote”.
In crisis countries, with high rates of youth unemploy-
ment, the pensions of older people (grandparents) are 
used as a source of income for much wider family 
groups, and cuts consequently generate an even great-
er degree of political resistance, so that not only the 
grey vote threatens actuarial calculations on the ad-
justment of pensions.
Pension reform, especially in southern European coun-
tries, has become a standard part of the response to the 
government debt crisis. One of the reasons that it has 
been so sensitive politically is that it interrupts the fam-
ily transfer union. In most of the crisis countries, pen-
sion reforms involve a raising of the retirement age, 
usually involving an equalisation of retirement ages 
between men and women, the limitation of provisions 
enabling enhanced payments, and adjustments to pro-
visions for earlier retirement on public pensions if  a 
specific number of years’ payments has been made. 
Greece had a uniquely complicated system, with 
133 separate public pension funds before the crisis. As 
part of the agreement with the troika (European 
Commission, International Monetary Fund and 
European Central Bank), the government embarked 
on an initial round of reforms in 2010, whereby the re-
tirement age for women was immediately set at 65, the 
same as the age for men, and pensions after 2012 were 
linked to GDP fluctuations. In addition, there were re-
ductions and special taxes on higher pensions, with 
penalties for early retirement before 60, a practice that 
had been widespread before the financial crisis. In 2012 
Greece made further cuts in higher level pensions and 
increased the retirement age to 67; it was only then that 
a hard commitment to coordinate pensions through 
the use of a social security number was undertaken. In 
2014 Greece committed to the requirement that, as of 
the beginning of 2015, supplementary pension funds 
would only be financed by own contributions. 
In Italy, the 2011 reform set the retirement age for men 
at 66, with women reaching that age by 2018. The pay-
ment moved to a defined contribution (contributivo) 
for employees hired after 1996, while the defined ben-
efits were kept for earlier payments of older workers. 
But many of the additional commitments to a long-
term schedule of raising pension ages, such as in Spain 
where 67 is the age that will be mandated by 2027 or in 
both Italy and Spain where the retirement age is to be 
linked to life expectancy, are problematic in the sense 
that they may be reversed. In both Greece and 
Portugal, constitutional courts were used to reverse 
important parts of the pension reforms. (This is not 
just a European issue: courts in the United States have 
also intervened to block cuts in public sector pen-
sions.) As European countries exit from crisis pro-
grammes with the International Monetary Fund, 
there will be more political leeway to reconsider the 
pension question. In addition, reductions in pension 
entitlements are also often compensated for by in-
creases in other forms of transfer, notably disability 
payments. 
Shifting the bulk of pensions (including public sector 
pensions) from defined benefits to defined contribu-
tions is a prerequisite for the long-term sustainability 
of the pension system. Sustainability also requires a 
shifting to higher retirement ages. The easiest way of 
protecting both moves from political pushback is by 
setting Europe-wide norms, but that mechanism is 
also susceptible to political pushback.
2.6 Paying for grampers: medical insurance
Medical insurance is also a way of making transfers to 
older people. For most of their lives, people pay in to 
explicit or implicit (welfare state) insurance schemes, 
including state schemes. In old age, and in especially at 
the end of their lives, they become recipients of pay-
ments. Technical change means that an increased vari-
ety of treatments and procedures are available that are 
also more expensive. Most medical expense occurs in 
the last years of life, although obviously it is not al-
ways clear with medical interventions whether they 
will be made or not in a terminal case. The rising costs 
are putting medical care systems under pressure in 
every country.
Medical payments – both in absolute terms and ex-
pressed as a proportion of per-capita GDP – are high-
er in the richer countries (with the United Kingdom as 
an outlier on the high side), and very low in most for-
merly communist countries (see Figure 2.11). 
Advances in medical technology, with a wider and 
more expensive range of treatment options, are push-
ing up costs. Prosperous societies are in a better posi-
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tion to realise the benefits and general welfare gains, 
but the advances also clearly pose a funding problem.
Like pensions, state provision of medical insurance 
was intended to help people escape from dependence 
on their family in old age. In practice, the combination 
of pensions and medical benefits has allowed individ-
uals to preserve larger shares of their accumulated as-
sets, which are then available as legacies. In this way, 
the young are held in a kind of dependence.
The United Kingdom, which is comparatively an out-
lier in terms of the high cost of care and medical treat-
ment in old age, has been propelled by the expense of 
the medical liability to embark on a much stricter pro-
gramme whereby old people’s assets are used to pay 
for their long-term medical care, and hence leaving 
less available as bequests to children. But the reform 
was also linked to a ceiling on the 
amount that an individual would 
pay for long-term care, so as to 
preserve some assets that could be 
bequeathed. 
Medical costs are also rising due 
to the individualisation of  socie-
ties: in many countries, hospital 
beds are occupied by elderly and 
fragile people who are not criti-
cally ill, but cannot safely be re-
leased because they live on their 
own without anyone to care for 
them. There is more generally 
the probability that an increas-
ingly large sector of  the elderly 
population will require long-term care (see 
Figure 2.12). The rise predicted is especially steep for 
the Scandinavian countries. That care can either be 
financed through the development of  an insurance 
system featuring higher payments by current mid-
generation individuals; or through the rigorous en-
forcement of  a means-tested and means-based pay-
ment system, designed to mobilise the locked-in as-
sets of  the elderly (Section 2.2).
The combination of health and retirement costs is in-
creasing fiscal pressure, which is likely to be particu-
larly severe in some northern European countries, in-
cluding the Benelux countries, the United Kingdom 
and Norway (see Figure 2.13). 
The health care explosion will disproportionately af-
fect the most prosperous European countries, and 
they too are likely to face the 
prospect of exit, especially by 
skilled younger people (see next 
section). They will need to con-
sider some combination of im-
porting cheap labour for health-
care or the mechanisation/roboti-
sation of healthcare.
2.7 Running away from grampers: 
debt dynamics 
There is an intergenerational as-
pect to debt. Public debt repre-
sents a commitment by taxpayers 
in the future to make payments 
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for goods and services that have been supplied in the 
present. As a result, an argument is often made that 
debt financed activity should be confined to invest-
ments – for instance in infrastructure – that will pro-
duce substantial returns for future citizens. Debt fi-
nanced growth can pay down debt; but in the absence 
of that growth, a vicious cycle sets in. If  debt produces 
a promise of larger future burdens, it will prompt 
those who are bound to shoulder those burdens to try 
to escape: or in Albert Hirschman’s terminology to 
“exit” (cf. Hirschman, 1970). But that choice will 
make the predicament worse. When productive and 
innovative (young) people abandon their country, they 
leave behind a highly indebted country. Now the debt 
has to be paid off  by a smaller, less productive, ageing 
population. In a sense, individual citizens have the op-
tion to “walk away” from their government debt obli-
gation by leaving the country. Emigration can be seen 
as an individual’s “private default 
option” on government debt.
Emigrants also walk away from 
infrastructure financed by previ-
ous generations. If  that infra-
structure is extensive and well-de-
signed, would-be emigrants have 
incentives not to move and to stay 
with a free gift from the past. In 
cases where, however, flawed in-
vestments in inadequate infra-
structure in uneconomic areas 
predominate, the incentives are to 
move away. The extensive debt-fi-
nanced infrastructure invest-
ments for Greece’s Olympic 
Games in 2004, crumbling stadia 
and swimming pools, do not con-
stitute a strong argument for 
young people to stay in Greece. 
However, individualised educa-
tion and the accretion of human 
capital – another important in-
vestment by the welfare state – are 
movable. Some European coun-
tries with education systems that 
are generally recognised as supe-
rior – such as Finland – suffer 
from the problem that highly edu-
cated young people take the exit 
option and withdraw their accu-
mulated human capital, without 
contributing in taxes to financing the education of the 
next generation.
Emigration has strained welfare provision within na-
tional states. Germany’s eastern Länder and the 
Italian Mezzogiorno are also predominantly areas 
where the young move and the old remain. In the case 
of nation-states, social and medical services are pro-
vided by budget transfers, so that taxpayers in the 
more prosperous and dynamic areas shoulder the fi-
nancial burden. This burden sharing currently does 
not take place in the case of cross-border or interna-
tional migration. Debt burdens vary substantially be-
tween countries (see Figure 2.14).
The ability to exit debt in an economic area constitut-
ed by high labour mobility provides one of the clearest 
arguments for the partial mutualisation of debt. The 
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alternative would be to move to a contributions-based 
insurance system of old age pensions on a cross-na-
tional or European basis.
2.8 There’s nowhere in the world to run: sustainability
The phenomena of advantages for the old at the ex-
pense of the young, as described so far, exist at the na-
tional level and are a result of national choices about 
education, pension, medical and tax regimes. But 
there is also a global sense in which today’s middle-
aged population is living at the expense of subsequent 
generations. The build-up of environmental damage is 
often interpreted as a burden that today’s generation is 
imposing on its successors without that cost having 
been unambiguously calculated. The current genera-
tions do not internalise the costs. 
Processes such as global warming will require costly 
adjustments by subsequent generations. Some argue 
that these high costs could be avoided by relatively 
small investments today. The failure to make these 
present day investments is effectively a tax on tomor-
row’s generation – a generation that is already being 
starved of life opportunities because of the way in 
which incentives are currently structured.
The landmark 2006 report by Nicholas Stern suggest-
ed that the eventual costs of global warming would 
amount to around 5 percent, and perhaps – in a cata-
strophic scenario – up to 20 percent of world GDP, 
while tackling the problem today would have a much 
lower present price tag (1 percent of GDP), cf. Stern 
(2006). But there are major difficulties in devising pro-
grammes that will really lead to environmental sus- 
tainability.
Some attempts to deal with the problem – like holding 
out the prospect of a radical reduction in the use of 
carbon emitting fossil fuel in the future – make the 
problem worse. Hans-Werner Sinn’s Green Paradox 
examines the way in which the perception that an en-
ergy product such as petroleum will not have any value 
in the future prompts an increase in present produc-
tion (Sinn, 2012). The resulting price pressure also 
constitutes a gain for today’s consumers at the expense 
of tomorrow’s population. The discussion of long-
term sustainability highlights the urgency of current 
measures to reduce the sources of global threats, par-
ticularly in the area of CO2 emissions.
2.9 Conclusion
Many aspects of  the challenge of  generational equity 
have been handled well in Denmark, or more gener-
ally by the Scandinavian model (see Chapter 4). This 
especially applies to labour market and housing is-
sues. The co-existence of  successful and unsuccessful 
models might be seen as a way of  showcasing policy 
best practice, and enhancing the reform drive in less 
successful cases. But the process of  institutional ad-
aptation is complex, and also painful. The more pain 
exists, the greater the likelihood of  a mass exit by in-
dividuals – and reduced overall sustainability. That 
threat is a powerful inducement to a search for over-
arching cooperation on Europe-wide retirement in-
surance that transcends national boundaries and 
corresponds to a high degree of  inter-European la-
bour mobility, and in the end to move towards some-
thing akin to the fully integrated United States social 
security system. Global threats (on climate sustaina-
bility) also require global solutions, and cannot be 
resolved on a solely national, or even on a European 
level.
Europe may be confronting a radical choice over 
where the responsibility lies for enforcing an effective 
and just social contract. On the one hand, there is the 
option of continuing with the old pattern of compet-
ing national examples, which has produced very suc-
cessful institutional adaptation in the past, but which 
in a world of high mobility is threatened by the possi-
bility of exit from policy failures. On the other hand, 
there is the option of Europeanising some part of the 
intergenerational contract and, at the same time, pro-
tecting it from political interference – an interference 
that is characteristic not just of states with poor per-
formance and failed policies, but also of apparently 
successful economic models. It is currently rather hard 
– perhaps even impossible – to see the national state in 
Pigouvian terms as “protecting the interests of the fu-
ture in some degree against the effects of our irration-
al discounting and of our preference for ourselves 
over our descendants.”
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Tuning Secondary 
educaTion
3.1 Introduction
Education is always on every parent’s mind and re-
peatedly hit the headlines in Europe during 2015. In 
Italy, the government introduced legislation (La 
Buona Scuola) hiring up to 100,000 permanent teach-
ers at substantial budgetary cost, improving school fa-
cilities with both public and tax-subsidised private 
funds, including some unpaid work activity by stu-
dents in the high-school curriculum, and reforming 
education management: some organisational and per-
sonnel decisions are decentralised, granting more 
powers to school principals in selecting, coordinating, 
and rewarding teachers (whose unions protested very 
vocally). 
In France, school reforms triggered first-page head-
lines, heated debates, and street demonstrations 
when the government introduced a broad reform of 
the lower secondary schools attended by 10–13 year 
old students (Collège: mieux apprendre pour mieux 
réussir). The new curriculum relaxes disciplinary 
constraints, introducing “pragmatic” pedagogy; it is 
partly chosen autonomously at the school level, 
where managers are granted more control over their 
staff. The socialist government’s stated goal was to 
ease the difficulties encountered by disadvantaged 
students, deemphasising traditional subjects in fa-
vour of  interdisciplinary approaches to themes of 
practical interest, and encouraging schools to adapt 
their teaching to the varied backgrounds of  their stu-
dents. The opposition criticised the watering down 
of  sound disciplinary knowledge in favour of  the su-
perficial “zapping” of  fashionable topics, and point-
ed out that the suppression of  difficult optional sub-
jects (including Latin and Greek) would prevent ca-
pable poor students from obtaining the elite knowl-
edge others can obtain from their families or private 
tutors. Stronger criticism (and strikes and street dem-
onstrations) came from teacher unions, which not 
only despised the inter-disciplinary approach, but 
also argued that school autonomy would widen the 
gap between “good” and “bad” schools; that the new 
powers of  school managers would reduce collegiali-
ty; and that the needs of  disadvantaged students 
would be better served by smaller classes, suitably 
sorted according to student ability. 
In Finland, were public school teachers are highly re-
garded and students have performed very well in inter-
national, standardised tests, the right-wing govern-
ment introduced sweeping and controversial reforms: 
to reduce budgetary costs, private school attendance is 
to be subsidised by public funds (at a per-student cost 
lower than that of public schools); to make schooling 
more relevant and interesting, school curricula are to 
be reorganised around practical topics (such as “res-
taurant operations”) rather than traditional academic 
subjects (such as languages, mathematics, and chemis-
try, all of which can be useful when running a 
restaurant). 
Education reforms can have large short-term budget-
ary effects and a strong influence on longer-term 
growth and inequality trends. Those briefly summa-
rised above differ widely in these respects, but all are 
similarly controversial and all deal with the more or 
less practical orientation of curricula, with school au-
tonomy and private education, and with teacher man-
agement. This chapter reviews such issues, focusing 
particularly on the organisation of the secondary or 
“middle” education level which, across European 
countries, is configured more differently than elemen-
tary education (where children achieve the basic skills 
necessary to interact with society beyond their imme-
diate family) and tertiary education, (where young 
adults obtain the more specialised knowledge they will 
individually bring to the labour market). Even more 
than in other economic policy areas, opinions about 
education policy differ sharply, and tend to be rooted 
in one’s own experience and viewpoint, rather than on 
hard evidence and broader perspectives. This is par-
ticularly the case at the secondary school level, which 
steers teenagers towards the labour market or higher 
education, and plays a crucial role in shaping both so-
cial and economic outcomes. 
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Section 3.2 outlines how the pros and cons of different 
secondary education models depend on various insti-
tutional, political, and economic features. Section 3.3 
uses those insights to discuss how education systems 
have evolved over time in Europe. Section 3.4 briefly 
reviews heterogeneous educational institutions within 
and across European countries. Section 3.5 inspects 
the resulting heterogeneity of schooling outcomes, 
their dynamics over time, and interprets current re-
form tensions in the light of the insights and evidence 
discussed in previous sections. Section 3.6 asks wheth-
er and how country-level policy choices might benefit 
from supranational EU-level coordination, and 
Section 3.7 offers some conclusions.
3.2 Education policy problems
There are several conceptually distinct reasons why 
education is a matter not just of individual choice, but 
of collective policy. 
3.2.1 Public benefits
Some of the benefits of education (in the form of in-
come and social status) accrue to individuals being ed-
ucated. But some spill over to other individuals, espe-
cially when taxation or collective bargaining imply 
that net income is not closely related to individual pro-
ductivity. And because society as a whole benefits 
when individuals communicate and cooperate, educa-
tion is partly a public good. Society wants children to 
be educated not only because of a paternalistic inter-
est in their future individual welfare, which their par-
ents may not appropriately take into account, but also 
because it is in everybody’s interest that all members 
of society acquire basic social skills. Education skills 
are necessary for the creation of well-functioning eco-
nomic and sociological networks; and as such, they in-
volve substantial positive externalities that justify 
public intervention from everybody’s point of view. 
The mandatory and collectively financed basic educa-
tion of every family’s children thus stems from basic 
economic considerations. 
While these aspects are clearly relevant for elementary 
or primary education, at more advanced levels each 
individual’s social and economic position can be 
strengthened by increasing his or her own education, a 
“human capital” that yields returns that are not pub-
lic, but private, and all the more so because skills are 
more valuable when they are scarce. There are, how-
ever, good (if  controversial) reasons for policy to 
shape individual skill accumulation: unlike other pri-
vate goods and services, skills are produced and trad-
ed in markets plagued by financial constraints, imper-
fect information, and externalities. 
3.2.2 Financial imperfections
Employers can finance the acquisition of “specific” 
skills that are useful only when working for them. The 
acquisition of broader “general” skills should be fi-
nanced by the same individuals who will reap invest-
ment returns in the labour market: but human capital 
is not good collateral for loans, and equity participa-
tion in a person’s labour income is hardly enforceable 
by private contracts. Poor children cannot self-finance 
their own education, and in free markets would ac-
quire inefficiently low skills. Society is the ultimate 
employer of all its members, and it can be efficient to 
finance their education with public funds. 
3.2.3 Imperfect information
Information about the quality of education, unlike 
that of fruit and vegetables, is difficult to obtain by in-
spection and impossible to assess through experience: 
those who by middle age find out that their education 
was of poor quality cannot go back and try again. So 
it can be efficient for education to be produced, or at 
least monitored and certified, by public bodies, if  the 
latter can assess and enforce quality standards better 
than individual market participants.
3.2.4 Coordination problems
Besides financial constraints and imperfect informa-
tion, externalities also make it difficult for markets to 
supply education efficiently. Education is group activ-
ity because the average cost of individual education is 
smaller in larger classes and, much as one might want 
to tailor school curricula to each student’s ability and 
ambitions, within each community students must be 
grouped in a limited number of school types. The pro-
duction process and the value of education are influ-
enced by the quality both of group teachers and of 
fellow students (through “peer effects”). So it would 
be very hard for markets to price education so as to 
appropriately influence individual choices. Even in the 
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absence of financial constraints and information 
problems, only very complicated pricing schemes 
(where school fees depend on each student’s and the 
classmates’ assessed and possibly evolving quality) 
could ensure that all individual choices appropriately 
take into account interpersonal spillovers. In more re-
alistic situations, good students may hoard into 
schools that are good only because they are populated 
by good students: a preference on the part of good 
teachers for teaching good students reinforces this 
mechanism, and nothing guarantees the efficiency of 
the resulting polarised quality distribution of schools. 
3.2.5 Policy imperfections
For all these reasons education is very rarely left com-
pletely to market forces. Policy decisions, however, 
also need to tackle difficult issues. To what extent 
should education be funded privately or by tax reve-
nues? Should it be provided by public or private or-
ganisations, and in either case should families be al-
lowed to choose among different schools? Should stu-
dents be offered the choice of different curricula, or 
selected in specific ones, or should they all receive the 
same education? Should such policy decisions be tak-
en centrally, or decentralised? The answers depend on 
the amount and quality of information available, and 
on whether that information is used in ways that fulfil 
suitable policy objectives, in each possible con- 
figuration. 
3.2.5.1 Centralisation of control
The state cannot know everything, and administrative 
decisions may not necessarily be based on good infor-
mation, particularly given that teachers may manipu-
late it. Because the performance of teachers and the 
output of schools is difficult to assess, administrative 
controls focus on inputs and on bureaucratic process-
es, but cannot control teacher effort and behaviour 
tightly. Hence, the public production of education 
may end up benefitting school workers, rather than 
school customers. Parents who enrol their children in 
private schools, or sit on the board of a school fi-
nanced by local property taxes, can observe the 
school’s operations more accurately, and provide more 
stringent oversight of school staff, than a distant min-
isterial bureaucracy. However, they may or may not 
use that information, and the power resulting from 
their ability to choose and control powers in the broad 
public interest, or even in their own. Incompetent 
school customers may well be more easily pleased by 
schools that teach and assess only very easy material 
and make students appear very clever, instead of mak-
ing them work hard. 
3.2.5.2 Decentralised choices
In the presence of market failures, market-like alloca-
tion mechanisms that let families influence school re-
sources (via the direct payment of fees, or mobility 
across locally financed school districts, or the alloca-
tion of public vouchers or enrolment-based transfers) 
need not be beneficial. Families are not only poorly 
informed about school output, but their choices may 
fail to internalise the relevant externalities: schools 
may end up being good only because they are attended 
by the culturally privileged children of rich families. 
Moreover, since school quality is relative and depends 
on the quality of enrolment, allowing school choice 
can trigger an arms race: even although half  of the 
students will ultimately have to be enrolled in schools 
of lower-than-median quality, parents will spend 
whatever resources are needed in order to try and stay 
ahead. 
3.2.5.3 The pros and cons of differentiated schooling
There are two conceptually distinct, but tightly related 
ways of “tracking” or “streaming” students across 
classrooms and schools. One, more relevant at young 
ages, is to separate them according to ability, but teach 
them the same material at different levels and in differ-
ent ways. The other, more relevant at subsequent stag-
es, is to group students by attitude and work objectives 
and teach them material that is substantively different, 
in programmes of different duration. 
Society is obviously better off  if  medical studies and 
other long and demanding educational programmes 
are attended by youths who find it easier to learn and 
understand, while those with lesser intellectual ability 
should be assigned to routine jobs. Hence, selecting 
students into different education programmes can be a 
good idea if  the abilities and talents of individuals can 
be reliably assessed. The implications of ability group-
ing, however, are not as clear for average achievement, 
and very clear for achievement inequality. Grouping 
students according to their ability can improve or 
worsen average education depending on how effective-
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ly teachers can deal with class heterogeneity and on 
whether, through “peer effects,” the quality of fellow 
students benefits low performers more or less than it 
slows down stronger students. Policy is more strongly 
influenced by the more obvious distributional implica-
tions of mixing or separating heterogeneous students. 
It can be efficient to impart different education to stu-
dents of differing capabilities, regardless of whether 
their abilities are truly their own as individuals, or 
stem from family influences. But assessing individual 
ability is very difficult, and family background plays a 
crucial role in determining children’s school careers 
and achievements. To the extent that education con-
tributes to individual human capital, high quality stu-
dents are naturally more interested in their own educa-
tion, than in that of their classmates. Hence, views and 
opinions on the structure of education beyond the 
very basic elementary level are unavoidably polarised 
and controversial. Disadvantaged students and socie-
ty may well benefit from comprehensive schooling, but 
segregation furthers the advantage of privileged 
students. 
3.3 Historical trends
Mandatory, free, and uniform elementary education 
was essential to ensuring the economic viability and 
political sustainability of the country-sized nations 
that a few centuries ago replaced family- and village-
level interactions with industrial production and ex-
tensive specialisation of labour. To participate effec-
tively in such a socio-economic system, individuals 
obviously need to use a common language and abide 
by common rules. Hence the public-good role of edu-
cation, as a means of fostering social communication 
and cooperation, was and remains a crucial element 
of European socio-economic systems.
3.3.1 Secondary schooling
If  primary education was the first form of education 
to be publicly funded and organised in Europe’s na-
tion states, secondary education followed as soon as 
technological and organisational progress required 
more advanced skills and delayed the age of labour 
market entry. 
The secondary school programmes attended by teen-
agers provide youths with more advanced general 
skills, useful for those who will attend tertiary educa-
tion, but also for those who will be learning-by-doing 
or training in the labour market. However, secondary 
schools can, and often do, also teach more practical 
skills to the many youths who will seek employment 
immediately after completing their secondary educa-
tion and, especially in cases where skills are not firm-
specific, youths cannot count on employers’ willing-
ness to train them while working as apprentices (as in 
the Swiss system described and analysed by Wolter, et 
al., 2006; Dionisius et al., 2009, document and discuss 
also the German system, where formal schooling and 
institutional constraints play a more important role). 
Their role in sorting youths into and out of  tertiary 
education, and between early and later job market en-
try, respond to technological and political changes. 
When machines replace brute force and production 
takes place in complex organisations, schools have to 
equip workers with technical and supervisory skills. 
As in other policy areas, European countries histori-
cally pursued similar goals with different tools, imple-
menting various combinations of  locally and nation-
ally organised education, often funding and regulat-
ing private education, as well as organising public 
schools. 
The timing and character of the process that sorts stu-
dents across various curricula has also changed over 
time in every country’s history, in response to techno-
logical and socio-political forces. Over time, academic 
schools meant to prepare students for tertiary educa-
tion (such as private elite schools run by the Jesuit or-
der, Napoleonic Lycées, Austro-German Gymnasiums) 
evolved alongside vocational secondary education in-
stitutions that traced their origin to the apprenticeship 
system of craftsmen’s guilds, came to be organized by 
industrial employers or their associations, and were 
formalised by nation-states in the form of dual educa-
tion systems that combine public education with prac-
tical skill transmission by private employers. 
As more complex socio-economic interactions began 
to require not only basic literacy, but also more ad-
vanced general skills, a role similar to that of elemen-
tary schools became natural for similarly comprehen-
sive secondary schools, which could also be politically 
attractive to the extent that tracked schooling tends to 
perpetuate and extend socio-economic inequality. For 
these reasons, reforms typically delayed not only the 
age at which students enter the labour market over 
time, but also the age at which they are sorted across 
academic and vocational tracks. 
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Many European countries adopted comprehensive 
lower secondary schools in the 1960s (Italy, for exam-
ple, did so in 1963; France’s relevant legislation was 
introduced in 1959, but some curriculum differentia-
tion persisted until 1975). Scandinavian countries 
took the same route somewhat later and more drasti-
cally: for example, in Finland a reform phased in be-
tween 1972 and 1977 increased the tracking age in sec-
ondary education from age 10 to 16, abolished aca-
demically-oriented upper secondary private schools, 
and was associated with significantly stronger inter-
generational income mobility (Pekkarinen et al., 
2006). Socialist countries kept early tracking and vo-
cational education as a mainstay of the secondary 
school systems way beyond the 1970s; Poland’s educa-
tional reform only delayed tracking in 1999 and this, 
together with greater resources devoted to education 
(particularly to instruction time), resulted in signifi-
cantly better PISA test results (OECD, 2011).
3.3.2 Tracking versus comprehensive schooling
While these trends are broadly similar across Europe, 
their timing and the resulting organisation of second-
ary education are very different across countries and 
over time. And there is a notable exception to the 
trend towards delaying tracking and extending com-
prehensive education in German-speaking countries, 
where children as young as 10 are already sorted ac-
cording to their school performance, into tracks teach-
ing standard subjects at different levels and in differ-
ent ways. In Germany, Austria, and Switzerland the 
preparation offered by the more academically ambi-
tious lower-secondary tracks is suitable for upper-sec-
ondary tracks that lead to University enrolment; that 
offered by the less ambitious tracks is suitable for vo-
cational upper-secondary tracks, mixing classroom 
work with workplace apprenticeships, meant to bring 
students quickly to labor market or in some cases to 
practical tertiary education programs. 
Because secondary schools meant to provide universal 
and mandatory education face a task that is more 
complex and difficult than preparing students either 
for work or for higher education, transitions from the 
latter “tracked” to the former “comprehensive” model 
typically were, and often still are, problematic. Schools 
tasked to teach a common curriculum to students with 
very heterogeneous backgrounds and different goals 
are, in effect, asked to perform a multitude of tasks. 
They may end up performing none well, as obscure 
compromises between supporters of an egalitarian 
single track and those who stress the efficiency of ear-
ly tracking can result in a gradual relaxation of quali-
ty standards, monitoring, and comparability of results 
(Bertola and Sestito, 2011 and 2013, review Italy’s 
comparative experience in this and other respects). 
Confused policy guidelines naturally result in a relaxa-
tion of administrative controls. To the extent that 
egalitarian pressures are effective, some equalisation 
may result in the grades attained by students. But lax 
control may allow schools and teachers to minimise 
their own efforts, instead of maximising either the vo-
cational or the academic achievements of their stu-
dents. From this point of view, it is not surprising that, 
after the vast expansion of European educational sys-
tems in the baby-boom years, the downsizing of teach-
ing staff  was often avoided by decreasing class sizes or 
reducing teacher class time. Yet, in the absence of ped-
agogical efforts targeted to weaker students, actual 
competencies will be largely determined by family 
background, and remain highly unequal.
3.4 Heterogeneity, within and across countries
The structure of European educational institutions is 
very heterogeneous in many more respects that it is 
possible to consider here, but some aspects are par-
ticularly relevant to the policy issues outlined in 
Section 3.2. 
3.4.1 The role of family background
The implications of early tracking are very different 
for different social groups, because the “quality” of 
students that plays a crucial role in arguments sup-
porting simpler schooling is very closely linked to 
family background. Test score differences between 
children at the extremes of the distribution of the 
number of books at home, an observable proxy of a 
family’s socio-economic level, can be as much as three 
times what students on average learn during a whole 
school year (this is the case in England, the country 
with the largest such differential among those studied 
by Hanushek and Wößmann, 2010).
Family background is extremely relevant not only to 
school results, but also to university enrolment, and to 
further socio-economic success. Figure 3.1 shows that 
this is also very much the case in France, a country 
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where family background influences test scores rela-
tively mildly (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2010, report 
a difference equivalent to about one school-year be-
tween households with the most and the least books at 
home). It is not surprising to see in the figure that chil-
dren hailing from better backgrounds are, on average, 
more competent at age 10, when they have already 
been able to take advantage of their family’s cultural 
background. It is more unsettling to see that many 
children from underprivileged families are just as 
smart as their peers at that age but, even in a relatively 
egalitarian and meritocratic school system, socio-eco-
nomic privilege strongly determines the probability of 
reaching advanced education opportunities. If  the 
family’s head is a scientist or a teacher, a child assessed 
at ability level 5 on a 1–10 scale has a 50 percent prob-
ability of enrolling in higher education, a key step to 
further economic and social success for him and his 
children; while a similarly clever child has less than a 
10 percent probability of success when the head of his 
family is unemployed, or fails to report any occupa-
tion. The ability of some children in the latter situa-
tion is scored at 9 or 10, but even they have only a 
50 percent chance of success. If  it is so difficult for the 
smart children of disadvantaged families to reach 
higher education, not only is inequality higher and 
more persistent, but society is also missing an oppor-
tunity to exploit the available talent pool. 
3.4.2 The role of tracking
The relevance of socio-economic background varies 
across countries in ways that both theory and evidence 
suggest depend on the age at which secondary schools 
students are “tracked” across 
more or less demanding curricula. 
Because tests can easily misjudge 
talent, one’s ability to learn or to 
perform can only be assessed by 
actually trying and possibly fail-
ing to do so. And because children 
from low-income households can 
hardly afford to try and fail, 
school systems that either allocate 
or allow self-sorting of youth 
across different programmes tend 
to aggravate and perpetuate socio-
economic inequality. 
This mechanism influences in-
come inequality and socio-eco-
nomic status persistence at two levels (Brunello and 
Checchi, 2007). Early tracking makes it more difficult 
for the brightest among underprivileged students to 
reach higher education, but can make it easier for the 
average underprivileged student to obtain training and 
valuable intermediate skills. In countries with earlier 
tracking, it is not impossible, but typically quite diffi-
cult for students to move from less demanding to more 
demanding academic tracks if  they do well. Still, the 
vocational upper-secondary school tracks do impart 
both general and practical skills, and prepare their typ-
ical students to perform strongly in a society that val-
ues jobs well done. In England, conversely, secondary 
schools target the rather specialised academic skills as-
sessed by A-level exams, and the absence of well-devel-
oped and articulate vocational tracks leaves too many 
youths uneducated, leading to calls for education re-
forms aimed at developing character, resilience and 
communication skills, rather than just pushing chil-
dren through “exam factories” (Corrigan, 2013). 
3.4.3 The role of private schools
The percentage of students attending private schools 
varies widely in the OECD Education at a glance sta-
tistics, which distinguish between schools controlled 
by a non-government organisation but largely funded 
by public money (among the EU member countries of 
the OECD Belgium, Spain, Denmark, and France fea-
ture double-digit percentages of primary and second-
ary student enrolment in such schools), and independ-
ent schools for which over 50 percent of core funding 
is private (these schools enrol over 10 percent of upper 
secondary students only in Poland and Portugal). 
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The appeal of private schools is re-
lated to the intensity of tracking, be-
cause in a comprehensive system 
privileged families may prefer to seg-
regate their children in socially selec-
tive schools. Not only the size, but 
also the characteristics and role of 
the private school sector differ sig-
nificantly across countries, including 
those within the EU.
Figure 3.2 plots some evidence for 
EU member countries covered by 
the OECD survey. In the top panel 
the test results are not correlated 
across countries with a measure of 
private funding: while privately 
managed schools typically do cover 
more of their costs with user fees 
than government schools, their stu-
dents do not always perform better 
in the standardised PISA achieve-
ment test. This would be quite sur-
prising if  the best students were se-
lected into a private sector that sup-
plies better education: performance 
should be stronger in private 
schools, all the more so where the 
percentage of school funding from 
fees or charges paid by parents differ 
more across private and government 
schools. 
The middle and bottom panel of the 
figure show possible reasons for this. 
PISA test scores quite intuitively 
tend to be better in more demanding 
schools, which attract more capable 
students and make them work hard-
er. But private schools are not al-
ways more selective and more rigor-
ous than public schools: in other 
countries, such as Italy, the opposite 
is the case (for definitions and for-
mal evidence).
Government-organised schools may 
cater for low or high ability students, 
leaving different market niches to be 
filled by privately-funded schools. 
School resources can be configured 
in ways that complement individual 
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ability, or remedy its deficiency. If  public schools are 
tailored to suit average or median ability, there is room 
for expensive private schools that use their additional 
resources to cater for better students. But students in 
expensive private schools will be less talented when 
those schools use their autonomy in ways that attract 
slow learners away from demanding government 
schools. 
3.4.4 Funding, choice, and control 
Like vouchers and other schemes that allow families 
to choose between schools, the public funding of au-
tonomously operated schools can relax the borrowing 
constraints that exclude brilliant, but poor students 
from better schools. More or less stringently regulated 
privately-managed schools are fully funded by the 
government in Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Germany (where federal states provide varying 
amounts of funding to private schools), Hungary, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, 
Slovak Republic, Serbia, Slovenia, and Sweden. 
Allowing the school system to cater more effectively to 
the distribution of heterogeneously skills can improve 
equality of opportunities, while simultaneously en-
hancing the productivity of society’s educational re-
sources. But if  high-quality government schools at-
tract the more capable segment of the student pool, 
then the public funding of privately-organised educa-
tion benefits students who are not rich or dumb 
enough to purchase unsubsidised remedial education. 
While the resulting redistribution across differently 
wealthy and differently able individuals may be politi-
cally attractive in some cases, the public funding of 
private schools need not enhance the overall equality 
of opportunities and efficiency in countries where 
governments supply high-quality education (Bertola 
and Checchi, 2013).
In France, the state pays and certifies all teachers in 
private schools that accept strict curriculum regula-
tion, and for this reason French public and private 
schools are not flagged differently in PISA data. 
Because families may choose to enrol their children in 
private schools, rather than attend their local public 
schools, private school enrolment is to some extent 
driven not only by religion (most state-funded private 
schools are Catholic), but also by an avoidance of un-
derprivileged classmates. Interestingly, the relation-
ships illustrated in Figure 3.1 between achievement 
and family background are a little weaker at private 
schools, where parental education is also less relevant 
to student performance: children of culturally disad-
vantaged families who can afford to pay private school 
fees (which are small, but not negligible in France) ap-
pear to find more suitable help in private schools than 
in public schools where teachers have passed more 
stringent tests, and are more demanding, but less help-
ful (Bertola, 2015). 
When public school teachers are academically compe-
tent, but have little incentives to help students who do 
not come from well-educated families, families that 
are culturally poor but financially unconstrained may 
pay for the remedial education they cannot obtain 
from state schools in private schools. In the English 
system, public schools are administered by local au-
thorities, and families have limited freedom in choos-
ing among them (Burgess et al., 2015). “Academy” or 
“Free” schools are semi-autonomous state-funded 
schools, and their appeal and performance at least 
partly reflects the fact that their management is more 
likely to serve students’ (rather than teachers’) needs.
 
While families’ freedom to choose their children’s 
school exerts performance pressure on educators, it 
can be problematic in practice. In Sweden publicly-
funded, privately-operated schools cannot select ap-
plicants, and have to accept students on a first-come, 
first-served basis. As a result, demanding families have 
to apply for admission to “good” schools (attended by 
children of other demanding families) as soon as a 
baby is born. It is natural to doubt that choices made 
so far in advance can be based on reliable information, 
and to wonder whether choice really improves educa-
tion quality in a system where good schools are good 
only because children hail from good backgrounds, 
rather than because of their teachers’ quality and ef-
fort. Yet, it is difficult to control the natural and pos-
sibly detrimental tendency towards school segrega-
tion. Even in countries that restrict school choice by 
linking enrolment to residence, and aim to provide 
uniform education everywhere, similar mechanisms 
are at work through residence choices. Families that 
move to areas where schools are good raise housing 
prices. As housing becomes less affordable for poorer 
families, a self-reinforcing loop tends to segregate 
population segments geographically, and the opportu-
nities offered by nominally similar, but really different 
schools tend to perpetuate those differences across 
generations. This mechanism is empirically detectable 
in France (Fack and Grenet, 2010), and plausible in 
any country where population is segmented, for exam-
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ple, according to national origin 
or other cultural characteristics. 
It may be particularly relevant 
when, as is currently the case, 
European countries are receiving 
unprecedented numbers of asy-
lum seekers. Allowing them to 
cluster in specific areas would en-
danger the broader cultural ho-
mogeneity that is essential to so-
cial and economic interactions 
within every country. 
3.5 Schooling outcomes and 
reforms
Institutional differences are significantly related to 
schooling outcomes in ways that can be interpreted 
sensibly in the light of Section 3.2’s outline of theo-
retical mechanisms. International evidence suggests 
that early tracking increases educational inequality 
and might perhaps reduce mean performance, which 
is enhanced by outside evaluation (typically in the 
form of standardised exams) of autonomous teachers 
and school administrators (Hanushek and Wößmann, 
2006, 2010). Competition from private schools can 
also offer appropriate incentives to autonomous 
school choices, all the more so when privately-operat-
ed schools receive more generous public funding. For 
if  good students, no matter how poor, may indeed 
choose private schools, competition forces public 
schools to use the degrees of freedom they are allowed 
in the production of education. The association of 
student achievement with school resources – whether 
measured in terms of expenditure, or of class size and 
teacher-student ratios – is empirically much weaker 
than that with socio-economic backgrounds. Teacher 
education and salaries do have a positive effect, espe-
cially when the class size is large. How much the teach-
ers are paid does matter to the selection of good per-
sonnel, but motivation and respect matter more. And 
what they are made to do, particularly through the ac-
countability implied by standardised exams and pa-
rental freedom of choice, may matter even more. 
Here, we briefly outline and discuss some aspects of 
the wide cross-country heterogeneity of education 
outcomes across EU member countries. While very 
many other structural and policy features differ across 
and within those countries, these indicators are cer-
tainly related to the structure of countries’ education 
systems on the one hand, and to the level and distribu-
tion of their citizens’ income on the other. 
3.5.1 Education across and within EU countries
Figure 3.3 reports summary indicators of  student 
competencies in an international survey (PISA for 
15  year-olds, PIRLS and TIMMS for 4th and 
8th  grade students). There are obviously very wide 
gaps across countries in the actual skills of  individu-
als at similar stages of  their education career. While 
better education appears to lead to faster economic 
growth on average (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2009), 
the competences assessed by international surveys are 
not obviously correlated with per-capita income. 
Some countries (such as Italy until the 1980s) have 
much higher incomes than one would expect on the 
basis of  their students’ school performance, presum-
ably because formal education is not as complemen-
tary to their production structure as in other 
countries.
These statistics, which report the shares of more or 
less competent students, document that educational 
outcomes vary within as well as across countries. They 
obviously also vary over time, and an interesting 
source of relevant information is the International 
Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) that was collected in 
1994, 1996, and 1998, and can be used to measure the 
number of years of formal schooling and skills (in 
terms of performance on a literacy test) of adult indi-
viduals whose schooling experience dates back to 
many years in the past.
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Figure 3.4 displays the mean of 
years of education and of compe-
tences for individuals born in two 
different periods for all available 
EU countries, and also the coeffi-
cient of variation of these indica-
tors. There is a high degree of het-
erogeneity across countries in 
both the duration of education 
careers and in the resulting com-
petences (OECD’s more recent 
PIAAC survey of adult compe-
tences detects similar cross-coun-
try patterns, particularly confirm-
ing the peculiarly low competenc-
es of Italian adults). The two in-
dicators are positively related, but 
the same number of school years 
results in much higher compe-
tences in Nordic countries. 
Interestingly, and perhaps as a re-
sult of differently organised edu-
cation, the countries with lower 
mean competences and education 
years often also display higher 
levels of variation in these indica-
tors across their citizens. Den-
mark and Germany, for example, 
are obviously very different in 
many respects: but if  only their 
education systems were different, 
then one would conclude that the 
Danish system delivers both high-
er and more equal education out-
comes than its German counter-
part. Over time, however, cohorts 
born in later years in all countries 
feature both higher means and 
(except in Hungary) lower coeffi-
cients of variation of these educa-
tion outcomes. 
Heterogeneity of education is 
very high within as well as across 
EU countries, but does tend to 
decrease over time. Figure 3.5 
shows that, as a result of both co-
horts’ education and demograph-
ics, average years of education in 
the working-age population con-
verge across the EU countries for 
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which information is available. Between 2000 and 
2010, 0.11 years of the initial educational difference 
were erased on average across the countries shown 
(0.20 if  Portugal is excluded).1 This process would ob-
viously take a long time to substantially reduce the 
wide heterogeneity observed in 2000 (when average 
years of education ranged from 10 years in Spain, and 
below this figure in Portugal, to about 13 years in 
Germany and in the United Kingdom). However the 
underlying socio-economic trends, unlike the income 
fluctuations generated over the same period by the cri-
sis, do indicate that EU countries tend to become 
more homogeneous over time.
3.5.2 Reform pressures and resistances
European school systems have been converging re-
cently, but remain very different. It would be too com-
plex and difficult to reconstruct the historical origins 
and discuss the implications of this heterogeneity. It is 
somewhat easier to discuss, in light of the insights and 
facts reviewed in the previous sections, the motivation 
and implications of reforms like those outlined in the 
introduction, focusing in particular on their tendency 
to invert previous trends privileging comprehensive 
education, and to emphasise practical and vocational 
education instead. 
Historically determined schooling systems are diffi-
cult to reform, and the most important effects of any 
reform are not realised for a long time. However, be-
cause the pros and cons of school systems depend on 
circumstances, school reforms are endlessly debated 
among individuals and families whose circumstances 
differ, and occasionally implemented when society’s 
own circumstances and perspectives change. The fi-
nancial and public debt crises of 2008 and 2010 cer-
tainly did influence European countries’ education 
budgets, as well as the appeal of their different educa-
tion system structures. 
Between 2009 and 2011 education expenditure fell 
continuously in Ireland, in Spain, and in Italy: these 
are the only 3-year spells of declining education ex-
penditure in Eurostat data, and were plausibly a result 
of the euro crisis, as during the same three years, edu-
1 The small decline in the average years spent in education in 
Germany is not due to recent reforms, which have reduced pre-ter-
tiary schooling from 13 to 12 years in most states as of 2012. It began 
already in the 1990s (German reunification should not be influential 
because the data claims to refer throughout to the same territory). In 
the IALS data of Figure 3.4, years of education are higher for those 
born in 1940–44 than for those born in the following 10 years, and in-
crease over younger cohorts.
cation expenditure always increased in Germany, 
France, and Luxembourg (EACEA, 2012). 
And while comprehensive schooling was perceived as 
adequately providing the general skills to adapt new 
technologies and perform new jobs in flexible, evolving 
labour markets before the crisis, the strong perfor-
mance of countries with “dual” track education sys-
tems triggered a reassessment of this view. Cross-
country differences in the labour market situation of 
youths had always depended on educational system 
characteristics, and became much more pronounced as 
Germany and its neighbours withstood the crisis far 
better than other countries (EEAG, 2013, pp. 76–7). 
The implicit jobs-for-life promise of the Germanic sys-
tems of dual vocational education and tightly regulat-
ed occupational and wage-setting schemes seemed ob-
solete before the crisis, when academic skills and a flex-
ible labour market appeared better equipped to adapt 
to frequent and unpredictable shifts in the demand for 
skills. But a crisis where flexibility and financial mar-
kets showed their shortcomings vastly increased its ap-
peal. Dual education systems have had the advantage 
of leading to lower rates of youth unemployment. This 
is the reason why even the United States under Presi-
dent Clinton seriously discussed the introduction of a 
German-style dual education system as a possible way 
to increase average labour productivity and integrate 
disadvantaged youth into civil society. 
Of course, it is difficult for other countries to simply 
adopt a dual educational structure that may not neces-
sarily fit their other institutional and structural char-
acteristics as well as it does in Germany, Austria, or 
Switzerland. The costs and benefits of vocational edu-
cation need to be shared between the public and pri-
vate sector in possibly unfamiliar ways, and should be 
assessed over a lengthy and uncertain transition peri-
od. These simple considerations may nevertheless ex-
plain why the reforms briefly outlined in the introduc-
tion above all tend to introduce practical aspects in 
more or less effective academic curricula, even if  their 
budgetary implications are negative when the govern-
ment aims to stimulate demand (as in Italy), or posi-
tive when the government adheres to the austerity par-
adigm (as in Finland). The discussion above also sug-
gests reasons why reforms tend to introduce manage-
rial control over public school teachers, and makes it 
unsurprising that reforms encounter two types of op-
position: from those who, even under the country’s 
new circumstances, support more egalitarian compre-
hensive education on the one hand, and from teachers 
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defending both academic curricula and their own 
work habits on the other. 
3.6 The role of EU institutions
Should some central authority or collective agency fi-
nance education, restrict choices, collect and certify 
information at the EU level? As discussed above, the 
answers are not clear-cut at the country level, because 
they depend on structural factors and points of view. 
However, the same questions and the same qualified 
answers are appropriate when considering policy is-
sues across tightly integrated nations, and many as-
pects of the policy problem interact with European 
integration.
3.6.1 Cultural homogeneity
Homogeneous and publicly-provided elementary 
schools were a backbone of national projects, and mu-
tually reinforced the cultural convergence originating 
from countrywide economic interactions. A suitable 
and possibly homogeneous cultural level is beneficial 
across national borders when international mobility 
becomes easier. EU institutions are, in fact, active in 
facilitating some relevant cultural exchanges. This is 
the explicit goal of such exchange programmes as 
“Erasmus” for university students and “Erasmus+” 
for secondary school teachers, administered by 
EACEA, the EU’s Education, Audiovisual and 
Culture Executive Agency. 
3.6.2 Monitoring
EACEA also monitors and documents the bewilder-
ing array of current configurations and ongoing re-
forms of education systems on its Eurydice website, 
which is the source of much of the information re-
ported in the previous sections and interpreted in light 
of theoretical issues and broader international evi-
dence. This information, and that collected and ana-
lysed by the OECD’s Directorate for Education and 
Skills, is obviously very valuable, not least because it 
can foster cross-country “yardstick” competition. 
Families can hardly choose to send their children to 
school in other countries, and international competi-
tion among systems cannot exercise the same perfor-
mance pressure exercised by private schools on public 
schools within countries. But families, and their politi-
cal representatives, can in principle use information 
from other systems to gauge their own system’s per-
formance, and act accordingly. 
As is the case within countries, this mechanism could 
be strengthened by availability of standardised exam 
results. As usual, when discussing EU issues it can be 
useful to consider how similar issues are addressed in 
the Unites States, a much older economic and mone-
tary union with a solid federal layer of government. In 
the Unites States, states can adopt the “Common 
Core State Standards” specification of expected 
achievement at each grade level of elementary and 
secondary school, and good results in tests can give 
them access to some federal funds. As many as 
42 states have adopted these standards since they were 
introduced in 2010, but increasingly many of these 
states (most recently Massachusetts in November 
2015) are rejecting them for reasons that would cer-
tainly also be relevant in Europe: the achievement 
tests cover a curriculum that is necessarily very limit-
ed, with a danger of “teaching to the test” and neglect-
ing broader, but less easily measured educational 
achievement, yet too uniform to fit states’ diverse so-
cio-economic circumstances. Conservative supporters 
of state autonomy, supported by teacher unions re-
senting evaluation of school performance by abstract 
and imprecise tests, have even reversed the initial 
adoption of Common Core standards in Massa-
chusetts, replacing them with tests that are locally de-
signed and administered.
3.6.3 Coordination
There are obvious reasons not to envision homoge-
nous schooling across vast and diverse regions: diverse 
school systems, each homogeneous within, are diffi-
cult to design, and their boundaries need not coincide 
with those of countries or regions. In the education 
field, in fact, the European Treaties do not envision 
any “harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States” through directives. As in welfare and 
labour policy, the historically determined configura-
tion of national education systems is too heterogene-
ous and politically important to be subject to the same 
degree of harmonisation as goods market regulations, 
or to unification as in monetary policy. 
European “Bologna process” guidelines exist for 
higher education: member countries and single insti-
tutions, on a voluntary basis, can harmonise the dura-
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tion and, to some extent, the content of  university 
curricula, making it possible to implement the ECTS 
university credit transfer system. The role of  EU poli-
cies is similar, but even less significant in the vocation-
al education and training aspects on which this chap-
ter focuses. CEDEFOP, the European Centre for the 
Development of  Vocational Training, is tasked and 
funded by the EU to study “[…] how transparency, 
comparability, transferability and recognition of 
competences and/or qualifications, between different 
countries and at different levels, could be promoted 
by developing reference levels, common principles for 
certification, and common measures, including a 
credit transfer system for vocational education and 
training.” The 2010 Bruges communiqué, agreed 
upon in the midst of  the euro crisis, envisioned a se-
ries of  national actions aimed at improving, certify-
ing, and internationalising initial and continuing vo-
cational education, with some support and informa-
tion activity at the EU level. CEDEFOP is in charge 
of  much of  the relevant coordination and monitoring 
action, and has guardedly assessed developments to-
wards the 2014 first-stage objectives as a “multifacet-
ed process which shows clear signs of  progress, but 
with more work to do.”
3.6.4 The pros and cons of centralised European 
education
Common and comparable standards would certainly 
contribute to European labour market integration: the 
first draft of the Bolkestein directive, meant to remove 
international barriers in services markets, would have 
forced automatic recognition of exactly those profes-
sional qualifications that, in tracked systems, are 
granted by vocational programmes and apprentice-
ships. Rejection by the European Parliament and sub-
sequent dilution of the directive was partly motivated 
by the defense of qualification holders within each 
country against “Polish plumber” competition, oppo-
nents also invoked the need to avoid the deterioration 
of quality standards: in the absence of European 
guidelines, each country might have incentives to 
grant qualifications leniently to individuals who would 
work elsewhere. 
Like almost everything (especially in matters of edu-
cation), harmonisation has costs as well as benefits. 
Competition among standards has advantages in 
terms of accommodating diversity and allowing ex-
perimentation, and different standards may indeed be 
appropriate for different geographically segmented 
services markets. The relevant heterogeneity is in fact 
larger within than across European countries. In 
Germany, for example, regional cultural diversity ar-
guments are considered so strong that there is not even 
a federal budget for schooling or universities.2 While 
there are good reasons for different educational sys-
tems to coexist in each country and in Europe, eco-
nomic and cultural interactions undoubtedly benefit 
from some standardisation (in language skills, for ex-
ample, or of the way numbers are handwritten or 
typed using points or commas as a decimal separator), 
and basic economic reasoning implies that public 
funding of education should in principle be pooled 
and harmonized throughout areas where labor mobil-
ity lets an integrated labor market be the ultimate em-
ployer of all individuals, wherever they were educat-
ed.3 In practice, of course, labour mobility is not as 
intense within culturally heterogeneous countries (let 
alone across the borders of European countries) to 
make this a serious concern. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Education is too important, and its quality is too dif-
ficult to assess, to be left to markets. It has some of the 
features of a public good, in that it provides youth 
with basic social skills and shared values: this always 
was, and certainly remains, important at the country 
level, especially as many are immigrants or children of 
immigrants, and extends across country boundaries as 
socio-economic interactions span the European conti-
nent and beyond. This motivation for public policy in 
education is strongest at the primary level, but extends 
to later ages as socio-economic interactions become 
more complex and require more sophisticated skills. 
Whether and to what extent and level different types 
of education should be publicly funded and organ-
ised, rather than left to individual choices and mar-
kets, depends on the availability of accurate informa-
tion, as well as on financial market imperfections. To 
improve on market outcomes, the public provision 
2 Wößmann (2007) documents within-Germany patterns of institu-
tional features and school outcomes that are consistent with interna-
tional evidence: test scores are less correlated to socio-economic sta-
tus in states where tracking begins at an older age and, while German 
private school results are not better than those of public schools, their 
presence is positively associated with system performance at the state 
level.
3 Locally financed education of mobile workers is obviously exposed 
to race-to-the bottom tensions, and might legitimate demands for a 
refund of the cost of migrating individuals (as was the case, before 
Germany’s reunification, when citizens of the Democratic Republic 
relocated to the Federal Republic).
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and regulation of education have to rely on effective 
administrative tools. This is a more likely outcome, 
both in theory and empirically, when public providers 
are subject to competitive pressure. 
The choice of whether to allocate youth to vocational 
and academic tracks, or offer comprehensive educa-
tion to all, depends on the extent to which society be-
lieves individual talents are observable early and 
should be allowed to influence life outcomes, even 
when they reflect the luck of being born to well-edu-
cated parents, as well as on implementation details. 
Tracking children as young as ten into different aca-
demic streams may in theory tailor teaching to individ-
ual skills, but in practice tends to exclude from higher 
education many able students from a labour class back-
ground. And while it can reduce youth unemployment 
and make well-paid jobs with favorable social status 
available to underprivileged students, it tends probably 
to widen and certainly to perpetuate cultural inequali-
ty. In Germany, for example, both firm-based and 
school-based vocational education tracks are not only 
highly occupation-specific, which reduces their stu-
dents’ adaptability to labor market developments, but 
also strongly segmented by family origin and achieve-
ment (Protsch and Solga, 2015). To address these issues 
it is advisable to delay tracking to about age 15 and en-
sure that vocational students are equipped with suita-
bly flexible cultural skills. Con versely, a comprehensive 
education system that keeps all youth together only ef-
fectively reduces cultural inequality if schools are 
geared towards helping students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. This is more likely when teachers are 
suitably selected and are given appropriate pedagogical 
incentives. Otherwise, poor performance in academic 
education leads to long spells of unemployment or un-
skilled employment opportunities. 
Both within and across countries, the advantages and 
disadvantages of differentiation across schools and 
school systems depend on circumstances. Practically-
oriented teaching lets students learn concepts working 
on real-life problems, but may not let them develop 
the ability to face other problems as they arise. Because 
the pros and cons of choices depend on the economic 
environment in which they are made, countries should 
not rush to imitate configurations that did well in the 
recent crisis. The good youth unemployment perfor-
mance of countries with dual education systems was 
also related to those countries’ industrial structure 
and to the character of shocks. Just like different oc-
cupations may fare better or worse in the face of busi-
ness cycles and structural change within a country, so 
across countries different ways of organising educa-
tion and production may take turns in grasping good 
opportunities. 
While competition among systems has advantages in 
terms of accommodating diversity and allowing ex-
perimentation, there are also advantages to the man-
datory enforcement of at least minimum standards. It 
might therefore be advisable for Europe to develop a 
supranational framework that buffers unbalanced 
cross-country impacts on the one hand, and eases mo-
bility across occupations and national borders on the 
other. Because the pros and cons of different systems 
differ drastically across different households, however, 
education policy is a politically-charged issue that 
cannot be assigned to the EU in the absence of effec-
tive supranational political processes. While the po-
tential benefits of a European education policy are ob-
vious it is safe to presume that, for the foreseeable fu-
ture, European-level measures shall remain “volun-
tary and principally developed through bottom-up co-
operation,” and ineffective.
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Denmark: Too GooD To Be 
True?
4.1 Introduction
Denmark is known to some as the country of Lego 
and fairy tales, and for decades it was pinpointed as an 
example not to be followed. Unemployment was per-
sistently high, the current account and the public 
budget displayed systematic deficits, there were fre-
quent devaluations, and recurrent changes of govern-
ment etc. In recent times, the picture has changed rad-
ically. There are frequent references to the Danish wel-
fare model, the flexicurity model is highlighted as an 
example of a well-functioning labour market, the pen-
sion system is ranked as the best in the world,1 and 
Danes are usually found to be among the happiest 
people in the world.2
In the case of Denmark one may also see a number of 
paradoxes. It is a small and open economy with one of 
the largest public sectors within the OECD, and yet 
Denmark’s economic performance indicators, like 
per-capita income and employment rates, are among 
the highest of all OECD countries. At the same time, 
income inequality is low. In discussions on monetary 
policy and exchange rate regimes, the option of a sta-
ble and credible unilateral exchange rate peg seems to 
be ruled out, and yet Denmark has successfully main-
tained such a regime. Denmark has a tradition for be-
ing highly open, and there is widespread support for 
EU-membership among its citizens. The country is a 
front-runner in the implementation of EU rules and 
regulations, and yet the euro has not been adopted 
and exemptions remain regarding military, police and 
judicial cooperation within the EU.
This chapter takes a closer look at the Danish case – is 
it too good to be true? The short answer is that 
Denmark has not worked miracles. Its performance is 
based on foundations laid years ago in response to an 
1 According to the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index, cf. 
Mercer (2015).
2 Ranked 3 of 158 in the 2015 World Happiness Report 2015, cf. 
Helliwell et al. (2015).
unsustainable economic situation. In the 1980s policy-
makers invested in the credibility of the fixed exchange 
rate policy and accepted the discipline that this re-
quired. Labour market reforms in the 1990s laid the 
foundation for the flexicurity model as it is currently 
known. Subsequently, a consolidation of public fi-
nances and concerns over the financial viability of the 
welfare model prompted reforms of welfare arrange-
ments, including pension and retirement reforms. 
Among policymakers there is an understanding of the 
constraints faced by a small and open economy, and 
that the viability of the welfare model ultimately de-
pends on maintaining a high employment level in the 
private sector. 
Danish achievements are the result of hard political 
work. The policies applied in Denmark are not unique: 
their packing may differ, but the ingredients are famil-
iar. Denmark’s achievements are a result of economic 
reforms, initially directed at overcoming the crisis and 
subsequently turned more forward-looking. If  any-
thing in these developments stands out, it is the politi-
cal economy of establishing consensus across a broad 
political spectrum. This implies both support for re-
forms and that continuity and consistency have been 
maintained in economic policy, despite the fact that 
most governments have been minority governments 
(and usually coalitions among several parties) and 
that there have been frequent changes in government.
4.2 Public sector and economic performance
The key question asked by outside observers is: “How 
is it possible to reconcile Denmark’s relatively good 
economic performance with its large public sector and 
high tax rates?” Have fundamental trade-offs been 
avoided? How can this be explained?
International comparisons suffer from potential 
measurement issues both when comparing public sec-
tor sizes and GDP levels. Some of these problems are 
discussed in Box 4.1, but they do not fundamentally 
alter the point that Denmark has a relatively strong 
economic performance, measured in terms of per-cap-
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ita income, for instance, and that the public sector is 
large, cf. Figure 4.1.
The size of Denmark’s public sector clearly reflects its 
political priorities. Equal opportunities, the eradication 
of poverty and low income inequality are important 
policy goals. Universal entitlement to education, health 
and the social safety net are thus defining characteris-
tics of the Danish/Nordic welfare 
model. At the same time, Denmark 
aims to be one of the most affluent 
countries in the world. 
The Danish lesson is not that in-
centives do not matter, or that there 
are no trade-offs. Micro-analyses 
of the incentive effects of taxes or 
unemployment benefits etc. do not 
put Denmark in a particular posi-
tion.3 Denmark, however, may 
stand out in terms of what has been 
done to flatten the trade-off, or 
counteract the effects of high taxes 
via the packaging of policies.
While there is a heavy burden on Denmark’s large 
public sector, it is often overlooked that its private sec-
tor is among the most liberal in the OECD area. 
Markets can be distorted not only by taxes, but also by 
3 The system also includes a number of checks and balances, for in-
stance individual identification numbers to ensure that all income is 
declared for taxation. This raises “Big Brother” issues. It is also the 
reason why the Nordic countries have such rich individualised data 
available for research!
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Figure 4.1
Box 4.1
Measurement issues
Cross-country comparisons of public sectors commonly use gross expenditure or revenue measures as a share of GDP, cf. 
Figure 4.1. This approach is problematic since it neglects important institutional differences; see Adema et al. (2011). Some 
countries pursue a gross principle where social transfers as a rule are taxable income, while others follow a net-principle 
whereby transfers are not taxable income.  Obviously, recorded expenditure and tax revenues are larger under the gross 
principle for the same net transfers and thus net expenditure. Such differences must be taken into account in cross-country 
comparisons. 
The OECD produces statistics for net and gross public social expenditure. In 2011 gross public social expenditure as a per-
cent of GDP was 30.1 percent in Denmark, 27.2 percent in Sweden, 25.5 percent in Germany and 22.7 percent in the UK. 
Considering net expenditure narrows the differences considerably. The share was 23.4 percent in Denmark, 22.5 percent in 
Sweden, 23.7 percent in Germany and 21.4 percent in the UK. In short, the usual measurement approach exaggerates differ-
ences in the size of welfare arrangements and thus the size of the public sector. To illustrate the implications of public sector 
size, Figure 4.1 corrects the gross expenditure share by the difference between gross and net social expenditure. Measured in 
this way the public sector is still large in Denmark, but not that much larger than in many other countries (and not the largest 
within the OECD).
The public sector may influence international comparisons in other ways. GDP is a measure of value added created by 
market activities.  Hence, if  activities like day-care are shifted from the household sphere to the public sector, recorded GDP 
will increase. This implies that GDP measures for countries like Denmark, where the public sector to a larger extent has 
taken over care activities and the like, may have a higher recorded GDP level; see Sinn (2006). Correcting GDP measures for 
such public activities as old-age, incapacity and child care, GDP falls by 5–6 percent for Denmark and Sweden, but by only 
0.8 percent for Italy, for example; see Andersen (2015a). However, the ranking of countries does not change significantly by 
such a correction, but the absolute differences do. This brings up the general problem that GDP is an imprecise measure of 
living standards and thus welfare, and that there are a number of institutional and cross-country differences influencing re-
corded GDP levels. As an example, Gordon (2006) argues that while the gap in GDP per capita between the USA and Europe 
is about 30 percent, it is reduced to 17 percent when account is taken of excess energy use, prison population, metropolitan 
dispersion and an inefficient medical care system. For a general discussion of GDP measures, see Stiglitz et al. (2009).    
There are also reasons why GDP may be underestimated, especially in countries with a large public sector. Under traditional 
national accounting conventions, the output value of public activities is assessed from the input (cost) side, and therefore 
productivity growth is, by definition, zero. Over time this may lead to a systematic underestimation of GDP. To address this 
issue, the European Commission has decided that output indicators should be used to assess public production in national 
accounts. Applying this approach over the period 2005–12, Statistics Denmark (2014) reports the average annual produc-
tivity growth in the public sector to be 0.8 percent, and the level of GDP based on the traditional approach is therefore an 
underestimation.
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rules and regulations, a lack of competition etc. 
Therefore, for international comparisons, all potential 
“distortions” should be taken into account. To men-
tion just a few indicators in support of this, the OECD 
index of product market regulation for 2013 ranks 
Denmark as having the fifth lowest level of product 
market regulation (close to the level in the US).4 The 
World Bank ranks Denmark number four (highest in 
Europe, and also above the US) in its 2015 version of 
the “Ease of Doing Business Index” including 
189  countries,5 and the World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Index for 2014–15 has Den-
mark ranked 13 among 144 countries.6 
The liberal private sector is intimately related to the 
fact that Denmark is a small and open economy. There 
are few large companies, but a large number of small 
and medium-sized enterprises, who are facing interna-
tional competition in export and/or import markets. 
The trade share is high (see Figure 4.2), and the more 
broad KOF Globalization Index ranks Denmark as 
number seven out of 204 countries.7 Maintaining 
competitiveness has thus been a continuous challenge. 
Interestingly, terms of trade have followed an upward 
trend, which may reflect an ability to innovate and 
move up the value added chain (Danish Economic 
Council, 2014). The current account has since the late 
1980s displayed surpluses. There is a widespread un-
derstanding of the importance of remaining competi-
tive to sustain high income and employment levels. 
4 See OECD, “Economy-wide Regulation,” OECD Product Market 
Regulation Statistics (database), last accessed on 31 December 2015.
5 See World Bank (2015).
6 See Sala-i-Martin et al. (2014).
7 Cf. 2015 KOF Index of Globalization, http://globalization.kof.
ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/rankings_2015.pdf, last ac-
cessed 31 December 2015.
Globalisation is not a new phe-
nomenon. Den mark is not an ex-
ample of “politics against mar-
kets” – if  anything, it is an exam-
ple of how to find a “third way” 
in striking a balance between 
markets and state. 
Secondly, not only the size, but 
also the structure of  the welfare 
state matters. The effects of  taxes 
cannot be assessed without tak-
ing into account what they fi-
nance. Different expenditure 
types and taxes affect economic 
performance in dissimilar ways. 
As an example, consider labour supply in cases where 
one may distinguish between passive expenditure re-
ducing labour supply (such as early retirement) and 
active expenditure supporting labour supply (such as 
day care, education). Recent empirical work on the 
nexus between economic performance (economic 
growth) and the public sector shows that the compo-
sition of  public expenditure and the mode of  financ-
ing is more important than its sheer size. The distinc-
tion between active/productive and passive/non-pro-
ductive expenditure is important, and the former may 
have positive effects on growth (see, for example, 
Gemmell et al., 2011, and Arnold et al., 2011). A rela-
tively large share of  public expenditure is of  the “ac-
tive” type in Denmark, and this helps to explain why 
economic performance has been relatively good, de-
spite the large public sector, cf. Andersen (2015a). A 
similar distinction applies to transfers; they are not 
passive in the sense that they can be claimed uncondi-
tionally.8 Various conditionalities – known as work-
fare or active labour market policies – are part of  the 
system to balance concern for income security and 
active job search incentives. It is also a case in point 
that there are trade-offs, and these policies come at a 
cost. Denmark spends 1.8 percent of  GDP (2013 
data) on active labour market policies (direct expend-
iture on programmes and their administration, and 
expenditure on transfers come on top of  this).9 This is 
the highest level of  expenditure among OECD coun-
tries, where the average is 0.6 percent of  GDP.
8 Entitlement to the basic social safety net is universal in the sense 
that it is not contribution-based. However, this is not tantamount to 
transfers being akin to a basic income scheme since various eligibility 
conditions apply.
9 See OECD (2015), especially Table Q.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the 
“active” approach may also con-
tribute to reducing income in-
equality. It is thus notable that 
low income inequality in Den-
mark – and the other Nordic 
countries – can largely be attrib-
uted to an equal distribution of 
market incomes. Education and 
labour market policies create the 
basis for high employment and a 
relatively equal distribution of in-
come. Low inequality is often at-
tributed to taxes and transfers, 
and although they are important, 
the labour market outcomes con-
stitute the foundation for the 
egalitarian outcomes.
4.3 Exchange rate policy
Economic policies in Denmark are continuously up to 
a market test since Denmark is one of the few coun-
tries where a unilateral fixed exchange rate is pursued. 
The Danish Krone is pegged to the euro, and the inter-
est spread to the euro area is a metric of the credibility 
of the peg, and thus ultimately of economic policy. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, when the economy suf-
fered from various imbalances, the interest rate 
spread was high, and recurrent devaluations took 
place. Credibility was low, and economic policies 
were not consistent. A firmer fixed exchange regime 
was established in the 1980s, based on the premise 
that discrete devaluations were not a policy option, 
and the credibility of  the peg should be ensured via 
fiscal policies (and structural reforms). The ex-
change rate was thus effectively pegged to the Deut-
sche Mark, and to the euro as of  1999. Denmark has 
adopted a narrow band for variations of  the Danish 
Krone relative to the euro of  ± 2.25 percent within 
the Exchange Rate Mecha nism  II, and this policy 
has attained a strong credibility.10 The interest rate 
spread to the euro area is very small, and has occa-
sionally even been negative,11 cf. Figure 4.3. It is 
10 The exchange rate has been very close to its parity. The parity is at 
746.038 and daily exchange rates have been within the ± 1 percent 
band over the entire period from January 1999 to June 2015. Over the 
period of 2 January 1999 to 14 August 2015, the Danish Krone-euro 
exchange rate reached a peak of 747.17 and sank to a low of 742.32. 
The standard deviation over the period is 1.1.
11  There have been occasional devaluation pressures on the Danish 
Krone. For instance, at the onset of the Great Recession, there was 
some capital outflow (mainly driven by the fact that a major Danish 
worth noting that, over the same period, the situa-
tion changed from a scenario of  systematic current 
account deficits and rising foreign debt (peaking at 
close to 50 percent of  GDP in the late 1980s) to sys-
tematic surpluses and a net foreign asset position (of 
about 40 percent of  GDP).
Since the Danish Krone is pegged to the euro, it is of-
ten difficult for outsiders to understand why Denmark 
does not join the EMU. The question is highly sensi-
tive and the issue has become taboo in policy debates. 
In parliament, there is a clear majority for member-
ship, but there is a political commitment that the issue 
should be decided in a referendum. A referendum has 
been held twice without obtaining support for 
member ship,12 and the political risk of calling a new 
referendum is therefore high. In recent pools the no-
side has a clear majority, or over two thirds of votes.13 
There is hardly any public debate on the issue, and the 
positions are at a stalemate. Proponents of member-
ship argue that since the fixed exchange rate policy is 
not being politically contested, Denmark might as 
well join to be present at the decision table, while its 
opponents argue that staying out has not been a prob-
lem, so why join. 
bank was financing its operations by short-term foreign borrowing) 
and the central bank raised interest rates, but the markets calmed 
quickly. Interestingly, and unthinkably just a few years ago, the 
Danish Krone has also been under an appreciating pressure. This 
happened during the sovereign debt crisis in 2011–12, and more inten-
sively in early 2015 when the Swiss central bank abandoned the “peg” 
vis-à-vis the euro and allowed the Swiss Franc to appreciate.
12  The Maastricht Treaty was not approved by a referendum in 1992. 
In 1993 a referendum approved the so-called Edinburgh agreement al-
lowing Denmark to opt out of not only the economic and monetary 
union, but also the parts dealing with cooperation in areas such as the 
military, the police and the judicial system, as well as union citizen-
ship. A referendum in 2000 had 53.2 percent of the votes against 
EMU membership.
13  In previous referenda, the majority of the no-side was lower at the 
referendum.
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0 % points
Interest rate spread between Denmark and Germanya)
a) Effective rate of return on state bonds. Annual observations.
Source: Danish Central Bank and EEAG calculations.
Figure 4.3
89 EEAG Report 2016
Chapter 4
4.4 Model resilience – effects of 
the Great Recession
Being a small and open economy, 
Denmark was severely affected by 
the Great Recession. No less than 
thirteen countries – including Den- 
mark – experienced a drop in real 
GDP of 5 percent or more bet-
ween 2008 and 2009. 
Denmark has experienced a 
boom-bust pattern in the past, cf. 
Figure 4.4. Prior to the Great 
Recession, aggregate activity was 
at or above full capacity utilisa-
tion. There were several signs of 
over-heating, including very low unemployment (sig-
nificantly below the structural level), accelerating 
wage increases, and a booming housing market. This 
development was largely driven by domestic demand. 
The economy was thus not on a sustainable path, and 
on the eve of the Great Recession there were already 
signs that economic activity was fading. The Great 
Recession accelerated this development. The combi-
nation of an already decelerating path and the Great 
Recession induced a steep decrease in GDP (see 
Figure 4.4) and employment. Unemployment in-
creased by 2.5 percentage points between 2008 and 
2009, and 4 percentage points between 2008 and 2010, 
almost double the increase for OECD countries on av-
erage, although unemployment remained below the 
OECD average. While the initial increase was larger 
than for euro and OECD countries, subsequent unem-
ployment has been slightly declining, cf. Figure 4.5. 
The financial crisis did not only 
have foreign causes, but also do-
mestic roots related to a price 
bubble in the Danish housing 
market. The financial sector was 
severely affected by the crisis, and 
“bank packages” were intro-
duced, but since they relied on 
bail-in mechanisms there have 
been no public bailouts of the fi-
nancial sector. It is also notewor-
thy that, despite the large turn-
around, not least in the housing 
market, there was no significant 
increase in household bankrupt-
cies in Denmark. The boom-bust 
pattern was thus in some respect similar to that seen in 
some Southern European countries (like Portugal and 
Spain), but with the important difference that 
Denmark’s financial sector was more resilient and 
public finances were in a much better position to ab-
sorb the consequences of the downturn in economic 
activity.
The boom-bust pattern can partly be attributed to an 
excessively lean fiscal policy. The economy was boom-
ing with high growth in private consumption and in-
vestments, and fiscal policy was expansionary. How-
ever, policymakers were reluctant to tighten fiscal pol-
icy. When confronted with calls from several econo-
mists to tighten fiscal policy, the Danish prime minis-
ter stated that economists had to rewrite their 
text books if  they did not appreciate how good the sit-
uation was. Subsequent developments confirmed that 
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the textbooks were closer to the mark than the prime 
minister!
The destabilising effects of fiscal policy had two main 
sources: a tax freeze and high public expenditure 
growth. The liberal-conservative government intro-
duced a so-called tax freeze with the intention of curb-
ing public sector expenditure. The tax freeze meant 
that tax rates were not to increase, but for property 
taxes and some excise taxes the freeze was defined in 
terms of nominal tax payments.14 In a situation with 
rapidly increasing house prices, this reduced effective 
tax rates which, in turn, contributed to further house 
price increases. At the same time, public consumption 
growth was high. The average annual growth rate for 
public expenditure was about 2 percent in the period 
prior to the Great Recession – primarily driven by in-
creasing health expenditure – while the target was 
around 1 percent. Fiscal policy was thus clearly pro-
cyclical during this period.
After the onset of the Great Recession, fiscal policy 
was expansionary. Denmark is among the group of 
countries that pursued the most expansionary fiscal 
policy over the period 2009–10.15 The presence of fis-
cal space allowed automatic stabilisers to work (the 
strongest within the OECD area) and left room for 
14 Property taxation has two parts: a property value tax to the state 
and a land tax (municipal property tax) to the municipalities. The 
state property value tax is 1 percent of  the assessed housing value 
(3  percent of  the value above some threshold, in 2015 
3,040,000  Danish Krone). A so-called tax freeze implies that the 
housing value for most house owners remains at the 2002 valuation. 
The municipal property tax decided by the municipalities lies within 
the interval of  0.16 percent and 0.34 percent of  the assessed land 
value. A temporary freeze of  the land tax has been launched in 2016.
15 According to Danish Ministry of Finance estimates, discretionary 
fiscal policy was expansionary over the years 2009–10 and mildly con-
tractionary over the years 2011–14.
discretionary policies.16 It is thus 
also part of the story that public 
finances were consolidated prior 
to the crisis, cf. Figure 4.6, which 
meant that there was some room 
for manoeuvre during the Great 
Recession.
Although Denmark is one of the 
European countries with the least 
problems assessed in terms of 
standard macroeconomic indi-
cators, the crisis has proved very 
persistent. As illustrated in 
Figure 4.4, activity has essentially 
remained unchanged after a small 
improvement in 2010–11. Aggre-
gate demand has remained subdued, particularly due 
to domestic private consumption and investment, 
while net export has grown. The protracted reduction 
in private domestic demand may be related to debt 
consolidation, precautionary savings and pessimistic 
expectations driven by the boom-bust pattern. How-
ever, being a small and open economy, foreign demand 
remains of crucial importance.
4.4.1 The labour market – the flexicurity model
Denmark’s low unemployment, especially prior to the 
Great Recession, generated a great deal of hype sur-
rounding the so-called flexicurity labour market 
model.17
The short version of the flexicurity model is as fol-
lows: hiring and firing rules are fairly flexible, and the 
unemployment insurance scheme is generous by inter-
national standards. However, this was also the case in 
the period from the mid-1970s to the early part of the 
1990s, where Denmark was routinely listed as a crisis 
country with problems for almost any macroeconomic 
indicator, including high and persistent unemploy-
ment. Therefore, the flex and the security part of the 
Danish policy package cannot, in isolation, account 
for the performance of the Danish labour market. 
This is not denying the importance of these elements, 
but it points out that they are no guarantees of a low 
and stable unemployment rate. A series of reforms 
16 Denmark has been in the excessive deficit procedure due to deficits 
exceeding the 3 percent limit in 2010–14. Measured in terms of defi-
cits, public debt etc., Denmark is one of the EU countries facing the 
smallest problems with public finances.
17 This section partly builds on Andersen (2015b).
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during the last half  of the 1990s 
plays an important role in ac-
counting for the Danish experi-
ence. The main thrust of these re-
forms was a shift from a passive 
focus on income protection to a 
more active focus on job search 
and employment. The policy 
tightened eligibility for unem-
ployment benefits and shortened 
their duration,18 as well as intro-
ducing workfare elements into 
unemployment insurance and so-
cial policies in general. 
Since Denmark took a severe 
beating during the Great Reces-
sion, the flexicurity model has been put to a serious 
test. The model as such cannot prevent cycles, and 
the interesting question is whether the model can 
weather a significant downturn. Lax firing rules 
make it likely that employment will fall drastically 
when aggregate demand drops, and although the so-
cial safety net cushions incomes for unemployed, the 
financial viability of  the model is at risk from a per-
sistent decline in employment. A prolonged decline 
in employment will reduce tax revenues and increase 
social expenditure, and thus put public finances un-
der strain.
A hallmark of the flexicurity model is a high level of 
job-turnover, implying that the unemployed (as well as 
the young entering the labour market) can find a job 
fairly easily; and that most unemployment spells are 
short. Can this characteristic survive a large drop in 
employment?
The answer to this question is giv-
en by Figure 4.7 showing inflow 
and outflow rates to and from 
jobs for a large part of the private 
labour market.19 The effects of 
the Great Recession are clearly 
18 Benefit duration was further reduced 
from four to two years. A recent reform, 
following the work of the Unemployment 
Insurance Commission, has allowed for 
more flexible employment eligibility rules 
related to claiming benefits.
19  A new statistic comprising the entire la-
bour market shows the turnover rate at the 
same level and a rising trend in job-matches 
(inflows) from 2009 to 2014. This statistic is 
only available since 2009 and does not dis-
play the changes induced by the Great 
Recession.
visible. Outflows from jobs increased and inflows into 
jobs declined. More striking is the fact that turnover 
levels recovered to the levels seen prior to the boom 
period, despite the overall level of activity remaining 
gloomy, cf. Figure 4.4. The turnover rates are high 
from a comparative perspective, and the transition 
rate from unemployment into employment is also 
high, cf. Figure 4.8.
Two additional facts are important: exit rates from 
unemployment are not significantly lower than dur-
ing the boom years before the Great Recession, for 
example. Accord ingly, most unemployment spells are 
short. The average duration of  an unemployment 
spell among those on unemployment benefits was 
17 weeks in 2014 (compared to about 13 weeks dur-
ing the boom period). Importantly, exits from unem-
ployment into employment are also back to normal 
levels. 
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The point of the evidence reported here is that al-
though unemployment has increased, most unemploy-
ment spells are short (close to 50 percent of total un-
employment is made up of spells of less than three 
months in 2013).20 As a result of the high level of turn-
over in the labour market, youth and long-term unem-
ployment are low by international comparison. High 
turnover rates thus effectively work as an implicit work 
sharing mechanism. Equal burden sharing is impor-
tant from a distributional perspective, but it is also of 
structural importance. The alternative would be longer 
unemployment spells concentrated on a smaller group 
of individuals, more long-term unemployed and a cor-
responding depreciation of human and social capital. 
In short, high turnover rates reduce the negative struc-
tural implications of high un em ployment. 
One critical question concerning the flexicurity model 
is whether labour turnover is excessive. Short tenure 
may reduce the incentive of both firms and workers to 
invest in firm-specific human capital, causing lower 
productivity growth. It is not clear that this is a major 
problem. International comparisons indicate that hu-
man capital acquisition of employees is fairly high.21 
Empirical studies also show that the turnover is condu-
cive to structural adjustments, which in turn improves 
productivity growth; see Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012). 
Excessive temporary lay-offs may also follow, since 
employers indirectly obtain a subsidy when workers 
are compensated by unemployment insurance in case 
of temporary variations in the need for labour. 
Employers contribute to unemployment insurance fi-
nancing by covering the first three days of an unem-
ployment spell (if  the employment relation has had a 
duration of at least three months), and this may fall 
short of the social costs of lay-offs; see Blanchard and 
Tirole (2003).
4.4.2 Labour market policies
Activation policies are an integral part of the Danish 
labour market model. Policies in this area have been 
continuously revised in the light of experience, re-
search and policy discussions. Most recently, the focus 
has been two-fold. Firstly, there is rising pressure on 
the young to obtain an education. This is reflected in a 
recent reform of the social assistance system. For indi-
20 For unemployed individuals entitled to unemployment insurance.
21 The share of persons in the age group 24–70 years receiving life-
long education is way above the EU average, according to Eurostat 
data.
viduals below the age of 30 (previously the critical age 
was 25) without a qualifying education, the social as-
sistance level has been reduced so that it does not pro-
vide better compensation than study grants. To be eli-
gible for support, it is mandatory for individuals to 
commence education, or participate in activation 
programmes. 
Secondly, activation policies have been changed from 
a rather rigid scheme to a more flexible system direct-
ed towards labour market needs and an individual fo-
cus relying more on job-search/matching than pro-
gramme participation, as well as incentives to ensure a 
quicker return to employment. In the first part of an 
unemployment spell (3 months for persons below 
age  30, 6 months for persons aged 30 to 49, and 
3 months for persons above age 50), the main inter-
vention consists of meetings and counselling to 
strengthen and target job-search, and further into the 
unemployment spell this is followed by programme 
participation (a right and a duty). All of the unem-
ployed also have a right to participate in an education 
programme lasting up to six weeks (individually cho-
sen from a short-list). The pendula thus swings from 
very rigid activation policies to more flexible policies, 
and since the policy shift is still under implementa-
tion, it is too early to assess how effectively it is 
working.
4.5 Future challenges
Complacency about past performance may blind, and 
it is crucial to consider how well prepared Denmark is 
in relation to future challenges including ageing and 
migration. How will they affect the model? 
4.5.1 Ageing and fiscal sustainability
The global ageing trend also affects Denmark, al-
though the increase in the dependency ratio is to the 
lower side since fertility rates are comparatively high. 
The key driver behind ageing is the trend increase in 
longevity.
A changed age composition may put public finances 
on an unsustainable path, and this concern has been 
high on the policy agenda for some years.22 A number 
22 The core of the Danish pension system is a combination of tax- 
financed public pensions and labour market pensions. The latter is a 
funded defined contribution scheme, which is bargained between so-
cial partners (participation is thus mandatory for the individual).
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of reforms have been enacted and 
they all share the common strate-
gic aim of increasing labour sup-
ply and employment, which, in 
turn, improves public finances via 
lower expenditure on social bene-
fits and higher tax revenue. 
A pivotal element in these reforms 
has been increases in the statutory 
retirement/pension ages via re-
forms undertaken in 2006 (the 
welfare reform) and 2011 (the re-
tirement reform). Both the early 
retirement age and the statutory 
pension age will increase in steps 
from currently 60 and 65 years to 
62 and 67 years, respectively.23 When these changes are 
phased in, statutory retirement ages will be indexed to 
the life expectancy at the age of 60 in order to target an 
expected pension period of 14.5 years (17.5 including 
early retirement). Currently, the expected pension peri-
ods are 18.5/23.5 years, so the reforms are quite ambi-
tious from this perspective. 
Moreover, all key social transfers constituting the so-
cial safety net (disability pensions, social assistance, 
unemployment insurance etc.) have been reformed to 
further increase the labour supply and employment. 
The labour market implications of the reforms are 
rather large, leading to a projected increase of five per-
centage points in Denmark’s labour force participa-
tion rate, which was already one of the highest in the 
OECD at the outset. The labour market challenge is 
to ensure that these increases in labour supply trans-
late into employment. 
The reform initiatives ensure that Danish public fi-
nances meet the criteria for fiscal sustainability (see 
Danish Ministry of  Finance, 2015, and Danish 
Economic Council, 2015).24 In that sense, the welfare 
system is robustly funded. The projected profile for 
public finances, taking into account both ageing and 
the reforms outlined above, is shown in Figure 4.9. 
Although the technical requirement for fiscal sustain-
ability is satisfied, the profile for public finances is 
problematic since it involves a long string of  years 
with deficits to be followed by surpluses in the distant 
23 The early retirement period is reduced from five to three years.
24 Defined such that the present value of projected revenues is at least 
as large as the present value of projected expenditure, plus initial net-
debt for the public sector.
future. This implies that the public balance will be in 
conflict with the fiscal budget norm, stipulating that 
the structural budget deficit is not to exceed 0.5 per-
cent of  GDP. Moreover, the margin for coping with 
business cycle fluctuations within the 3 percent deficit 
limit will be small. The particular budget profile aris-
es mainly because life expectancy has grown substan-
tially since the reforms were agreed in 2011 (by about 
1½ year for a person at the age of  60). Since the in-
dexation mechanism linking retirement ages to lon-
gevity will not be operative until later, some cohorts 
gain a longer pension period than originally planned. 
In the long run the indexation formula for statutory 
pension ages is rather tough, since an expected pen-
sion period of  14.5 years implies that the share of  life 
spent in the labour market increases when longevity 
goes up; hence, the long-term improvement in the 
budget. This latter feature may call into question the 
medium-run political sustainability of  the indexation 
mechanism.
4.5.2 Migration
Migration is a particularly sensitive issue in Denmark. 
It is a predominant theme in public debates, and has 
been a major issue in parliamentary elections for a 
number of years. Denmark has traditionally been very 
open, and in other respects known for having rather 
liberal views on the way people live their lives. The re-
cent asylum crisis has further attenuated the migration 
issue, and Denmark has opted out of participating in 
a common EU-solution to the problem.25
25 Measured relative to population size, Denmark received the fifth 
most asylum seekers in 2014 among EU countries. The relative posi-
tion will be lower for 2015.
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It is well-established that the implications of immigra-
tion for public finances are closely aligned with the 
employment rate of immigrants; see OECD (2013) 
and Hansen et al. (2015). The higher the employment 
rate, the larger the net contribution to public finances, 
and vice versa. This is no surprise since most of the 
jobless are entitled to some form of social transfer and 
the tax burden on earned income is high. In an extend-
ed welfare state, public finances are highly sensitive to 
the employment rate; see Andersen (2015a).
It is therefore impossible to generalise about how im-
migration affects public finances, and thus the finan-
cial viability of the welfare model, since this depends 
on the employment record of the group in question, 
cf. Figure 4.10. The labour market performance of im-
migrants varies significantly, making it difficult to gen-
eralise. But at an aggregate level, immigration from 
high-income countries (higher share of migrant work-
ers, students, well-educated etc.) may improve public 
finances (be neutral), while immigration from low- 
income countries (more asylum seekers, family reuni-
fication, lower qualifications etc.) tends to negatively 
impact public finances. 
The design of the welfare model in general may in it-
self  be an impediment to labour market entry for some 
immigrants.26 The Danish labour market is character-
ised by relatively high minimum wages and a com-
pressed wage structure. Working in a poorly paid posi-
tion is not an option. It is a consequence that there are 
26 Empirical evidence does not find strong support that welfare ar-
rangements function as magnets attracting migrants; see Pedersen et 
al. (2008) and Giuletti et al. (2013). There is some indication of “wel-
fare magnet” effects between the “old” and “new” EU member states 
(see De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2013), but not more generally influenc-
ing EU migration flows; see Skupnik (2014).
relatively high qualification re-
quirements for finding a job, and 
few low-skilled jobs.
In addition, the reference point 
for labour market participation is 
high for both men and women. 
By international comparison, the 
employment rate for various 
groups of immigrants is not par-
ticularly low in Denmark. How-
ever, employment gaps are large, 
reflecting generally high employ-
ment rates for natives (the welfare 
model is an “employment mod-
el”), especially for women. Lower 
labour market participation rates 
may also reflect different cultures and norms for some 
immigrants with respect to gender roles, for example. 
This effect may be compounded by language barriers, 
problems related to recognising foreign education 
qualifications and possible discrimination in the la-
bour market.
The policy debate on migration has been lively in 
Denmark, and various policy initiatives have been 
taken.
Firstly, immigration rules have been tightened. 
International conventions and EU-rules limit the room 
for manoeuvre in this respect, but Denmark has intro-
duced tougher criteria for family unification.27 For vol-
untary migrants from outside the EU, there are selec-
tion criteria that depend on qualifications, job oppor-
tunities etc. The latter follows an international trend 
and a “race to the top” to attract the best qualified la-
bour; see for example Chaloff and Lemaître (2009). 
Secondly, there have been several changes in the social 
safety net prompted by immigration issues. The wel-
fare model builds on the principle of universality; that 
is, equal rights for all independent of past history (em-
ployment, tax payments etc.). This has not been 
changed for welfare services, but there have been 
changes for social transfers. However, the options are 
constrained, not least due to EU-rules. Since eligibility 
cannot be made directly dependent on nationality, 
screening is attempted via eligibility criteria in the so-
cial safety net.
27 The so-called 24-years rule is much debated. It requires both 
spouses to be at least 24 years old. Additionally, the couple’s connec-
tion to Denmark must be stronger than to the country of origin, un-
less one spouse has lived in Denmark for more than 26 years.
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The core element of the social safety net is the so-
called social assistance, which provides a floor for eco-
nomic support to all those unable to support them-
selves and their family. A residence principle for eligi-
bility was introduced in 2002, implying that full social 
rights to social assistance are attained after residence 
in Denmark for 7 out of the last 8 years. In 2006 this 
was further strengthened by adding an employment 
criterion, stipulating that eligibility depends on having 
been in ordinary employment for an accumulated pe-
riod of at least 2½ years within the last 8 years.28 
Individuals who do not fulfil these requirements are 
entitled to a different transfer (start aid/introduction 
benefit) equivalent to roughly half  of the value of so-
cial assistance. Although, these conditions did not 
achieve a complete screening, since they also affected 
Danes returning after extended periods abroad, they 
did have the largest effect on groups of immigrants 
with a low employment rate and thus very likely to re-
ceive social assistance.
This scheme was extensively debated, not least be-
cause the employment effects of  the benefit reduc-
tions were small. The above-mentioned rules were 
abolished by the Social Democratic government in 
2012, but the newly elected Liberal government 
(2015) has reintroduced a similar scheme. The fre-
quent changes in policies in this area reflect the sensi-
tivity of  the issue and different political standpoints 
on it, but the overall trend has been towards a tight-
ening of  the rules on both immigration and access to 
the social safety net.
A particularly controversial issue is the universal state 
child subsidy (børnechecken) to which all parents are 
eligible. This implies that a guest worker who leaves 
his family in his home country is still eligible to the 
subsidy, even if  the children are not living in Denmark. 
To many this is a sign that the generosity of the Danish 
welfare model goes too far. In 2010 an eligibility con-
dition was introduced, stipulating that full entitlement 
to the subsidy requires two years of residence in 
Denmark (the subsidy is reduced proportionally in 
case of a shorter residence period, starting with 
25 percent of the subsidy after 6 months’ residence). 
This rule applies to all immigrants, including those 
from EU countries. The EU court has twice (in 2011 
and 2013) ruled this to be in conflict with EU rules. 
Since 2013 the scheme has been administered accord-
28  A further employment criterion was added to target couples, im-
plying lower levels of social assistance (for those meeting the above-
mentioned criterion) to couples with an insufficient employment 
record.
ing to EU rules, but the issue is being contested by 
policymakers.
Immigration, particularly by migrant workers, also di-
rectly affects labour markets. As for other “old” EU 
countries, there has been an upward trend in migrant 
workers. While this is an intentional consequence of 
EU-enlargement and the single market, there have 
been concerns about its labour market effects. Firstly, 
there have been problems in terms of ensuring compli-
ance with labour market and tax rules. Secondly, many 
labour market issues in Denmark (like minimum wag-
es, for example) are not regulated by law, but settled 
via collective wage bargaining. Among unions there is 
thus a concern that migrant workers undermine col-
lective bargained outcomes and release “race-to-the-
bottom” mechanisms. 
4.5.3 Welfare services – increasing demands
Denmark – and the other Nordic countries – stand 
out by virtue of the extensive public provision of wel-
fare services like education, care and health. This has 
important implications for equal access (universality) 
and opportunities, but it also contributes to redistri-
bution. Moreover, solutions offered by the welfare 
state are supposed to meet reasonable standards ac-
ceptable to most, and are not supposed to be of a low-
er standard only acceptable to those who cannot af-
ford better quality private solutions.
The extensive provision of welfare services raises vari-
ous challenges. Services may be exposed to both the 
Baumol cost disease (low productivity growth) and 
the Wagner effect (high income elasticity of demand), 
which creates an expenditure surge. This is most clear-
ly seen in the area of health. Life sciences make ongo-
ing progress offering new and better treatment, but 
this immediately translates into an expenditure pres-
sure on public health expenditure.
The importance of the health area is reflected in a con-
sensus across the political spectrum, irrespective of 
views on the size of the public sector, that health ex-
penditure should increase. As mentioned above, the 
fiscal targets for expenditure growth in the early 2000s 
were violated primarily due to a public expenditure 
hike in health.
Education is a topic of lively debate in Denmark, 
which has the highest public education spending as a 
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share of GDP among all OECD countries. Yet educa-
tional outcomes are mediocre, and there is a great deal 
of discussion over the achievements of the education-
al system in both qualitative and quantitative terms; 
see e.g. Bogetoft et al. (2015). In qualitative terms, 
Denmark does not score particularly high in the Pisa 
tests, for example. In quantitative terms, around 1/5 of 
a cohort still does not get any education beyond basic 
schooling (10 years). Moreover, there is also the prob-
lem of high turn-over (most youths embark on higher 
education, but drop-out rates are high) and low com-
pletion rates. A further issue is the choice of subject, 
and whether the consumption value of education 
dominates the investment value (relevance for the la-
bour market), since education is publicly financed and 
study grants are relatively generous. 
All levels of the educational system are currently un-
dergoing reforms to address some of these challenges. 
Some of these reforms are still in the pipeline, and 
others are in the implementation phase, meaning that 
it is still too early to judge their success.
The large level of  public consumption (and thus the 
high public employment level) raises important ques-
tions on productivity and efficiency in the public sec-
tor.29 These issues are not new, but have been brought 
to the fore by the discussion of  the financial sustain-
ability of  the welfare model. While reforms imply that 
the requirements for fiscal sustainability are met, this 
only ensures that it is possible to finance current 
standards. Financial scope for improvements needs to 
be found if  they are to be realised. Since reforms have 
already considered most routes by which labour sup-
ply and employment can be increased, the need to pri-
oritise will be sharper in the future. Pressures to in-
crease expenditure in various areas require financing 
via tax increases, cuts in other areas, or improvements 
in efficiency and productivity. Most policymakers re-
frain from the first two, and the focus therefore 
switches to efficiency and productivity within the 
public sector.
It is much easier to agree in principle on the need for 
productivity and efficiency improvements in the public 
sector than to deliver such improvements. There are 
ongoing discussions on this. Explicit targets have been 
formulated, but there are obvious measurement prob-
lems in controlling whether these targets are met. 
Some recent changes to make public provision more 
29 Productivity in this context refers to whether a given task is solved 
cost efficiently or with the highest possible quality for given costs, 
while efficiency refers to whether the right tasks are being addressed.
productive have been taken, a controversial example 
being a new “time agreement” for teachers. Out-
sourcing may be a solution in some areas, but more 
generally it is important to have a clear management 
structure for public institutions, so that their perfor-
mance can be evaluated continuously and in a system-
atic way.
4.6 Conclusion
Public debates often pronounce particular countries 
to be “super-models”, as is the case for Germany and 
Sweden, for example, and more recently for Denmark. 
Despite differences in country performances and les-
sons to be learned from cross-country benchmarking, 
such discussions easily become superficial, leading to 
a naïve “copy and paste” view. This neglects the com-
plementarity between different policy instruments, the 
institutional structure and the political environment. 
History also documents that the “super-models” have 
their ups and downs, stressing that performance is 
shock dependent and various models/countries have 
different comparative advantages.
The relatively favourable performance of  the Danish 
economy is not the result of  a quick fix, but the out-
come of a long string of  reforms addressing structur-
al problems and very explicitly taking into account 
the constraints faced by a small and open economy. 
The latter is immediately clear from the fixed ex-
change rate policy and the need to ensure that it is 
credible. This has passed a market test since the inter-
est rate spread vis-à-vis the euro area has been very 
small for years, and even negative in some periods. 
The Danish case also shows that policy choices are 
possible even in an era of  globalisation. Denmark’s 
public sector plays a larger role than in most other 
countries. The interesting lesson is how the welfare 
state has been designed so as to balance concerns over 
economic performance on the one hand, and the pub-
lic provision of  welfare services and the pursuit of 
egalitarian outcomes on the other. Two points are 
particularly important. Firstly, while the public sector 
is large, the private sector is very liberal in Denmark. 
The Danish model is thus not “politics against mar-
kets”. Secondly, welfare arrangements have a strong 
active focus on supporting labour market participa-
tion and human capital acquisition. Since the finan-
cial viability of  the welfare model ultimately depends 
on maintaining a high employment level in the private 
sector, the conflict between welfare objectives and 
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economic performance is not as stark as it may first 
appear.
Looking forward, the future holds both political and 
economic challenges for Denmark. On the political 
side, it is unclear whether Denmark is a fully-fledged 
member of the EU. Denmark’s rejection of the euro 
and the exceptions to EU regulations that it has intro-
duced on a number of other issues makes it unclear 
whether Denmark is in or out. Is it a tenable position 
to be a selective member? This question was revital-
ised by the referendum in December 2015 on whether 
Denmark should change its blanket opt-out on all EU 
justice and home affairs cooperation in favour of an 
opt-in model as adopted by the UK and Ireland. The 
outcome was a “no”, further confirming Denmark’s 
“side-lined” position on EU cooperation.
Looking to the future, migration is a particularly 
thorny issue for a country with extensive welfare ar-
rangements. Even if  welfare arrangements are not 
magnets attracting migrants, the financial viability of 
the welfare model rests on a high employment level. 
Egalitarian objectives imply high entry requirements 
in the form of qualifications to find jobs (to qualify for 
high minimum wages), as well as generous social 
transfers. This causes a very tight relation between the 
employment rate and how public finances are affected 
by immigration. Denmark thus faces a difficult trilem-
ma of having to choose between extremely restrictive 
immigration rules (constrained by international trea-
ties and EU rules), lowering minimum wages or differ-
entiating between social rights. All three avenues chal-
lenge the basic objectives of the welfare state. To date 
Denmark has largely pursued the first and third ave-
nues, but how far is it possible to proceed in these 
directions?
Ageing challenges fiscal sustainability. In the Danish 
case, the first test has been passed. A number of re-
forms, notably increases in pension ages, imply that 
the criterion for fiscal sustainability is met. The second 
test is to ensure that the reforms work out and deliver 
the anticipated effects. Policy discussions often focus 
on new initiatives to be taken; but it is equally impor-
tant to ensure the effective implementation of already 
approved reforms and make them work. In the case of 
Denmark this is not a trivial point, since its economic 
policy strategy relies critically on substantial increases 
in labour supply and employment. This is not an im-
possible task, but not a trivial one either. Retirement 
ages are going to increase significantly, and although 
this is motivated by increasing longevity and healthy 
ageing, there are still hurdles to pass. Does the design 
of the system provide the right economic incentives to 
support increases in the labour supply and employ-
ment? How can the level of qualification be main-
tained and developed to facilitate such increases?
The strategy of ensuring both high employment and 
an equal distribution of income depends critically on 
ensuring not only a high level, but also a reasonably 
equal distribution of qualifications. Despite the sub-
stantial resources devoted to education, guaranteeing 
“value for money” in education is a major challenge. 
A particularly severe problem is the large share of 
young cohorts who do not receive a labour market rel-
evant education. 
There are also challenges within the public sector. 
Since it is large, and not directly exposed to market 
forces, it is essential to maintain focus on efficiency 
and productivity within the sector. Public finances will 
be strained in the future, and room for improvement 
has to be found either via the reallocation of resources 
or improvements in efficiency and productivity. 
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Western Balkans: Coming 
together
5.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines some of the key features of the 
economic transformation of the Western Balkans 
(WB) over the past 15 years. We discuss the achieve­
ments of this transformation, as well as some of the 
related pitfalls and challenges. In doing so, we draw 
lessons from those countries of the Baltics1 and 
CESEE2 regions that have been undergoing similar 
processes for a decade longer. We define the WB as 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, 
Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) Macedonia, Mon­
te negro, and Serbia.3 
The WB region, with a current population of around 
20 million, is the gateway between West and East, be­
tween Europe and the Middle East. It is a region 
steeped in history: over 20 Roman emperors in the 3rd 
and 4th centuries A.D. were born on the territory of 
WB.4 The boundary between Eastern and Western 
Roman empires and, consequently, between the 
Orthodox and Catholic worlds, as well as the border 
between the Austrian and Ottoman Empire passed 
through the region. As a result, the WB region has 
been home to an exciting, but often volatile mix of 
ethnic and religious groups throughout history, in­
cluding Orthodox and Catholic Christians as well as 
Muslims. 
The contemporary political landscape of the WB re­
gion was shaped in the 1990s with the disintegration 
of the former Yugoslavia, as all of the countries that 
are now members of the WB region, with the excep­
1 This group of countries consists of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
2 This group of countries includes the central European countries 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as 
the south eastern European countries Bulgaria, and Romania.
3 Geographically, the province of Kosovo also belongs to the region 
of WB. Since its unilateral secession from Serbia is not recognised by 
Serbia itself, by some members of the EU, or by the United Nations, 
we exclude it from consideration. For consistency’s sake, all data on 
Serbia in this paper excludes Kosovo.
4 Of that number, 18 were born on what is now the territory of 
Serbia alone. 
tion of Albania, are former Yugoslav republics.5 
Yugoslavia was unique among the former socialist 
countries on many levels. It enjoyed excellent econom­
ic, cultural and political ties with the West and, at the 
same time, a solid working relationship with the 
Eastern Block. As a result, Yugoslavian citizens, un­
like other Eastern Europeans, could travel to most 
countries of the world visa­free. As one of the leaders 
of the Non­Aligned movement, a block of over 
100 developing economies of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, Yugoslavia also had excellent economic and 
political ties with most emerging economies. Yugoslav 
firms led many large infrastructure projects through­
out the developing world. Tens of thousands of stu­
dents from non­aligned countries studied in Belgrade, 
Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Sarajevo. 
Yugoslavia’s economic system was also unique and 
can be described as socialist market economy. It was 
based on labour­managed (socially­owned) firms that 
competed in goods and services markets. Managers 
made production decisions together with workers 
(these decisions were not the result of a strict central 
planning), but could not (until the late 1980s) own 
their companies outright. Farmers, by contrast, could 
own land (up to 10 hectares). Importantly, the quality 
of goods and services was high, with the German in­
dustrial DIN standard serving as a template in 
Yugoslavia. One key feature of the Yugoslav system 
was a strong reliance on remittances from its citizens 
living abroad (in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
etc.).6 In order to attract their savings, the government 
had encouraged savings accounts in foreign curren­
cies. Decades later, this measure is still haunting poli­
cymakers in Yugoslavia’s successor states (see below) 
as it led to very high levels of euroisation in the region 
and made it difficult to enact a currency devaluation. 
The system ground to an abrupt halt in the late 1980s. 
Aiming to reform the country, move it towards the 
membership of the European Economic Union and 
trying to fight chronically high inflation, the last prime 
5 The only former Yugoslav republic that is not a member of the WB 
is Slovenia.
6 In 1989, remittances to Yugoslavia totalled around 6.2 billion US 
Dollar, or around 19 percent of the world’s total remittances for that 
year.
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minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic´, introduced a 
number of reforms. These reforms included the inter­
nal convertibility of the dinar and a fixed exchange 
rate with respect to the Deutsche Mark. The fixed ex­
change rate coupled with the large interest rate differ­
ential between the Yugoslav dinar and the Deutsche 
Mark led to arbitrage opportunities, to a fast and un­
sustainable increase in Yugoslavia’s trade deficit and, 
eventually, to a depletion of currency reserves. The 
peg failed, causing a spiralling rise in inflation. 
The economic difficulties, requests for full political 
liberalisation and the introduction of the multi­party 
democracy, and, above all, the national aspirations of 
the peoples that made up Yugoslavia, led to popular 
discontent. The first multi­party elections brought to 
the fore leaders in the largest republics (Serbia and 
Croatia) that had decided to use unresolved national 
issues to boost their popularity and solidify their grip 
on power. Prime Minister Markovic´ tried to present 
an alternative to these nationalist movements. How­
ever, his power base was not strong enough and he 
failed to preserve the unity of the country and trans­
form it in a new, more democratic fashion. Civil war 
ensued. It was the bloodiest conflict seen in Europe 
since the Second World War, resulting in over 
100,000 deaths, several hundred thousands of refugees 
and the wholesale devastation of the country’s human 
and physical capital.
The economic costs of the break­up of Yugoslavia 
alone were enormous. A relatively vibrant, well­inte­
grated market was violently fragmented, property be­
longing to individuals and firms from other republics 
was wilfully expropriated or simply destroyed. In ad­
dition, Serbia and Montenegro were placed under a 
regime of strict UN­imposed economic, cultural, sci­
entific and political sanctions for several years which, 
for all practical purposes, cut them off from the rest of 
the world. State institutions significantly weakened, 
together with the rule of law. The economy became in­
creasingly informal. Corruption, previously a moder­
ate problem, became endemic in most parts of the for­
mer Yugoslavia. 
By 2001, more cooperative governments came to pow­
er in the entire region. Albania joined this mix. 
Albania’s socialist experience was very different from 
that of Yugoslavia. The country remained in a virtu­
ally complete self­imposed isolation for at least 
40 years, maintaining a somewhat closer relationship 
only with China. The collapse of the system left 
Albania as the poorest country in Europe, but deter­
mined to make progress. Changes at the dawn of the 
new century represented a real chance for a new begin­
ning for the entire WB region. While the initial condi­
tions were challenging for most countries in the re­
gion, they are trying to catch up with their peers in 
CESEE and the Baltics and, eventually, join the 
European Union. 
5.2 Growth and income patterns
From 2001 until the inception of the global crisis the 
WB, along with the rest of emerging Europe, experi­
enced strong growth (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). During 
that period Albania and Serbia boasted the highest re­
gional growth rates of around 6 percent per annum on 
average. Baltic countries, Romania and Slovakia grew 
even faster. Especially stellar were growth rates of 
Latvia and Lithuania, averaging around 7.5 percent 
per annum (see Figure 5.1).7 
At that time ample money had become available for 
investment throughout emerging Europe. Foreign di­
rect investment started entering the WB region. The 
first sectors to be liberalised were financial services 
(banking), goods trade and mobile telecommunica­
tions at a later date. The transition to a market econo­
my became a political priority in the region. The pri­
vatisation of formerly state­owned and socially­owned 
companies8 led to an increase in total factor produc­
tivity, which, along with strong growth in private con­
sumption, fuelled growth in that period. The con­
sumption was driven by ample access to mortgage 
lending, consumer credit and government borrowing. 
In some WB countries such as Serbia, the funds raised 
by privatisation were mostly consumed rather than in­
vested. Thus, throughout the region, imported funds 
were used for consumption rather than capital accu­
mulation and growth, developing the non­traded 
goods sectors and imports at the expense of exports.9 
The consumption­led growth model was in no small 
measure driven by exporters, banks and the financial 
investors of developed economies. Clearly, there was 
(and, partly, still is) a desire in the population of the 
region to catch up with “Western” consumer goods, so 
7 In a recent IMF report, Murgasova et al. (2015) provide a detailed 
account of the transition experience of WB in the past 15 years. 
8 Socially­owned companies were remnants of the unique socialist 
system of Yugoslavia. 
9 One partial exception to this rule was Macedonia, which re­fo­
cused on more diversified growth and the development of tradeable 
goods exporting capacity from around 2004 on.
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the “push” from exporters was warmly welcomed by 
the “pull” from WB consumers. Financial investors, 
expecting a repetition of what was experienced in 
Central and Eastern Europe, were banking on a grad­
ual convergence of local financial markets with those 
of Europe, while getting a lot of “bang for their buck” 
from high local interest rates and foreseeable foreign 
exchange trends. With all that in mind and “easy mon­
ey” from both money markets and Western deposi­
tors, foreign banks who set up shop locally stood by to 
provide financing, hence reinforcing this one­sided 
trend. 
The industrial capacity of the region, already serious­
ly impaired and technologically out­of­date, shrank 
even further in that period. Local currency apprecia­
tion and wage increases indirectly or directly financed 
by the inflow of foreign capital went beyond produc­
tivity increases and revalued the 
economy, depriving it of its inter­
national competitiveness. The 
problems were, in that sense, very 
similar to those in southern Euro­
pean countries, which also experi­
enced an inflationary credit bub­
ble due to the abundance of 
cheap foreign capital and the re­
sulting wage increases.10 
Private trading companies, pro­
tected from true competition, cre­
ated oligopolies in the region. 
Their business model was largely 
to import foreign products and 
sell them for a hefty premium 
while, at the same time, squeezing domestic suppliers 
utilising market power. Obviously, there were natural 
limits to such a growth model. These limits were ex­
posed when the crisis hit.
The growth model in 2001–2008 led to large and un­
sustainable current account deficits in both the WB 
and Baltic regions (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4). This re­
flected the fact that both regions lived beyond their 
means at that time period. A particularly stark exam­
ple is that of Montenegro where the current account 
deficit reached almost 50 percent of GDP in 2008 and 
of Serbia, where it went from a surplus of 2 percent of 
GDP (in 2001) to a deficit of over 21 percent (in 2008). 
The situation was structurally different in many 
CESEE countries, since an important fraction of their 
deficit came from importing machinery needed to 
build large tradeable goods sector (Romania and 
Slovakia, for example). 
With the onset of the great reces­
sion, growth patterns started to 
diverge sharply across the regions 
of emerging Europe and between 
countries of the same region.11 
The crisis hit the Baltics as early 
as 2008, while the WB and 
CESEE regions continued grow­
ing until 2009. As a result of the 
Vienna Initiative 1, large Western 
financial groups that dominate 
the financial landscape of emerg­
10   See Sinn (2014), Chapters 2 and 4. 
11   Bakker and Klingen (2012) document ex­
periences in emerging Europe during the 
2008–2009 crisis.
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ing Europe agreed not to deleverage in the WB region 
during the height of the crisis. Some even increased 
their lending during that period. After the measures 
expired, however, the WB region was hit hard by de­
leveraging. As many firms in the region struggled with 
liquidity, the share of nonperforming loans increased 
substantially (see Section 5.6). 
While most of  Europe was in recession in 2009, 
Albania and FYR Macedonia continued to grow, al­
beit at lower rates. As we shall see later, these are 
countries that improved their business climate in the 
first years of  transition along several dimensions 
(this is particularly true of  FYR Macedonia). On the 
other hand, Serbia, Croatia and BiH were hit by re­
cessions. The debt­driven bubbles burst like those in 
southern Europe. The response to the crisis in these 
countries varied, but typically involved providing 
government support to struggl­
ing businesses. Serbia used vari­
ous forms of  state subsidies for 
the large loss­making state com­
panies. In addition, the govern­
ment instituted programmes that 
would subsidise banks to lower 
the interest rates for eligible pri­
vate companies. This led to a 
sharp increase in public debt: 
Serbia’s gross government debt 
increased from 32 percent (in 
2008) to over 72 percent of  GDP 
(in 2014). During the same peri­
od, Croatia’s public debt rose 
from 36 percent to 80 percent of 
GDP. For emerging countries 
that mostly borrow in foreign 
currency, such debt levels can 
easily become un sustain able.12 
In contrast to the WB region, the 
Baltic countries had little public 
debt before the crisis. While 
Estonia continues to have very 
low debt levels (below 10 percent 
of  GDP), the debt levels of 
Lithuania and Latvia grew close 
to 38 percent by 2014. In the 
CESEE region, Slovenia tried to 
preserve its unique economic 
model featuring a significant in­
volvement of  the state in the 
large business sector and at­
tempted to bail out large government­controlled 
banks and companies. As a result, it increased its 
public debt from 22 percent (in 2008) to over 80 per­
cent of  GDP (in 2014). Figure 5.5 illustrates the 
change in government debt as a fraction of  GDP for 
the three regions.
When the influx of foreign credit dried up, a change in 
the economic model was needed in order to address 
unsustainably high current account deficits. As shown 
in Figure 5.3, most countries in our sample signifi­
cantly and painfully reduced their current account 
deficits by sliding into recessions and curtailing their 
imports; some even turned their deficits into a surplus 
(Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria). The only 
exception in the entire sample, in that respect, is 
12 Koczan (2015) provides an overview of fiscal deficits and the public 
debt experiences of the WB over the past 15 years.
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Albania. Its current account deficit continued to grow 
even after the crisis hit and is expected to reach almost 
15 percent of GDP in 2015. For sure, this is another 
bubble in the making.13 While Montenegro slightly 
improved the overall situation with its current account 
deficit, it was still astronomical, paving the way for a 
disaster. 
A borrow­and­spend strategy did not help Serbia 
and Croatia to return to growth. In the period of 
2012–2014 Serbia dipped in and out of  recession a 
couple of  times while Croatia contracted for 4 years. 
It became increasingly obvious to the governments 
of  the WB that what they called a “consumption­
growth model” was, in fact, just over­borrowing and 
bubble creation with a temporary hype, followed by 
misery when the bubble burst, as has been observed 
in so many countries of  this world. Countries like 
FYR Macedonia that were reforming their business 
environment had healthier growth than those lagging 
behind in reforms. In Serbia, the decision was made 
to refocus on the production of  tradeable goods and 
services by attracting large multinationals. The free 
trade agreement that Serbia has with Russia, 
Belorussia and the Ukraine, as well as with the EU, 
the proximity to key EU markets and relatively low 
labour costs, make Serbia a potentially attractive 
destination for foreign direct in vestment. 
As in the WB, the growth in the Baltics prior to the 
crisis was largely driven by an increase in consump­
tion and ample foreign credit. After the crisis hit, 
however, the Baltic governments reacted quite differ­
13 But, for now, despite the high level of deficit, in Albania financing 
has been available through debt and foreign direct investments, see 
World Bank (2015), p. 1.
ently from the governments of 
the WB countries. In order to 
preserve the peg with the euro 
and their prospects of  joining 
the Eurozone, they underwent 
real devaluations by rigorously 
cutting wages and prices and im­
posing harsh austerity measures 
with large cuts in public expendi­
ture.14 As a result, the region 
contracted by over 14 percent in 
2009. After that year, however, 
the period of  recovery began. By 
2012 the Baltics returned to 
strong growth. By contrast, the 
WB countries, led by Croatia, 
dipped back into the negative 
territory of  growth. While WB countries are only 
gradually reducing their current account deficits, 
Baltic countries have already balanced their current 
accounts. 
In the CESEE region, several countries depend on 
tradeable goods exports. Slovenia’s economy, for in­
stance, contracted by 7.8 percent in 2009. Slovenian 
production mostly goes to the EU market (especially 
car parts). A sharp decline in the car industry had a 
strong negative effect on Slovenia’s economy, which 
dipped in and out of  recession before finally return­
ing to healthy growth (2.6 percent) in 2014. As ex­
ports improved, Slovenia’s current account moved 
into a strong surplus (estimated at 5.8 percent in 
2014 and over 7 percent of  GDP in 2015). Romania 
and Hungary also faced serious challenges. Both 
countries have strong exports. Both implemented 
substantial cost cutting measures to regain competi­
tiveness and, in Hungary’s case, to avoid insolvency. 
By 2014, Hungary had a healthy current account sur­
plus of  over 4 percent, while Romania had reduced 
its deficit to less than 0.5 percent of  GDP. Poland, 
the largest and most diversified economy in our sam­
ple, continued to grow throughout the crisis. While 
Poland never had a large current account deficit, in 
the past few years it has kept its deficit below 2 per­
cent (supported by large transfers from the EU). 
We saw previously that the WB countries grew quite 
strongly in real terms in the period 2001–2008, but 
that growth tapered­off in subsequent years. Similar 
patterns can be seen in cumulative GDP per­capita 
growth (compare Figure 5.6). 
14 See Sinn (2014), Chapter 3.
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The highest cumulative change in per­capita income 
was in Lithuania (over 150 percent), Albania (145 per­
cent) and Latvia (143 percent). Please note that all 3 of 
these countries not only saw substantial real GDP 
growth, but also a significant reduction in their popula­
tion (see the next section). Per­capita income in the eco­
nomically most developed former Yugoslav republics, 
Croatia and Slovenia, grew the least (56 and 57 percent, 
respectively). Much of the growth was achieved in the 
period 2001–2008. In 2009–2014, Albania and Poland 
had the highest cumulative growth (over 30 percent), 
while Croatia and Slovenia had a cumulative reduction 
of (PPP adjusted) per­capita income. 
In per­capita terms, Albania was the poorest in 2001, 
while Slovenia was the most affluent country in our 
sample. By 2014, BiH had the smallest per­capita in­
come, while the Czech Republic had the largest. Is 
there any evidence of income convergence in the WB 
region and emerging Europe as a whole? Firstly, we 
compare the per­capita incomes of the richest and the 
poorest country in the WB region and the total sample 
for 2001 and 2014 in Table 5.1. 
Please note that the poorest countries (Albania in 2001, 
and BiH in 2014, both belonging to the WB region) 
were both absolutely and relatively 
less poor in 2014 than in 2001 with 
respect to the richest countries of 
emerging Europe: ratios of the 
highest to the lowest per­capita in­
comes decreased over time. Thus, 
extreme differences in per­capita 
incomes have gotten smaller both 
within the WB region and in the 
total sample. In addition, variabil­
ity of income, defined as the ratio 
of standard deviation to average 
per­capita income within the WB 
countries got smaller (from 0.41 in 
2001 it dropped to 0.27 in 2014), 
indicating some convergence of in­
come within the WB region. 
On average, however, the WB region is increasingly 
lagging behind both Baltic and CESEE regions 
(Table 5.2). Namely, while in 2001 the average income 
of the Baltic countries was about 1.4 times higher that 
of WB, this ratio grew to 1.9 by 2014. On the other 
hand, the ratio of average incomes between CESEE 
and WB regions increased marginally in that period 
(from 1.6 it grew to 1.7). 
Note that the Baltic countries have surpassed the 
CESEE region in terms of average per­capita income 
(while the ratio of CESEE to Baltics average income 
was 1.11 in 2001, in 2014 it was only 0.93). Thus, it was 
the Baltics whose per­capita income grew the most, in 
average, in the preceding period. 
5.3 Population patterns
In the past couple of decades emerging Europe has 
been getting increasingly depopulated. This is particu­
larly true for the Baltics and the Western Balkans 
(Figure 5.7).
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Ratios of PPP-adjusted per-capita income of the 
richest and the poorest country 
 2001 2014 
Western Balkans 2.88 2.12 
Total sample 4.06 3.04 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and EEAG 
calculations. 
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Ratios of weighted average (PPP-adjusted) per-capita 
income with respect to the weighted average income of 
the Western Balkans 
 2001 2014 
Baltics 1.4 1.9 
CESEEa) 1.6 1.7 
a) Central European and south eastern European 
countries. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and EEAG 
calculations 
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Out of the 16 countries in our sample, 10 saw their pop­
ulation decline in the period 1991–2014. In percentage 
terms, by far the biggest depopulation occurred in 
Latvia (a 12.6 percent drop), followed by Lithuania 
(10.1 percent) and Estonia (7.7 percent). In WB, BiH, 
after losing over 7 percent of its 
population in the decade of the 
war, the population grew slightly, 
fuelled by the return of a fraction 
of refugees. While both Albania 
and Serbia lost population overall 
(Albania by over 5.5 percent and 
Serbia by 2.7 percent), the depop­
ulation of Albania is tapering off, 
while in Serbia it is accelerating. In 
Croatia, the population drop is 
starting to accelerate in connec­
tion with the country’s member­
ship of the EU and people looking 
for jobs in developed countries of 
that trading block. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the largest 
net gain in the WB region and 
among all 16 countries was made 
FYR Macedonia (2.4 percent) and 
Slovenia (1.4 percent). Looking at 
regions on the whole, the situation 
looks like in Figure 5.8.
As a result of depopulation, the to­
tal number of people in the 
16 countries of our sample dropp­
ed from over 128 million (in 1991) 
to less than 120 million (in 2014), 
representing a drop of around 
3  percent. As the largest of the 
three regions, CESEE lost 5 mil­
lion people, or 2.3 percent. Of 
those countries, Romania and 
Bulgaria lost around 7 percent of 
their population respectively. 
Poland during that same period 
lost only around 0.12 percent, or 
around 100 thousand people. As 
mentioned before, Baltic countries 
experienced the highest loss of 
population. While smaller in per­
centage terms than the depopula­
tion of Romania and the Baltics, 
the depopulation of the WB region 
is nevertheless quite dramatic. 
It is clear that a reduction in population may be caused 
by both low fertility (and/or high mortality) rates, as 
well as by net emigration. Let us, therefore, first con­
sider the natural causes. 
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Albania (see Figure 5.9) has by far the highest birth 
rates of any country in the sample, followed by FYR 
Macedonia (which also has a significant fraction of 
the Albanian population). However, in both of these 
countries birth rates declined significantly in the 
2000s, moving towards the EU average. BiH saw a dra­
matic drop in birth rates in the 2000s, which are cur­
rently the lowest in our sample. Birth rates in Slovenia, 
by contrast, have increased slightly in recent years.
Not only does Albania have higher birth rates than the 
other countries in the sample, but it also has very low 
mortality rates (see Figure 5.10) – less than half the 
mortality rates of Serbia, Latvia or Hungary, reflecting 
the fact that the population of these countries is older 
on average than that of Albania. Calculating the cumu­
lative net contribution to population change from natu­
ral causes (births net of deaths) we obtain Figure 5.11.
Thus, while the population of Albania has decreased 
substantially, this has been due entirely to high levels 
of net emigration. The population change seen in 
Latvia, by contrast, can largely be attributed to natu­
ral causes and, to a lesser extent, to net emigration. 
These numbers, however, do not tell the whole picture. 
Consider Serbia, for example. The cumulative de­
crease in its population from natural causes is higher 
than the total loss of population, indicating a net mi­
gration into the country. Does that mean that Serbian 
citizens did not emigrate? It certainly does not. Indeed, 
both during the 1990s and, with a renewed intensity, 
in the past few years, a large number of highly skilled 
professionals (among others) have been leaving the 
country in a search of better life.15 Taking advantage 
of a bilateral contract between Germany and Serbia, 
for example, hundreds of medical professionals have 
left Serbia to (legally) work in 
Germany. On the other hand, 
Serbia has also gained a large 
number of new residents as a re­
sult of conflicts in BiH, Croatia 
and Kosovo. In net terms, Serbia 
had a positive net immigration 
trend in the period of 1991–2013, 
i.e. it absorbed more people into 
the country than the number of 
people that emigrated. 
One of the important parameters 
of quality of life is expected lifes­
pan (at birth). Throughout emerg­
ing Europe and in the EU, life ex­
pectancy has been rising steadily 
over the past couple of decades. 
Not surprisingly, Slo venia and the 
Czech Republic, the two countries 
with the highest per­capita in­
come in our sample, came on top. 
More specifically, the expected 
lifespan in Slovenia has risen to 
almost 80 years, very close to the 
EU average.16 On the other hand, 
it was Albania that came in third 
15   In addition, a large number of low skilled 
and unskilled people, mostly of Roma and 
Albanian origin, used visa liberalisation af­
ter 2009 with the WB countries to ask for 
political asylum in the richer EU countries 
in search of better economic outcomes. 
16   Average life expectancy in the EU was 
77.5 years in 2001 and 80.4 years in 2013. 
Source: World Bank World Development 
Indicators.
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in the sample in the period of 2009–2013 and first in 
the WB region (see Figure 5.12). 
Overall, the WB region outperforms the Baltics ac­
cording to this criterion. In addition, people in WB 
had a somewhat higher expected 
lifespan than the population of 
CESEE as well in 2001. By 2013, 
the expected lifespan for the 
CESEE region caught up with the 
WB region (see Figure 5.13).
5.4 Unemployment, income 
distribution and poverty
Persistently high unemployment 
has been one of  the biggest chal­
lenges for the economies of  the 
WB region, with regional aver­
age unemployment rates well 
above the Baltics and, especially, 
the CESEE figures (see Fi­
gures  5.14 and 5.15).17 In 2001, 
FYR Mace donia had the highest 
unemployment rate in the region 
(30.5 percent), while Serbia had 
the lowest (12.8 percent), the rea­
son being that many socially­
owned companies were not yet 
privatised at that time and 
hoarded excess labour. By 2008, 
helped by growth, unemploy­
ment rates fell throughout 
emerging Europe. However, the 
situation improved much more 
in the Baltic countries and 
CESEE than in the WB region. 
Unem ployment actually wors­
ened in Macedonia, where it 
reached 33.8 percent in 2008. In 
Serbia, the effects of  downsizing 
and privatisation had translated 
into an unemployment rate of 
over 20  percent by 2006. Thus, 
even in the boom period, many 
WB countries struggled with 
very high un employment.
The onset of the great recession 
pushed up unemployment in all 
regions of emerging Europe, but especially in the WB. 
The only country of the region with unemployment 
consistently below 15 percent in the period 2002–2013 
was Albania (helped largely by the export of excess la­
17   Gligorov et al. (2008) analyse structural issues related to the labour 
market in WB.
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bour force). With a protracted recession, unemploy­
ment rates grew in Croatia from 8.4 percent (in 2008) 
to close to 18 percent in 2013. 
Consistent with the high unemployment rates, the WB 
countries also had low participation rates (i.e. the frac­
tion of 15+ year olds who are active participants in 
the labour market). Even in relatively good times, such 
as in 2008, participation rates in the WB countries 
were well below 50 percent, with the corresponding 
numbers particularly low for FRY Mace donia (32 per­
cent), and BiH (36 percent). The highest rates of par­
ticipation in the WB region, in line with lower rates of 
unemployment, were seen in Albania. It is worth not­
ing that the Baltic countries posted higher participa­
tion rates after the crisis than the CESEE region, and 
much higher than those of the WB region. Average 
participation rates in the CESEE region are fairly sta­
ble at slightly over 50 percent. The highest participa­
tion rates in our sample were seen in the two most de­
veloped countries, Slovenia and 
the Czech Republic (around 55 per ­ 
cent). These are also the countries 
with the lowest unemployment 
rates in the sample. Another coun­
try with relatively low unemploy­
ment and a high labour market 
participation rate is Romania (an­
other country with very high emi ­ 
gration).
One of the key reasons for persis­
tently high unemployment (and low 
employment) rates are the institu­
tional and business environments 
of the WB region. When these start 
changing for the better, unemploy­
ment rates drop and labour partici­
pation rises. Consider the case of 
FYR Macedonia. In the past few 
years it has significantly improved 
its business environment (see the 
next section). While the country still 
has the highest unemployment and 
the lowest labour participation rates 
in our sample, its unemployment 
rate fell from a peak of 37.3 percent 
in 2005 to 29 percent in 2013.
Labour participation rates, by con­
trast, grew from 32.4 percent in 
2004 to 39.2 percent in 2013. 
Next, we address the issue of income inequality by us­
ing two measures: the Gini coefficient and the share of 
income earned by the highest 10 percent of earners. 
For both of these measures, higher values correspond 
to higher inequality of income. Figure 5.16 demon­
strates that these two measures are almost perfectly 
correlated.
In our sample, FRY Macedonia had the highest in­
come inequality, followed by the Baltic countries, 
while Slovenia had the most equitable income distri­
bution. In the WB region, the smallest average Gini 
coefficient had Serbia, while Montenegro had the 
smallest concentration of income by the top 10 per­
cent of earners. For the same time period, the average 
Gini coefficients for Finland and the United States 
were 28.2 and 41.1 percent, respectively. Thus, Slo­
venia had even a more equitable income distribution 
than a country that is traditionally considered as a 
beacon of the welfare state (Finland). On the other 
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hand, US income distribution is even more inequitable 
than FRY Macedonia. 
Let us now consider poverty. Again, we use two meas­
ures: the first one is based upon the national standards 
of poverty in each country, with the poverty head­
count ratio at national poverty lines as a fraction of 
the population size. One problem with this measure is 
that each country may have a somewhat different defi­
nition of what poverty actually means. So we also use 
another measure defined as the headcount ratio of in­
dividuals who make (PPP­adjusted) 2 dollars a day or 
less (as a fraction of total number of population). 
This measure determines a fraction of the population 
in dire poverty. It is worth noting that these two meas­
ures have little correlation (see Figure 5.17). However, 
it is clear that poverty is still a problem in the WB re­
gion, Bulgaria and Romania; and 
a much smaller problem in the 
countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. More specifically, there is 
still a non­negligible fraction of 
people in dire poverty in all WB 
countries except in Croatia. 
5.5 Transition patterns
The European Bank for Re­
construction and Develop ment 
(EBRD) has been collecting tran­
sition scores (from 1989) for all 
countries within its zone of re­
sponsibility, including the coun­
tries of the WB region, Baltics and CESEE regions. 
There are several transition categories and the scores 
awarded each year are from 1  to 5. A score of 4 or 
higher means an almost complete transition to best 
market practices in a particular category, while a score 
of 1 indicates that no transition in that category has 
taken place to date.18
Initially, the republics of the Former Yugoslavia were 
the frontrunners in transition, since Yugoslavia was 
the first country to undertake a small scale privatisa­
tion in 1989. However, with the disintegration of the 
country, some of the former republics, particularly 
BiH and Serbia, backtracked on transition for several 
years (see Figures 5.18 and 5.19).
In BiH, strict price controls were introduced during 
the war from 1992 to1995. Since establishing peace in 
1995, the country has been under 
de­facto foreign tutorage. At the 
beginning, several market re­
forms were enforced so the ag­
gregate transition index in­
creased from 1.2 (in 1995) to 2.9 
(in 2001). In the 2000s, local civil 
administration started to take re­
sponsibility for day­to­day deci­
sions in the country. Here, a 
structural problem of  BiH re­
vealed itself. Namely, the compli­
cated political system developed 
by the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
effective in ensuring peace, but 
not conducive to efficient deci­
18   See EBRD (2013).
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sion­making, created an environ­
ment where major changes are 
hard to make. This, in turn, 
slowed down the transition 
process.19 
The decade of the 1990s is known 
in Serbia as “the Lost Decade”. 
The economic sanctions sealed 
off  the country completely in 
1993–1996 and partially (the so­
called outer wall of sanctions) in 
1997–2000. During that time, like 
in BiH, price controls were in 
place, but not successful: in 1993 
the country went through one of 
the most severe hyperinflations in 
history (see the next section). 
After a pro­Western coalition 
took power in the late 2000, the 
outer wall of sanctions was lifted 
and Serbia was allowed back into 
the “international community”. 
By that time the economy was 
devastated. The region of Koso­
vo, around 15 percent of the terri­
tory rich in coal and minerals, 
was de­facto separated from the 
country following the NATO in­
tervention in 1999. The issue of 
Kosovo has been a serious stum­
bling block for Serbia ever since. 
Nevertheless, as of 2001 the coun­
try has been trying to catch up 
with the rest of emerging Europe. 
In 2001–2008, Serbia made sub­
stantial progress in transitioning 
towards a market economy (from 
an average score of 1.6 in 2001 to 
3.2 in 2008). After 4 to 5 years of 
relative stagnation following the 
great recession, Serbia has started 
to address most of the remaining 
tough issues over the past two 
years, including the issue of 
Kosovo, the restructuring of loss­
making public companies, and 
19   The system in BiH is based upon the 
principle of consensus (somewhat similar 
to Switzerland) between three constituent 
nations (Bosniaks­Muslims, Croats and 
Serbs) and two political entities (Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika 
Srpska). In addition, the Federation itself  
consists of a number of cantons.
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generally improving the competitiveness and quality 
of the country’s institutions. 
The following examples illustrate the recent restruc­
turing of public companies in Serbia. Yugoslav 
Airlines, a loss­making national carrier, was restruc­
tured in partnership with Etihad Airlines, which took 
a 49 percent stake in the company. The company 
changed its name to Air Serbia to mark the new begin­
ning. Importantly, Etihad took over management of 
the joint venture and greatly improved it. The compa­
ny significantly increased its number of passengers 
flown and started posting profits instead of losses af­
ter just one year. Another example of large­scale, suc­
cessful restructuring was seen in the car industry. 
There, Fiat took over an ailing car manufacturer, 
Zastava, and became the largest exporter in Serbia. 
Some other foreign companies moved parts of their 
production to Serbia (Bosch, Siemens and Benetton, 
among others). As mentioned before, free trade agree­
ments between Serbia and both the EU and Russia are 
making the country attractive for European investors. 
Montenegro was the smallest republic of the Former 
Yugoslavia. Formally part of the federation with 
Serbia until it declared independence in 2006, it acted 
de­facto independently of the central government after 
1994. As a result, it made inroads in transition, even at 
a time Serbia did not (in the 1990s), albeit at a slower 
pace than Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. In­
terestingly, it had unilaterally adopted the euro (previ­
ously Deutsche Mark) as its currency, while still for­
mally being part of the federation with Serbia. In the 
period of 2001–2008 the pace of transition in Mon­
tenegro accelerated. For a few years, a large number of 
foreign investors, mostly from Russia, purchased prop­
erties in Montenegro, bringing flood of money into the 
country. A real estate bubble was created, fuelled by 
easy access to loans in the pre­crisis period. After the 
crisis hit, the bubble burst and the country is still trying 
to find an alternative way of going forward. 
FYR Macedonia has traditionally always been one of 
the poorest Yugoslav republics. After the break­up of 
Yugoslavia it achieved macroeconomic stability rela­
tively quickly, but had the slowest growth rates among 
the former Yugoslav republics in the early 2000s and 
by far the highest rates of unemployment. By the mid­
2000s the government decided to make the country at­
tractive for foreign investment. Its reform efforts are 
starting to pay off. The aggregate transition score of 
FYR Macedonia in 2012 (3.6) is second in the WB re­
gion only to Croatia’s score (3.9). As a result of these 
reforms, the country continued to grow throughout 
the crisis period when several other countries in the re­
gion went into recession. 
Croatia is another interesting case. Despite the fact 
that for 4 years (1991–1995) the country was practi­
cally split in two as a result of the rebellion by the 
Serbian population of Croatia, it has never stopped 
developing towards a fully­fledged market economy. 
This fact was eventually reflected in its membership of 
the EU in 2014. Croatia is the most economically de­
veloped part of the WB, with high, steady revenues 
from tourism, and it has received assistance from the 
leading Western powers ever since its declaration of 
independence. Most importantly, perhaps, it stands 
out among the other WB countries by virtue of the 
quality of its institutions and its infrastructure. While 
Croatia scored a solid 3.3 for governance and enter­
prise restructuring in 2012 and 3.0 for competition 
policy, the closest competitor in that sense in the WB 
region had corresponding scores of just 2.7 and 2.7 
(FYR Macedonia). On the other hand, comparable 
numbers for BiH are only 2.0 and 2.3, respectively.
The pace of Albania’s transition was similar to that of 
FYR Macedonia (it has been outpaced by it in terms 
of reforms in recent years). As a result, Albania has 
been steadily lifting itself  out of poverty and improv­
ing its population’s quality of life. The country grew 
quite strongly in the boom period (2001–2008). It con­
tinued to grow at a slower pace even after the crisis. 
The unemployment rate, high by European standards, 
has been one of the lowest in the region for over a 
decade.
Overall, all WB countries, with the partial exception 
of Croatia, are still seriously lagging behind in terms 
of governance and the restructuring of large enter­
prises and, especially, in assuring a level competitive 
playing field. 
The Baltic countries made the fastest and most com­
prehensive transition in our sample. From the start, 
they instituted liberal economic policies that were kept 
in place independently of the ruling parties. As a re­
sult, the aggregate transition score of the Baltic coun­
tries reached 3.9 in 2012, the highest of the three re­
gions. Importantly, in those areas that most countries 
in emerging Europe found particularly challenging, 
namely governance and enterprise restructuring and 
competition policy, the average scores for the Baltics 
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in 2012 were 3.3 and 3.7, respec­
tively (the corresponding scores 
for WB were 2.5 and 2.4 and for 
CESEE 3.3 and 3.2). The com­
mitment of the Baltic nations to 
the free market was proven, once 
more, in the aftermath of the 
great recession. 
In the CESEE region, the average 
aggregate scores are similar, but a 
little lower than those for the 
Baltics. Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia are on a par with the 
Baltics in transition scores, in­
cluding governance and enter­
prise restructuring and competi­
tion policy. On the other hand, Slovenia, one of the 
most developed countries in emerging Europe, 
achieved scores of just 3.0 and 2.7 for these two cate­
gories of transition in 2012, respectively (and scored 
lower than Croatia, for example). The strong protec­
tionist inclinations of the Slovenian government cost 
the country a severe drop in output in the post­2008 
period. 
Sometimes a country can change its business climate 
relatively quickly. A case in point is Slovakia. After 
several years under an authoritarian rule and in a rel­
ative isolation from the rest of  Europe, Slovakia, 
with a change in government, quickly transitioned 
towards a vibrant market economy. Importantly, a 
serious effort was made to increase the efficiency of 
its public institutions. This paid off  handsomely, es­
pecially in Slovakia’s Western parts, which developed 
into an export­driven powerhouse (primarily in the 
car industry). 
While the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” ag­
gregate scores are susceptible to potential gaming by 
countries and should therefore be used with caution, 
the analysis behind them provides important addi­
tional insights into the institutional strengths and 
weakness of countries. As we show below, these in­
sights are broadly consistent with the EBRD indica­
tors discussed above. 
One of the common problems in most transitioning 
economies is corruption. The reason is simple. When, 
after a long period of equitable income distribution, 
an initial accumulation of capital in the hands of the 
few is allowed or, indeed, encouraged, serious tempta­
tions may occur. Corruption appears in various guises. 
Apart from an outright extraction of money by public 
officials, it can implicitly be present when unnecessary 
or overly complicated procedures are imposed on 
businesses. This, in turn, provides an opportunity to 
extract bribes to “speed up” processes, or to ensure 
positive outcomes.
Based on the results in Figure 5.20, reported corrup­
tion dropped substantially in the post­crisis period 
throughout the sample. This can be interpreted as a 
sign of a genuine progress or, perhaps, corruption is 
just being less frequently reported. To corroborate 
these findings, we look into less subjective measures 
that can proxy for potential corruption: the number of 
procedures needed to start a company and the number 
of taxes that firms need to pay in a given year (see 
Figure 5.21).
We see that, on average, the countries in the WB re­
gion still have more complicated procedures along 
both dimensions when compared to the Baltic and 
CESEE regions. However, all three regions improved 
after the crisis, with CESEE and, to some extent the 
WB region, catching up with the Baltics. It is worth 
noting that some countries made significant headway, 
while others made little progress. In the WB region 
(and, together with Slovenia, overall in the sample), 
FYR Macedonia had the smallest number of proce­
dures needed to open a company in 2014 (only 2). The 
second­best regional performer was Albania with 
5 procedures. In contrast, the worst performer, BiH, 
required 11 procedures to start a company in 2014. In 
terms of the number of different taxes that a company 
needs to pay in a single year, FRY Macedonia once 
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again ranked top of the entire sample in 2014, togeth­
er with Estonia and Latvia (7). The region’s second 
best performer was Croatia with 19 taxes. The worst 
performers were BiH (45) and Serbia (67). While 
Serbia did not, at least until 2014, 
change its complicated tax proce­
dures, Romania reduced the num­
ber of taxes from 113 (in 2008) to 
only 14 (in 2014). Clearly, signifi­
cant improvements are needed in 
most WB countries, with the ex­
ception of Macedonia, in terms 
of simplifying tax procedures.
WB countries made serious head­
way along another related meas­
ure, namely the number of days 
needed to legally start a new busi­
ness (compare Figure 5.22). 
The best overall performer in 2014 
was FYR Macedonia (2 days), 
with Lithuania (4 days) and Alba­
nia, Estonia and Hun gary (5 days) 
close behind. All of these coun­
tries made significant improve­
ments with respect to the 2003 sit­
uation, along with Serbia, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia, among 
others. The worst performers in 
this respect were Poland (30 days) 
and BiH (37 days). 
Finally, let us have a look at the 
average gross monthly salaries for 
the 16 countries of our sample and for five major trad­
ing partners of WB countries (Austria, Germany, 
France, Italy, and Greece) for the years 2008 and 2014 
in Figure 5.23. In the WB region, Croatia had the 
highest and Albania the lowest 
gross monthly salaries both in 
2008 and in 2014. Albanian and 
Serbian salaries dropped slightly 
(measured in euros) in 2014 with 
respect to 2008, while the salaries 
of other WB countries did not 
fall, despite the crisis. Slovenia 
posted by far the highest average 
gross monthly salaries among the 
16 countries of emerging Europe 
and Germany overall in the sam­
ple presented. In particular, the 
average gross monthly salary in 
Serbia and FYR Macedonia was 
just one third of that of Slovenia 
and 14 percent of Germany’s av­
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2005 2008 2014
Number
Corruption indicators
a) Former Yugoslav Republic.
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, the "Ease of Doing Business" project and EEAG 
calculations.
Procedures needed to start a company
Taxes companies need to file in a given fiscal year
Number
a)
a)
Figure 5.21
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2003 2008 2014
Number of days
Time needed to legally start a company
a) Former Yugoslav Republic.
Source: World Bank Word Development Indicators, the "Ease of Doing Business" project and EEAG calculations.
a)
Figure 5.22
114EEAG Report 2016
Chapter 5
erage salary level in 2014. The corresponding ratios 
for Albania were 17 and 7 percent, respectively. In 
2014, only Albania and Bulgaria had lower wages 
than Serbia and FYR Macedonia. It is worth noting 
that the average gross monthly salary in Greece in­
creased from 2008 to 2014. While Greek average gross 
salaries were below those of Slovenia in 2008, they 
surpassed them in 2014. The patterns are similar when 
one compares average net salaries.
In short, while WB countries still lag behind the Baltic 
states and some CESEE countries in terms of institu­
tional development, especially in terms of large enter­
prise restructuring and competition policy, they are 
certainly making progress towards becoming func­
tioning market economies. Albania, Serbia and 
Macedonia have managed to keep wages competitive­
ly low, while BiH and, especially, Croatia, are more 
expensive. 
5.6 Financial development patterns
The 1990s were very challenging for the financial sector 
in WB countries. Prior to the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, large state­owned banks were well­capital­
ised and liquid. With the failure of the reform in the 
late 1980s, all of the republics of that country entered 
into a period of hyperinflation. People lost confidence 
in the banking system. Dinar deposits, which before the 
crisis constituted roughly 50 percent of the deposit to­
tal (the other half of deposits were primarily denomi­
nated in Deutsche Marks), quickly lost value. On the 
other hand, banks lost the ability to repay hard cur­
rency deposits. As a result, these hard currency deposits 
were effectively frozen. In re­
sponse to the situation, the Slo­
venian government issued govern­
ment bonds and recapitalised its 
banks, thus preserving those 
banks headquartered in Slovenia 
that existed prior to the break­up 
of the country. While banks be­
came common­stock companies, 
Slovenia introduced measures that 
prevented foreign banking groups 
from taking control of their large 
banks (until recently). The Croa­
tian government also recapitalised 
its banks and preserved previously 
existing banking entities. However, 
recapitalisation was not sufficient 
– banks had to find foreign strategic partners. In Serbia 
and Montenegro hyperinflation was persistent and 
reached 3.7×1014 percent (a number of 37 with 13 zeros 
afterwards) in 1993.20 Large state banks became empty 
shells. In this environment, the citizens of Serbia and 
Montenegro were allowed to open private banks. Only 
a small amount of initial capital was required (just 
6,000 Deutsche Marks) and very lax supervision was 
imposed. Two private banks created a large pyramid 
scheme in which a large share of citizens lost their sav­
ings. In Albania, the collapse of a similar pyramid 
scheme led to the toppling of the government in 1997 
and to a popular revolt. While banking crises also oc­
curred in the Baltic and CESEE countries, they were 
not as severe as in the WB region. 
Inflation was a long standing problem for WB coun­
tries. With the normalisation of the political situation 
in the 2000s, the introduction of market reforms in the 
financial sector and an independent central banking 
function, inflation was gradually brought under con­
trol. In 2001, Serbia, Romania and Montenegro were 
still struggling to stabilise prices. By 2005 inflation was 
tamed in all sample countries apart from Serbia. FYR 
Macedonia even experienced deflation that year. By 
2008, however, inflation was on the rise again in the 
Baltics, Bulgaria and Montenegro among other coun­
tries as a result of a large increase in bank lending. 
The great recession led to a reduction in inflation in all 
16 countries including, in the past couple of years, in 
Serbia. Moreover, in 2014, 7 out of 16 countries in the 
sample entered into deflation (largely imported from 
the Eurozone). Arresting inflation in the WB states 
20 Year­on­year inflation only fell below 100 percent in 1996. Source: 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia.
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significantly boosted the credibility of the region’s 
central banks. 
In Figure 5.24 we present aggregate inflation, measured 
through the GDP deflator, in the period between 2005 
and 2014 for the 16 countries of our sample and for 
Germany, Greece and Spain. It is worth noting that, 
measured in the local currency, Serbia and Romania 
had the highest aggregate inflation in that period 
(92 and 85 percent, respectively). However, both coun­
tries substantially depreciated their currencies with re­
spect to the euro. This, in turn, helped them stay rela­
tively competitive, despite high inflation in the local 
currency. Additional depreciation in these two coun­
tries would be desirable in order to improve competi­
tiveness. On the other hand, due to the high level of eu­
roisation (especially in Serbia), substantial further de­
preciation would probably have a negative impact on 
financial stability. Besides, gross 
salaries in these countries are al­
ready lower than in most European 
countries in euro terms (see Figure 
5.23). Measured in terms of the 
change in prices expressed in eu­
ros, Albania had the smallest ag­
gregate inflation rate in that period 
among the 19 countries presented 
here (less than 7  percent in ag­ 
gregate). 
Apart from taming inflation, an­
other key reform in the financial 
sector was to completely restruc­
ture the banking system by allow­
ing the strong entry of Austrian, 
Italian, French, Greek, and even 
Hungarian and Slovenian banks 
into the region. The presence of 
reputable foreign banking groups 
helped to restore savers’ confi­
dence and brought in the know­
how needed. Moreover, since am­
ple money was available in 2001–
2008, and large returns on invest­
ment were expected, it became 
possible to obtain loans both for 
businesses and individuals.
Much of the bank ownership 
transformation in emerging Eu­
rope occurred between 1998 and 
2001.21 By 2001, the majority of 
assets were held by foreign­owned banks in all coun­
tries except in Albania, Serbia and Slovenia (compare 
Figure 5.25). Transformation of the banking system 
in Serbia started in 2001 with the Central Bank’s clo­
sure of the four largest state banks. In their place, for­
eign financial institutions were invited to start from a 
de­facto clean slate. By 2005, foreign banking groups 
dominated the market in all countries apart from 
Slovenia.22 
Domestic credit to the private sector is a frequently­
used measure of financial deepening. It refers to finan­
21 In the Baltics, the process of bank restructuring that involved the 
entry of Nordic banks into the region was largely completed by 1998. 
At that time, bank restructuring was just beginning in the other two 
regions. 
22 Long­resisted bank ownership transformation is currently under­
way in Slovenia. After the creation of the Bad Bank, the second larg­
est bank in Slovenia was sold to a consortium of foreign investors. 
The sale of the largest bank, Nova Ljubljanska Banka, seems 
imminent.
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cial resources provided to the private sector by finan­
cial corporations. Below we measure it as a fraction of 
GDP.23 In the boom period there was a significant fi­
nancial deepening in emerging Europe, especially in 
the Baltics, which was the first region to transform its 
banking system. The market first 
started to become shallower in 
that region after 2009, followed 
by most other countries after 
2011. Mild deepening only con­
tinued in the Czech Republic, 
FYR Macedonia, and the Slovak 
Republic, where the ratios of do­
mestic credit to the private sector 
were moderate to begin with (see 
Figure 5.26).
Table 5.3 summarises EU mem­
bership status, the monetary poli­
cy regime and the EMU accession 
date (where applicable) for the 
16 countries of emerging Europe 
in our sample. It is worth noting 
that, out of the 16 sample coun­
tries, 5 are currently members of 
the Eurozone, one has unilateral­
ly adopted the euro, two have cur­
rency boards, one has a formal 
currency peg and one uses the ex­
change rate with the euro as a 
nominal anchor. Five countries 
have adopted inflation targeting 
(IT) as a stated monetary policy.
23 Cottarelli et al. (2003), among others, 
study growth in the bank credit issued to 
the private sector in emerging Europe.
One of  the most important fea­
tures of  financial development 
in emerging Europe is the high 
level of  euroisation of  both 
loans and deposits in those 
coun tries that do not already use 
the euro as a legal tender (com­
pare Figure 5.27).
Deposits in Deutsche Marks 
were an important feature of  the 
former Yugoslavia’s banking sys­
tem for decades. After its collapse 
in the 1990s, the propensity to 
save in hard currency (first in 
Deutsche Marks and then in eu­
ros) became, if  anything, even 
stronger. This does not depend heavily on the type of 
exchange rate regime or the level of  inflation prevail­
ing in a country over an extended period of  time. The 
cases in point are Croatia and Serbia. In both coun­
tries deposit euroisation was very high in 2007 and in­
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EU and EMU accession date (if applicable) and monetary policy regimes 
 EU accession 
date 
Monetary policy 
regime adopted 
EMU 
accession date 
Albania – 
Inflation targeting (IT) 
since 2009 
– 
BiHa) – Currency board – 
Bulgaria 01/01/2007 Currency board – 
Croatia 01/07/2013 
Exchange rate as 
nominal anchor 
– 
Czech 
Republic 
01/05/2004  IT since 1997 – 
Estonia 01/05/2004 
Fixed exchange rate 
regime 
 before joining EMU 
 01/01/2011 
Hungary 01/05/2004 IT since 2001 – 
Latvia 01/05/2004 
Fixed exchange rate 
regime 
 before joining EMU 
 01/01/2014 
Lithuania 01/05/04 
Fixed exchange rate 
regime 
 before joining EMU 
 01/01/2015 
FYRb) 
Macedonia 
– Peg to euro – 
Montenegro – 
Unilateral introduction 
of euro as a legal tender 
– 
Poland 01/05/2004 IT since 1999 – 
Romania 01/01/2007 IT since 2005 – 
Serbia – IT since 2009 – 
Slovak 
Republic 
01/05/2004 
Implicit IT since 1999;  
 01/01/2009 
IT since 2005 
Slovenia 01/05/2004 
 Exchange rate anchor 
before joining EMU 
 01/01/2007 
a) Bosnia and Herzegovina. – b) Former Yugoslav Republic. 
Source: Jahan (2012) and National Banks' websites. 
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creased even further by 2014 (in Croatia, from 72.3 to 
82.3 percent, and in Serbia from 83.1 to 89.6 percent). 
At the same time, the monetary policy regime and in­
flation track record differ significantly in the two 
countries. Serbia has pursued inflation targeting since 
2009, while Croatia used the Deutsche Mark for 
many years and subsequently the euro as a nominal 
anchor. Serbia also had a history of  far higher infla­
tion than Croatia (13.6 versus 2.6 percent, on average 
per annum, for the period 2001–2014). Yet, in both 
countries people simply do not seem to trust their do­
mestic currency as a store of  value. Similarly, BiH has 
had a currency board since the 1990s, but slightly 
over half  of  its deposits are in a foreign currency (eu­
ros). Even those countries with the smallest level of 
euroisation in the WB region, namely FRY Mace­
donia and Albania, posted rather high levels of  de­
posit euroisation (42.8 and 45.9 percent, respectively) 
in 2014. 
In contrast to WB, deposit eurois­
ation is low in some CESEE coun­
tries, especially those with strong 
export industries: in December 
2014, deposit euroisation was only 
6.0 percent in Poland, 9.6 percent 
in the Czech Republic and 
17.7  percent in Hungary. While 
the Baltic countries are now in 
EMU, prior to joining the Euro­
zone the euroisation levels of de­
posits in these states had varied 
considerably: with Estonia at 
around 80 percent, Latvia around 
50 and Lithuania only around 
25 percent. 
A high level of  deposit euroisa­
tion increases the hard currency 
reserves of  a country. On the oth­
er hand, the euroisation of  do­
mestic deposits increases the de­
sire of  banks to issue hard cur­
rency­denominated loans in or­
der to match the currency struc­
ture of  assets and liabilities.24 If  
that is not legally allowed (as is 
the case in Serbia, for example), 
then the banks issue hard curren­
cy (mostly euro)­pegged loans. 
For such loans, interest rates are 
typically set based on a premium 
with respect to EURIBOR. Im­
portantly, monthly payments depend on the current 
level of  the nominal exchange rate between the an­
chor currency (the euro, for example) and the local 
currency.25 Even if  interest rates were fixed (or, in­
deed, small as was the case with Swiss franc­denomi­
nated mortgages), a sudden appreciation of  the an­
chor currency can still significantly constrain borrow­
ers’ ability to pay, if  borrower income is not hedged 
against such risks. For individuals taking out mort­
gages this is usually the case, since salaries are rarely 
pegged to hard currency. Thus, by issuing hard­cur­
rency­pegged loans banks reduce their exchange rate 
risk (which could potentially be hedged relatively eas­
ily) and create highly correlated potential credit 
events (which banks have more difficulty hedging 
against). 
24 Post­crisis regulation in some countries (e.g. Austria) is tilting to­
wards making domestic deposits the primary source of loan­issuance 
in a host country (instead of borrowing from the mother bank). 
25 See Božovic´ et al. (2009).
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There is, also, a demand side reason for issuing hard 
currency­pegged loans. Namely, loans pegged to the 
euro and, especially, to the Swiss franc traditionally 
had much lower interest rates than domestic curren­
cy loans. Part of  the reason for the large price differ­
ential (in Serbia, in particular) is the exchange rate 
risk that is priced into domestic currency loans. 
Moreover, in order to have long term loans in do­
mestic currency, a yield curve must exist that can be 
used for pricing such loans. Unfortunately, with the 
partial exception of  Croatia, domestic financial mar­
kets are highly underdeveloped in WB countries.26 
High levels of loan euroisation dramatically limit a cen­
tral bank’s scope to conduct independent monetary 
policy.27 Even if a country proclaims to be targeting in­
flation, a central bank policy rate can only directly im­
pact local currency­denominated loans. At the same 
time, a high level of loan euroisation imposes a limita­
tion on the exchange rate depreciation a country may 
allow without seriously impacting its financial stability. 
Thus, the highly euroised economies of WB bear many 
of the costs of being in the Eurozone, without any of 
the potential benefits of being the actual members.
High level of  loan euroisation is part of  the reason 
for high levels of  nonperforming loans (NPLs) in 
WB countries shown in Fig ure 5.28.28
Prior to the crisis (2004–2008) NPLs were over 10 per­
cent only in FYR Macedonia and Serbia out of the 
26 Generally, very low liquidity characterises all capital markets in the 
former Yugoslavia, especially in the period after the crisis. By con­
trast, Polish or Hungarian markets are significantly more liquid.
27 See discussion of Grga and Uroševic´ (2014) for the case of Serbia.
28 For a discussion of NPLs in emerging Europe, see European 
Banking Coordi nation Vienna Initiative (2012).
16 countries in our sample. In the 
period of 2009–2011, NPLs sig­
nificantly increased in most WB 
countries, and continued to grow 
in 2012–2014. Currently NPLs 
present a serious challenge for 
most WB countries, except FYR 
Mace donia where they are stable 
(around 10 percent).29 In particu­
lar, NPLs are now over 20 percent 
in both Serbia and Albania. It is 
instructive to compare the WB re­
gion with the Baltic experience. In 
particular, the Baltic region had 
very few NPLs in the boom peri­
od (2004–2008). In crisis times 
(2009–2011) NPLs in the region 
rose dramatically. After the crisis, unlike in the WB re­
gion, Baltic countries mostly cleaned up their bank 
balance sheets. 
High levels of  NPLs make it more difficult for banks 
to support economic growth. Loans are both less 
available and more expensive than in countries with 
low levels of  NPLs like the Czech Republic, Estonia 
and Slovakia, among others. One issue preventing 
the clean­up of  balance sheets in the WB states is the 
tax treatment of  bad loans. Currently, strategies are 
being devised to address NPLs in both Serbia and 
Albania. The situation is also difficult in Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania. In order to address both 
foreign­currency pegged loans and related high lev­
els of  NPLs, administrative measures in Hungary ef­
fectively halved loan euroisation rates from 50 to 
25 percent in March 2015.30 
Given the high levels of NPLs and the history of fi­
nancial crises in the 1990s, should we worry about the 
safety of WB banks? In order to answer that question 
let us first consider the level of loss coverage provi­
sions as a share of non­performing loans in 
Figure 5.29. This ratio shows the extent to which non­
performing loans are already covered by provisions. It 
turns out that in Serbia, a country with one of the 
highest levels of NPLs, banks cover more than the full 
amount of potential losses on average (i.e. the ratio is 
greater than 1). In contrast to Serbia, the loss coverage 
29 In some WB countries such as Serbia, one of the driving factors 
behind high levels of NPLs is large exposure of banks to a relatively 
small group of dominant market players which have financed fast ex­
pansion of their business empires by sharply increasing their 
leverage. 
30 Much of the problematic loans in Hungary were related to Swiss­
franc denominated loans.
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ratio is only around 55 percent in Albania. Thus, while 
NPLs are very high in both countries, this seems to be 
more of a real threat in Albania than in Serbia. 
The bank capital to assets ratio31 as shown in 
Figure 5.30 reflects the size of a bank’s financial cush­
ion and measures its ability to withstand a serious cri­
sis. Again, it is the banks in Serbia that have by far the 
highest capital buffer (over 20 percent) on average. In 
addition, while banks in most countries increased 
their bank capital buffers after the crisis, these buffers 
31 Bank capital to assets is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to 
total assets. Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, 
retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valua­
tion adjustments. Capital includes tier 1 capital (paid­up shares and 
common stock), which is a common feature in all countries’ banking 
systems, and total regulatory capital, which includes several specified 
types of subordinated debt instruments that need not be repaid if  the 
funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels (these com­
prise tier 2 and tier 3 capital). Total assets include all nonfinancial and 
financial assets. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
increased the most in the WB 
states and the least in the CESEE 
region. Since risks are higher than 
prior to the crisis, increases in 
capital buffers are prudent. 
However, they are also costly. A 
higher capital buffer means that 
less money remains available for 
investment in productive projects. 
In summary, WB countries have 
integrated into the European fi­
nancial system and have made 
substantial progress towards sta­
bilising prices and modernising 
their banking systems. On the 
other hand, high levels of NPLs 
and financial euroisation present serious challenges 
that need to be addressed in the future. While finan­
cial, insurance and private pension fund markets exist 
in most of the region’s countries, they do not (yet) play 
a significant role.
5.7 Coming Together
In the past, most of the WB was part of an economi­
cally and politically relatively strong country, Yugo­
slavia. It had a diversified economy and was well­inte­
grated into the world economy and the world commu­
nity of its time. The creation of several small, quarrel­
ling, inward­looking nation­states, several small mar­
kets for goods, services, and ideas in place of one larger 
vibrant market is clearly limiting the prospects of each 
and every country of WB. After 15 years of peace, the 
question is: what is the appropriate 
level of cooperation between these 
countries required for each of 
them to realise their full potential? 
Within the political elites, as well 
as much of the region’s popula­
tion, there is a consensus that the 
only way forward is for the WB 
countries to eventually join the 
EU: it is within this wider group 
of nations that they would be, in 
some way, reunited again. This 
makes sense for both political and 
economic reasons, especially 
since all of the countries of the 
WB region are either candidate 
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countries, or have already joined the EU (Croatia). 
They enjoy visa­free travel within the EU (with the ex­
ception of Kosovo); and have free trade agreements 
with each other and with the EU. However, there are 
challenges that would need to be addressed before the 
rest of the region can actually join the EU.
In the political arena, the key question is the same as 
that which led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia: the 
unresolved national aspirations of various ethnic 
groups. In the breaking up of Yugoslavia, administra­
tive lines drawn rather arbitrarily by former Com­
munist leaders were elevated to the status of national 
borders, regardless of the ethnic and religious makeup 
of these new nations.32 An exception was made in 
Kosovo, formerly an autonomous province of Serbia 
that was, as a result of NATO intervention, separated 
from it. There, the national makeup of the province 
(ethnic Albanians currently constitute the majority) 
was used to justify the secession. Serbia does not for­
mally recognise the secession of Kosovo, but de­facto 
increasingly cooperates with it. BiH does not formally 
recognise Kosovo either. Within BiH and FYR Mace­
donia there are strong forces pushing for their disinte­
gration along ethnic/religious lines. In addition, FYR 
Macedonia has a name dispute with Greece. Thus, 
neither borders nor the names of all WB countries are 
universally accepted as such. Forging a way forward 
requires finding a creative compromise that would re­
flect the legitimate interests of all parties involved. 
This is a difficult task. In the case of Kosovo, substan­
tial progress has been made in the past two years via 
EU­mediated talks, but care must be taken that both 
sides implement the agreements. 
Given its turbulent history, true progress in the re­
gion is only possible in the longer run if  the borders 
between WB countries increasingly become irrele­
vant, so that not only goods and services but also 
investments, people, culture and ideas can circulate 
freely across them. Instead of  Chinese walls between 
people, we suggest building new physical and human 
regional infrastructure. The process of  EU integra­
tion is certainly helpful in this respect.
Paramount to the destiny of the region is its economic 
development. No political arrangement can be stable 
32   The last Constitution of Yugoslavia, adopted in 1974, laid the foun­
dation for the country’s disintegration. It allowed the republics of 
Yugoslavia the right to self­determination, including secession from 
the country. On the other hand, it did not specify a constitutional 
mechanism for such a secession. This facilitated a bloody, rather than 
peaceful, separation in 1990s. It is worth notingin passing that the EU 
does not have specified mechanisms for a country to secede from the 
Union either (or from the Eurozone, for that matter). 
if  economies falter. The people of Yugoslavia lived 
peacefully together in times of prosperity. Problems 
came with the economic crisis in the late 1980s.33 The 
economic situation of WB region is currently fairly 
challenging. Large numbers of people are leaving it to 
move to the EU: while lower­qualified people (mostly 
of Albanian and Roma origin) are trying to become 
economic refugees, highly­qualified individuals are 
leaving on official work visas, resulting in a drain on 
the region’s scarce human capital. In addition, hun­
dreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East 
are using the Western Balkans route to go to Germany 
and other developed EU countries. This is creating 
growing tensions in EU and WB countries alike. In or­
der to prevent more problems and solve existing ones, 
the level of cooperation between all countries involved 
needs to rise dramatically. While it may be necessary 
to overhaul immigration and asylum rules, it is also 
important to preserve visa­free travel between EU and 
WB as one of the principal achievements of the 
European project. The stability of the WB is impor­
tant for the stability of EU, and not just vice­versa, 
since the region is simply too close to be ignored. It is 
also the gateway to the East.
While some of the transition toward a functioning 
market economy has been completed in all of the WB 
countries, much more work needs to be done in terms 
of improving the efficiency of public institutions, im­
proving physical and financial infrastructure, the gov­
ernance of large companies, and levelling off  the com­
petitive playing field. 
Instead of efficiently serving citizens, public institu­
tions in the WB region are the principal source of em­
ployment for the political party members (and their 
friends and family). This needs to fundamentally 
change. As Slovakia’s example shows, it is possible to 
simultaneously reduce costs and greatly improve the 
quality of public institutions by introducing principles 
of efficiency at all levels of administration. Stream­
lining procedures, using new technologies and reduc­
ing the number of less productive public employees 
while, at the same time, increasing the motivational 
pay of the most productive workers is one way 
forward.
In most WB countries infrastructure needs to be up­
graded significantly. For a long time, there was a talk 
of building Corridor 10 that would connect Hungary 
33 Similarly, Europeans seem to be increasingly moving away from 
the idea of the continent’s closer integration as a result of the pro­
tracted economic crisis.
121 EEAG Report 2016
Chapter 5
and Serbia with the Adriatic port of Bar in Mon­
tenegro. It is a high time for this project to be execut­
ed. Several other regional infrastructural projects also 
need to be completed. In addition, a lot more needs to 
be done to protect the environment by reducing ener­
gy consumption, by producing cleaner energy and by 
recycling (in all these areas Croatia is significantly 
ahead of the curve in the region). Closely related to 
improving infrastructure is the issue of restructuring 
large public companies which is, in most WB coun­
tries, seriously lagging behind the Baltics and some of 
the CESEE countries. Large public companies serve 
as rent­extraction devices for the political class. Non­
economic employment in such companies is also used 
to buy social peace. Difficult economic situations and 
the requirements of EU integration are making it in­
creasingly clear to the top politicians in the region 
that, however painful, the restructuring and profes­
sionalisation of management of these companies sim­
ply has to proceed. Electrical power utilities and the 
railroad systems seem to be particularly inefficient.
Financial infrastructure also needs a significant up­
grade. Banks need to clean up their balance sheets and 
rid themselves of excessive NPL baggage, so that they 
can resume lending to potentially productive compa­
nies. The high level of euroisation also needs to be ad­
dressed as far as possible. Unfortunately, no quick fix­
es are possible without risking large disturbances in an 
already fragile financial sector. Painful memories of 
hyperinflation and lost savings are still very strong in 
people’s minds. In the longer run, low, predictable lev­
els of inflation in the local currency would help to in­
crease the local­currency deposit base. Even if  this is 
achieved, however, as we have seen in case of Croatia, 
euroisation may be quite persistent. In Serbia, adver­
tising and trade in real estate and other expensive 
items in foreign currencies instead of the local curren­
cy is also contributing to the high level of euroisation. 
In line with EU policy, such practices may have to be 
prohibited. In many cases, people are also unaware of 
the risks inherent in foreign­currency pegged loans. 
Such risks should be much more clearly communicat­
ed to the general public by both regulators and the fi­
nancial industry. Preferential tax treatment of domes­
tic currency deposits and the differential capital cost 
of foreign and domestic currency loans may also be 
helpful instruments. Other, more forceful administra­
tive measures such as banning the issuance of new un­
hedged foreign exchange or foreign exchange­pegged 
loans should also be considered.
If  the financial system is to truly support the creation 
of a vibrant regional economy, however, far more 
needs to be done. The region’s current bank­driven 
system leaves little room for innovative start­ups to be 
financed. The creation of regional financial markets 
(they currently only exist in a rudimentary form, ex­
cept to a certain extent, in Croatia), and regional ven­
ture funds and angel investor firms would be very use­
ful in tapping into the productive potential of the WB 
population. To this end, it would be helpful to system­
atically spread information on innovative firms in the 
region via social networks and the web. 
Another area where the WB countries are lagging be­
hind is in ensuring a level competitive playing field. 
Favouritism takes many forms. During the privatisa­
tion process, the rules were often designed to favour 
certain market players (typically, those with the best 
political connections). These large players effectively 
divided the spoils of privatisation between themselves, 
leaving a substantial share of WB economies in dire 
straits. In Serbia, large retailers typically enjoy far 
higher margins than in the West. Consumers not only 
pay more, but are often offered a poorer selection of 
inferior quality goods.34 On a more positive note, 
Serbia is quite open to both investment and trade: the 
largest retail chain in Serbia is Belgian­owned, while 
the second largest is Croatian­owned. By contrast, the 
market in Croatia is generally more competitive than 
in Serbia. However, Croatia discourages, albeit unof­
ficially, Serbian­owned businesses from entering the 
Croatian market. Overall, however, investment and 
trade between WB countries is increasing, driven by 
the regional free trade (CEFTA) agreement brokered 
by the EU. While the EU is the leading trading partner 
of the WB nations, the region itself  is the second most 
important export market for most of them. Never­
theless, far more needs to be done if  a truly competi­
tive regional market is to become a reality in the 
Western Balkans.
We believe that cooperation between WB countries 
needs to go beyond just free trade and investments. In 
the next step of the integration process, prior to EU ac­
cession (and, perhaps, as a test of its viability), we pro­
pose a significant deregulation of labour laws and the 
creation of an integrated labour market in the WB re­
gion as an extension of the CEFTA agreement. For in 
small, fragmented economies, it is often hard to find 
people with the right skills and expertise. As a result, 
34 The average quality of goods sold seems to have declined since the 
break­up of the former Yugoslavia due to the abandonment of DIN 
standards.
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many ideas are never realised. If  
people were able to look for jobs 
across the region, this would, con­
trary to popular fears, reduce un­
employment over time by encour­
aging firms to think regionally.35 It 
would also facilitate growth. If all 
of the WB countries were to par­
ticipate in this process, a common 
market of 20 million people, with 
rules and business practices grad­
ually harmonised with the EU, 
would be much more attractive to 
investors than each of the small 
WB markets taken separately. 
Such a common market would 
also brighten the region’s pros­
pects of eventually integrating with the EU. Croatia, 
the most developed country of the Western Balkans 
and already an EU member, could serve as a natural 
bridge between the region and the EU. 
Institutions of higher learning could play an impor­
tant role in supporting the creation of a regional la­
bour market, as this would give universities in the WB 
region an incentive to reach out to the entire region 
(and beyond), and not just to their small, local com­
munities. This would dramatically improve the quality 
of universities, as well as their relevance to society. 
Given that the number of young people in the region 
is diminishing, and that many leave to study in Western 
countries and often never return, regionalisation may 
be necessary for these universities to survive and de­
velop. Apart from potentially reducing the brain­drain 
from the region, regionalisation of the education pro­
cess would be helpful to combat prejudices between 
various national and religious groups and could open 
up the possibility of gradually lowering regional 
tensions. 
Improving the education process at all levels, with a 
shift away from learning by rote and towards solving 
real­life problems, and using the best regional and 
world practices to do so, has to become a regional pri­
ority. Given WB population trends, most future 
growth will have to come from increasingly higher val­
ue­added activities, and not from activities that re­
quire ample cheap labour. Estonia is an excellent ex­
ample of a country that has implemented swift, yet 
well­thought out reforms in education. It is the first 
35 This may be politically challenging but, unlike in the EU, most 
people in the former Yugoslavia can communicate in their own 
language(s) with each other without any difficulty. 
country in the world, for example, to incorporate a pi­
oneering computer­based method of teaching math in 
schools. There, students learn necessary math con­
cepts by posing and solving interesting and challeng­
ing real­life problems. In doing so they use highly so­
phisticated, but user­friendly, computer technology. 
As a result of its varied educational reforms, Estonia 
ranks very highly in global PISA scores. Good educa­
tion over time leads to innovations. Skype, one of the 
world’s leading communication platforms, was largely 
developed in Estonia.
The Western Balkans has significant potential to fur­
ther develop and fully exploit its human capital. For 
example, Serbia ranks first among the 16 countries of 
our sample in terms of the average share of Information 
and Computer Technology (ICT) of total services ex­
ports (36.5 percent, compare Figure 5.31).36 
A growing number of Microsoft products for the 
world market have been developed in the Microsoft 
Development Center Serbia in Belgrade, one of the 
leading employers of software engineers in the coun­
try. Several Western financial firms are outsourcing 
back office work to companies that operate in 
Belgrade. Increasingly, due to improvements in quan­
titative finance education in the country, Serbian firms 
are being asked not only to code, but also to develop 
trading strategies, risk management models, etc., i.e. 
to work up the value chain. Regional software firms 
36 Another country in which ICT services exports account for over 
30 percent of services exports (on average) is Romania (32.1 percent). 
Among WB countries, the second place in that category is held by 
FRY Macedonia (24.1 percent). It is worth noting that export of ICT 
services (software) is relatively far more important for WB countries 
than the export of ICT hardware. The latter is the most important for 
Hungary. 
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are developing proprietary products for various niche 
software markets around the world. A Croatian firm 
has developed and is successfully marketing one of the 
best trams on the world market. Similar examples can 
be found elsewhere in the region.
Another area that could be greatly improved in the fu­
ture is agriculture. In several areas of WB there are ex­
ceptional conditions for the development in this area. 
Focusing on higher­value­added activities such as or­
ganic production could be a key future strategy for re­
gional agriculture. 
To dramatically improve the lives of the people in the 
WB region, their economic and political leaders need 
to show both courage and commitment to significant­
ly improving institutions, tearing down regional barri­
ers, and creating a level playing field in terms of com­
petition. This may well prove harder than it sounds 
since those in power at every level in the region are 
used to exploiting that power to extract rents. This is 
why the EU accession process offers the most poten­
tial benefits for the region’s population, as pressure 
from Europe may be needed to speed up the process. 
On the other hand, as recent events amply demon­
strate, the EU itself  is experiencing a deep structural 
crisis and cannot be seen as a universal panacea for 
the WB region’s problems. The desire to truly reform 
and build a better life for the region’s people has to 
come from within the region itself. There are some 
hopeful signs that this gradually seems to be dawning 
on regional leaders. If  they pursue reforms, the 
Western Balkans may yet become a regional develop­
ment pole, instead of a potential source of instability. 
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